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NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) w1ll be re-"Jt. .d,_ . ..,_,eased, as 1s being done in connection with this case, at the time 
U ~ ihe opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion 
k ~
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for 
• he convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber 
~ o., 200 U.S. 321, 337. rv-~e -S-
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATffi 
~7T$ ~~ tc.1 ,:~~ ~ 
~~;/~Y3_a~ 
-L_r.JJ 
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS v. 
?k.~~~ ~~~-n., 
CERTIORARl TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE dM,. 
FIFTH CIRCUIT 
~,>. 
No. 79-1764. Argued December 9, 1980-Decided March 4, 1981 
Respe,ndent filed suit in Federal District Court, alleging, inter al.ia, that 
her termination of employment with petitioner was predicated on gender 
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
The District Court found that the testimony for petitioner sufficiently 
had rebutted respo!!dent's allegation of gender discrimination in the 
decision to terminate her employment. The Court of Appeals reversed 
this finding, holding that the defendant in a Title VII case bears the 
burden e,f proving by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment action and also 
must prove by objective evidence that those hired were better qualified 
than the plaintiff, and that the testimony for petitioner did not carry 
either of these burdens. 
Held: When the plaintiff in a Title VII case has proved a prima facie 
case of empioyment discr..mination, the defendant bears only the burden 
of explaining clearly the nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Pp. 
4-11 
(a) As set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 
792, the basic allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof 
in a Tit!e VII case, is as follows. First, the plaintiff has the burden of 
proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of 
discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima 
facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legi-
timate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." Id., at 
802. Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must 
then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the leg;timate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true 
reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. The defendant need not 
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Syllabus 
reasons, but it is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine 
issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff. To 
accomplish this, the defendant must clearly set forth, through the in-
troduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff's rejec-
tion. Pp. 4-6. 
(b) The Court of Appeals erred by requiring petitioner to prove by 
a preponderance of the evidence the existence of nondiscriminatory rea-
sons for terminating respondent. By doing this, the court required 
much more than is required by McDonnell Douglas, supra, and its 
progeny: it placed on petitioner the burden of persuading the court 
that it had convincing, objective reasons for preferring the chosen 
applicant above the respondent. Limiting the defendant's evidentiary 
obligation to a burden of production will not unduly hinder the plain-
tiff. Pp. 7-9. 
(c) The Court of Appeals a)so erred in requiring petitioner to prove 
by objective evidence that the person hired was more qualified than 
respondent. It is the plaintiff's task to demonstrate that similarly 
situated employees were not treated equally, but the Court of Appeals' 
rule would require the employer to show that the plaintiff's objective 
qualifications were inferior to those of the person selected, and if it 
cannot, a court would, in effect, conclude that it has discriminated. 
The Court of Appeals' views can also be read as requiring the em-
ployer to hire the minority or female applicant whenever that person's 
objective qualifications were equal to those of a white male applicant. 
But Title VII does not obligate an employer to accord this preference. 
Rather, the employer has discretion to choose among equally qualified 
candidates, provided the decision is not based upon unlawful criteria. 
Pp. 9-10. 
608 F. 2d 563, vacated and remanded. 
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 
,, 
' 
NOTICE: Thts optnton ts subject to formal revtston before pubUcatton 
tn the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are re-
quested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the 
United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other 
formal errors, In order that corrections may be made before the pre-
liminary l)rint goes to press. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 79-1764 
Texas Department of Community] On Writ of Certiorari to 
Affairs, Petitioner, the United States Court 
v. of Appeals for the Fifth 
Joyce Ann Burdine. Circuit. 
[March 4, 1981] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case requires us to address again the nature of the 
evidentiary burden placed upon the defendant in an em-
ployment discrimination suit brought under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C. § 2000e et seq. The nar-
row question presented is whether, after the plaintiff has 
proved a prima facie case of discriminatory treatment, the 
burden shifts to the defendant to persuade the court by a 
preponderance of the evidence that legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reasons for the challenged employment action existed. 
I 
Petitioner, the Texas Department of Community Affairs 
(TDCA), hired respondent, a female, in January 1972, for 
the position of accounting clerk in the Public Service Careers 
Division (PSC). PSC provided training and employment 
opportunities in the public sector for unskilled workers. 
When hired, respondent possessed several years' experience in 
employment training. She was promoted to Field Services 
Coordinator in July 1972. Her supervisor resigned in No-
vember of that year, and respondent was assigned additional 
duties. Although she applied for the supervisor's position of 
Project Director, the position remained vacant for six months. 
PSC was funded completely by the United States Depart-
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ment of Labor. The Department was seriously concerned 
about inefficiencies at PSC.1 In February, 1973, the Depart-
ment notified the Executive Director of TDCA, B. R. Fuller, 
that it would terminate PSC the _following month. TDCA 
officials, assisted by respondent, persuaded the Department to 
continue funding the program, conditioned upon PSC re-
forming its operations. Among the agreed conditions were 
the appointment of a permanent Project Director and a com-
plete reorganization of the PSC staff.2 
After consulting with personnel within TDCA, Fuller hired 
a male from another division of the agency as Project Direc-
tor. In reducing the PSC staff, he fired respondent along 
with two other employees, and retained another male, Walz, as 
the only professional employee in the division. It is undis-
puted that respondent had maintained her application for the 
position of Project Director and had requested to remain with 
TDCA. Respondent soon was rehired by TDCA and as-
signed to another division of the agency. She received the 
exact salary paid to the Project Director at PSC, and the sub-
sequent promotions she has received have kept her salary and 
responsibility commensurate with what she would have re-
ceived had she been appointed Project Director. 
Respondent filed this suit in the United States Distr:ct 
Court for the Western District of Texas. She alleged that 
the failure to promote and the subsequent decision to ter-
minate her had been predicated on gender discrimination in 
violation of Title VII. After a bench trial, the District Court 
held that neither decision was based on p;ender discrimination. 
The court relied on the testimony of Fuller that the employ-
ment decisions necessitated by the commands of the Depart-
1 Among the problems identified were overstaffing, lack of fiscal control, 
poor bookkeeping, lack of communication among PSC staff, and the lack 
of a full-time project director. Letter of March 20, 1973 from Charles 
Johnson to B. R. Fuller, reprinted in App., at 38-40. 
2 See id., at 39. 
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ment of Labor were based on consultation among trusted 
advisors and a nondiscriminatory evaluation of the relative 
qualifications of the individuals involved. He testified that 
the three individuals terminated did not work well together, 
and that TDCA thought that eliminating this problem would 
improve PSC's efficiency. The court accepted this explana-
tion as rational and, in effect, found no evidence that the 
decisions not to promote and to terminate respondent were 
prompted by gender discrimination. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed in part. 
608 F. 2d 563 (1979). The court held that the District 
Court's "implicit evidentiary finding" that the male hired as 
Project Director was better qualified for that position than 
respondent was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the court 
affirmed the District Court's finding that respondent was not 
discriminated against when she was not promoted. The 
Court of Appeals, however, reversed the District Court's find-
ing that Fuller's testimony sufficiently had rebutted respond-
ent's prima facie case of gender discrimination in the decision 
to terminate her employment at PSC. The court reaffirmed 
its previously announced views that the defendant in a Title 
VII case bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence the existence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons 
for the employment action and that the defendant also must 
prove by objective evidence that those hired or promoted were 
better qualified than the plaintiff. The court found that 
Fuller's testimony did not carry either of these evidentiary 
burdens. It, therefore, reversed the judgment of the District 
Court and remanded the case for computation of backpay.3 
Because the decision of the Court of Appeals as to the bur-
den of proof borne by the defendant conflicts with interpreta-
tions of our precedents adopted by other courts of appeals/ 
3 The Court of Appeals also vacated the District Court's judgment that 
petitioner did not violate Title VII's equal pay provision, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000e-2 (h), but that decision is not challenged here. 
4 See, e. g., Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F. 2d 60 (CA2 1980); Jackson v. 
U. S. Steel Corp., 624 F. 2d 436 (CA3 1980); Ambush v. Montgomery 
~ 
'i 
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we granted certiorari - U. S. - (1980). We now vacate 
the Fifth Circuit's decision and remand for application of the 
correct standard. 
II 
In McDonnell Douglas Cnrp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), 
we set forth the basic allocation of burdens and order of pres-
entation of proof in a Title VII case alleging discriminatory 
treatment.5 First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by -the preponderance of the evidence a prima f acie case of dis-
crimination. ~ d, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the 
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant "to artic-
ulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the em-
ployee's rejection." Id., at 802. Thirj , should the defendant 
carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity 
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legiti-
mate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true 
reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. Id., at 804. 
The nature of the burden that shifts to the defendant 
should be understood in light of the plaintiff's ultimate and 
intermediate burdens. The ultimate burden of persuading ~ 
~ the trier of fact that the defendan(fntentionally discriminated 
against the plaintiff remains at all time with the plaintiff. 
~ Board of Trustees of K_eene State College v. Sw~eney: 439 
U. S. 24, 25, n. 2 (1979); id., at 29 (STEVENS, J., d1ssentmg). 
See generally 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2489 (3d ed. 1940) (the 
burden of persuasion "never shifts"). The McDonnell Doug-
las division of intermediate evidentiary burdens serves to 
County Government, 22 FEP Cases 1101 (CA4 1980) ; Loeb v. Textron, 
Inc., 600 F .2d 1003 (CAl 1979). But see Vaughn v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 620 F. 2d 655 (CA8 1980), cert. pending, No. 80-276. 
5 We have recognized that the factual issues, and therefore the character 
of the evidence presented, differ when the plaintiff claims that a facially 
neutral employment policy has a discriminatory impact on protected 
classes. See McDonnell Douglas, supra, 411 U. S., at 802, n. 14; Team-
&ters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 335-336, and n. 15 (1977). 
~~,(,,,-
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bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to 
this ultimate question. 
The burden of establishing a prima f acie case of disparate 
treatment is not onerous. The plaintiff ~ ust ....,Erg,ve by a 
proponderence of the evidence that she applie"d for an avail-
able position, for which she was gualified, but was rejected I 
under circl!!?stances which give rise to an inference of unl~w- i 
ful discrimination.6 The prima facie case serves an important 
~ litigation: it eliminates the most common 
nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. See 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 & n. 44 (1977). 
As the Court explained in Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 
438 U. S. 567, 577 (1978), the prima facie case "raises an 
inference of discrimination only "because we presume these 
ltct s, 1£ otne~se un explained, are more likely than not based 
on the consideration of impermissible factors." Establish-
ment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption 
that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the em-
ployee. If the trier of fact believes the plaintiff's evidence, 
and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, 
0 McDonnell Douglas, supra, we described an appropriate model for 
a prima facie case of racial discrimination. The plaintiff must show: 
"(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was 
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; 
(iii) that, despite his qualification, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after 
his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to 
seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications." 411 U. S., 
at 802. 
We added, however, that this standard is not inflexible, as "[t]he facts 
necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification above 
of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily appli-
cable in every respect in differing factual situations." Id., at 802, n. 13. 
In the instant case, it is not seriously contested that respondent has 
proved a prima facie case. She showed that she was a qualified woman 
who sought an available position, but the position was left open for several 
months before she finally was rejected in favor of a male who had been 
under her supervision. 
-~~ 
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the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no 
issue of fact remains in the case.1 
The burden that shifts to the defendant, therefore, is to 
rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evi-
dence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was pre-
ferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The de-
fendant need not persuade the court that it was actually mo-
tivated by the proffered reasons. See Sweeney, supra, at 25. 
It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine 
issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plain-
tiff. 8 To accomplish this, the defendant must clearly set 
forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the 
reasons for the plaintiff's rejection.9 The explanation pro-
vided must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the 
defendant. If the defendant carries this burden of produc-
( 
1 The phrase "prima facie case" may denote not only the establishment 
of a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumgtion, but also may be used by 
I 
courts to describe the pliinfiff 's 'Eiurden of producing enough evidence to 
permit the trier of fact to infer the fact at issue. 9 Wigmore, Evidence 
§ 2494 (3d ed. 1940). McDonnell Douglas should have made it apparent 
that in the Title VII context we use "prima facie case" in the former 
sense. 
8 This evidentiary relationship between the presumption created by a 
prima facie case and the consequential burden of production placed on the 
defendant is a traditional feature of the common law. "The word 'pre-
1 sumption' properly used refers only to a device for allocating the pro-
l duction burden." F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure § 7.9, at 255 
(2d ed. 1977) (footnote omitted). See Fed. Rule Evid. 301. See gener-
ally 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2491 (3d Ed. 1940) . Cf. J . Maguire, Evi-
dence, Common Sense and Common Law, 185-186 (1947). Usually, as-
sessing the burden of production helps the judge determine whether the 
litigants have created an issue of fact to be decided by the jury. In a 
Title VII case, the allocation of burdens and the creation of a presumption 
by the establishment of a prima facie case is intended progressively to 
sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional 
discrimination. 
9 An articulation not admitted into evidence will not suffice. Thus, the 
defendant cannot meet its burden merely through an answer to the com-
plaint or by argument of counsel. 
1 
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tion, the presumption raised by the prima f acie case is re-
butted,10and the factual inquiry proceds to a new level of 
specificity. Placing this burden of production on the defend-
ant thus serves simultaneously to meet the plaintiff's prima 
facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the action and 
to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the 
plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate 
pretext. The sufficiency of the defendant's evidence should 
be evaluated by the extent to which it fulfills these functions. 
The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. She now 
must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered 
reason was not the true reason for the employment decision. 
This burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuad-
ing the court that she has been the victim of intentional dis-
crimination. She may succeed in this either directly by per-
suading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely 
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the 
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. 
See McDonnell Douglas, supra, at 804-805. 
III 
In reversing the judgment of the District Court that the 
discharge of respondent from PSC was unrelated to her sex, 
the Court of Appeals adhered to two rules it had developed 
to elaborate the defendant's burden of proof. First, the de-
fendant must prove by a preponderence of the evidence that 
10 See generally J. Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 346 (1898). 
In saying that the presumption drops from the case, we do not imply that 
the trier of fact no longer may consider evidence previously introduced by 
the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case. A satisfactory explanation by 
the defendant destroys the legally mandatory inference of discrimination 
arising from the plaintiff's initial evidence. Nonetheless, this evidence 
and inferences· properly drawn therefrom may be considered by the trier 
of fact on the issue of whether the defendant's explanation is pretextual. 
Indeed, there may be some cases where the palintiff's initial evidence, com-
bined with effective cross-examination of the defendant, will suffice to 
discredit the defendant's expalnation. 
'i 
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legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the discharge existed. 
608 F. 2d, at 567. See Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 
F. 2d 1251, 1255 (CA5 1977). Second, to satisfy this burden, 
the defendant "must prove that those he hired ... were 
somehow better qualified than was plaintiff; in other words, 
comparative evidence is needed." 608 F. 2d, at 567 (empha-
sis in original). See East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F. 2d 332, 
339-340 (CA5 1975). 
A 
The Court of Appeals has misconstrued the nature of the 
burden that McDonnell Douglas and its progeny place on the 
defendant. See Part II, supra. We stated in Sweeney that 
"the employer's burden is satisfied if he simply 'explains what 
he has done' or 'produc[es] evidence of legitimate nondis-
criminatory reasons.'" 439 U. S., at 25, n. 2, quoting id., 
at 28, 29 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). It is plain that the Court 
of Appeals required much more: it placed on the defendant 
the burden of persuading the court that it had convincing, 
objective reasons for preferring the chosen applicant above 
the plaintiff.11 
The Court of Appeals distinguished Sweeney on the ground 
that the case held only that the defendant did not have the 
11 The court reviewed the defendant's evidence and explained its 
deficiency: 
"Defendant failed to introduce comparative factual data concerning 
Burdine and Walz. Fuller merely testified that he discharged and re-
tained personnel in the spring shakeup at TDCA primarily on the recom-
mendations of subordinates and that he considered Walz qualified for the 
position he was retained to do. Fuller failed to specify any objective 
criteria on which he based the decision to discharge Burdine and retain 
Walz. He stated only that the action was in the best interest of the 
program and that there had been some friction within the department that 
might be alleviated by Burdine's discharge. Nothing in the record indi-
cates whether he examined Walz' ability to work well with others. This 
court in East found such unsubstantiated assertions of "qualification" and 
"prior work record" insufficient absent data that will allow a true com-
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burden of proving the absence of discriminatory intent. But 
this distinction slights . the rationale of Sweeney and of our 
other cases. We have stated consistently that the employee's 
prima facie case of discrimination will be rebutted if the em-
ployer articulates lawful reasons for the action; that is, to 
satisfy this intermediate burden, the employer need only pro-
duce admissible evidence which would allow the trier of fact 
rationally to conclude that the employment decision had not 
been motivated by discriminatory animus. The Court of Ap-
peals would require the defendant to introduce evidence 
which, in the absence of any evidence of pretext, would 
persuade the trier of fact that the employment action was 
lawful. This exceeds what properly can be demanded to 
satisfy a burden of production. 
The court placed the burden of persuasion on the defend-
ant apparently because it feared that "[i] f an employer need 
only articulate-not prove-a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for his action, he may compose fictitious, but legiti-
mate, reasons for his actions." Turner v. Texas Instruments, 
Inc., supra, at 1255 (emphasis in original). We do not be-
lieve, however, that limiting the defendant's evidentiary obli-
gation to a burden of production will unduly hinder the plain-
tiff. First, as noted above, the defendant's explanation of its 
legitimate reasons must be clear and reasonably specific. 
Supra, at 5-6. See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F. 2d 1003, 
1011-1012, n. 5 (CAl 1979). This obligation arises both from 
the necessity of rebutting the inference of discrimination aris-
ing from the prima facie case and from the requirement that 
the plaintiff be afforded "a full and fair opportunity" to 
demonstrate pretext. Second, although the defendant does 
not bear a formal burden of persuasion, the defendant never-
theless retains an incentive to persuade the trier of fact that 
the employment decision was lawful. Thus, the defendant 
normally will attempt to prove the factual basis for its expla-
nation. Third, the liberal discovery rules applicable to any 
civil suit in federal court are supplemented in a Title VII suit 
11 
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by the plaintiff's access to the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission's investigatory files concerning her complaint. 
See EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., - U. S. -
(1981). Given these factors, we are unpersuaded that the 
plaintiff will find it particularly difficult to prove that a prof-
fered explanation lacking a factual basis is a pretext. We 
remain confident that the McDonnell Dougl,as framework 
permits the plaintiff meriting relief to demonstrate inten-
tional discrimination. 
B 
The Court of Appeals also erred in requiring the defendant 
to prove by objective evidence that the person hired or 
promoted was more qualified than the plaintiff. McDonnell 
Douglas teaches that it is the plaintiff's task to demonstrate 
that similarly situated employees were not treated equally. 
411 U. S., at 804. The Court of Appeals' rule would require 
the employer to show that the plaintiff's objective qualifi-
cations were inferior to those of the person selected. If 
it cannot, a court would, in effect, conclude that it has 
discriminated. 
The court's procedural rule harbors a substantive error. 
Title VII prohibits all discrimination in employment based 
upon race, sex and national origin. "The broad, overriding 
interest, shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is effi-
cient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair 
and ... neutral employment and personnel decisions." Mc-
Donnel Dougl,as, supra, at 801. Title VII, however, does not 
demand that an employer give preferential treatment to mi-
norities or women. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (j). See Steel-
workers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193, 205-206 ( 1979). The stat-
ute was not intended to "diminish traditional management 
prerogatives." Id., at 207. It does not require the employer 
to restructure his employment practices to maximize the num-
ber of minorities and women hired. Furnco Construction Co. 
v. Waters, 438 U. S., at 577-578. 
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,, 
The views of the Court of Appeals can be read, we think, as 
requiring the employer to hire the minority or female appli-
cant whenever that person's objective qualifications were 
equal to those of a white male applicant. But Title VII does 
not obligate an employer to accord this preference. Rather, 
the employer has discretion to choose among equally quali-
fied candidates, provided the decision is not based upon un-
lawful criteria. The fact that a court may think that the 
employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does 
not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this 
may be probative of whether the employer's reasons are pre-
texts for discrimination. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., supra, at 
1012, n. 6; see Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F. 2d 60, 65 (CA2 
1980). 
IV 
In summary, the Court of Appeals erred by requiring the 
defendant to prove by a preponderence of the evidence the 
existence of nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating the 
respondent and that the person retained in her stead had 
superior objective qualifications for the position.12 When the 
plaintiff has proved a prima facie case of discrimination, the 
defendant bears only the burden of explaining clearly the 
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The judgment of 
the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
12 Because the Court of Appeals applied the wrong legal standard to the 
evidence, we have no occasion to decide whether it erred in not review-
ing the District Court's finding of no intentional discrimination under 
the "clearly erroneous" standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 (a). 
Addressing this issue in this case would be inappropriate because the 
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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
fAbE~eF~ 19, 1982 Conference 
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l.o M-0~ 
No. 81-1044 
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE 
BOARD OF GOVERNORS 
v. 
LOUIS H. AIKENS 
Cert to CADC 
(Wilkey, Wald, Edwards) 
(Wilkey, dissenting) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Did the CADC err in holding that a prima 
facie case under Title VII is established when an employee shows 
that he is a member of a minority group, applied for a promotion, 
possessed the minimum qualifications for the position, but the 
promotion went to someone else, not a member of a minority. 
Gr~· {lft '/X!__ (~ <!AS-) ~ ~ ~ ~ 
1kL /!Ille ~ bi:/ <L5 f ri'U<.A...- f c..<L ~ "-"-' f""o-,,,, a +o;-;;,_,_) 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Resp, a black retired 
Postal Service employee, brought this suit in DCDC on Feb., 1977, 
alleging that his employer had discriminated against him on the 
basis of race by denying him certain details 
violation of Title VII. The trial court found 
offered and refused several romotions 
1966 and 1974. For 
been 
between 
trial that he had 
to have to up o 
would "hate 
ersonnel in order to take over a new 
division." The trial judge found that the experiences resp might 
have gained in the positions he refused would have given him a 
considerable advantage in being considered for other positions. 
Resp claimed that he was denied four promotions or 
"details" between Jan. 17, 1973, and Jan. 12, 1974. The trial judge 
concluded that resp had ~ 
"produced no evidence that he was treated any differently ~ 
because of his race~ During the period in question, other 
blacks as well as whites were promoted or detailed to 
positions above resp. A black was selected for the 
positlon of Postmaster of the District of Co1um5la in ,O~~ 
January, 19/~osition which plaintiff contends he was y-, · --
not selected for because of his race. ~
"During the period covered by this complaint and 
continuing to the present, there was a considerable 
increase in the number of black emplo ees occupying high 
leve positions in the 1s o Columbia Post Office. 
At the present time almost all high level positions are 
held by blacks." 
The trial court noted that resp had produced no "evidence --
of specific acts of discrimination against him" @ "~hat resp 
produced no credible evidence that he was as qualified or more 
qualified than other individuals who were detailed or promoted above 
-
3. 
him." The trial judge concluded that resp had failed to establish a 
prima facie case. 
Over Judge Wilkey's dissent, the CADC reversed, holding 
that a Title VII pltf, establishing a Title VII case, need not show 
that he is as qualified or more qualifed than the person actually 
selected for a promotion. Instead, a pltf need only show that (1) 
he was a member of a minority; (2) he applied for, and was denied, a 
promotion for which he was qualified; and (3) the promotion went to 
someone who was not a minority. 
The SG filed a petn for cert, requesting that the judgment 
be vacated and the case remanded in light of Texas Department of w..,(_ 
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). On June 29,~ 
1981, the Court (Justices Brennan and Marshall dissenting) granted p'y(....I 
the petn, vacated, and remanded in light of Burdine. ~
On Sept. 8, 1981, in a per curiam, the CADC reaffirmed it 
earlier holding, though it noted that the "minimum" qualifications 
would not be sufficient if the employer indicated he preferred or 
required additional qualifications. The CADC remanded to the DC for 
it to determine whether petr had the qualifications desired by the 
employer (if so, a prima facie case had been established). 
3. CONTENTIONS: The SG argues that the CADC's decision/ 
is inconsistent with this Court's decisions developing the prima ~ 
facie, including Burdine, and creates a split between the CADC and 
the CA9 & CAlO. The SG begins by noting that this Court first 
considered the elements of a prima facie case under Title VII in 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), in which the 
Court held that the pltf had successfully established a prima facie 
4. 
case by showing that he was a member of a class protected by Title 
VII, that he had applied and was rejected for a job for which he was 
qualified and for which the employer was seeking applicants, and 
that the employer thereafter left the position unfilled while 
continuing to seek applicants with the pltf's qualifications. Id., 
at 802. 
In Furnco Construction Corp. v. waters, 438 u.s. 567, 577 
(1978), the Court explained the principle behind the McDonell 
Douglas rule--in the situation described in McDonell Douglas, an 
inference of discrimination may be drawn because "we know from our 
experience that more often than not people do not act in a totally 
arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a 
business setting." And, as the Court noted in International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977), 
the evidence necessary to establish a prima facie case depends upon 
the particular context. 
Next, the SG explains why he sought a remand on~~ 
which held that the pltf's showing of a prima facie case shifts only ~ 
a burden of production, not proof, to the deft. In Burdine, the · 
--------- 1/ 
Court reaffirmed the rationale of McDonell Douglas and Furnco by 
emphasizing that a Title VII pltf must establish a prima facie case, 
not by invocation of a formalistic test, but by showing that he was 
rejected "under circumstances which give rise to an inference of 
discrimination." 450 U.S., at 253. The Court explained that such 
~
evidence must be sufficient to "create[] a presumption that the 
employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee," id., at 
254. And the Court specified: "[i]f the trier of fact believes the 
~~~~ 
c..----------
pltf 's evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the 
presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because 
no issue of fact remains in the case." Ibid. An accompanying 
footnote explained that "[t]he phrase 'prima facie case'" is 
intended in this context to "denote ••• the establishment of a 
legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption." Id., at 254 n.7. 
The SG criticizes the CADC for mechcanically applying 
prima facie case described in McDonell Douglas, E~iring easy , in 
which the employer continued to seek workers with the pltf's ~ ~~~;;_ 
qualifications after turning down the pltf, to a promotion L~~ 
'vt..-
situation, in which an employer can give a promotion to only on~r 
a group of qualified employees. The SG notes that the inference ~ 
that can be drawn from passing over a qualified applicant in the 
McDonell Douglas situation simply cannot be drawn in the promotion 
situation. By focusing entirely on whether McDonnell Douglas --requires a showing of minimal qualifications of equal or greater 
lifications, the CADC failed to realize that the last prong of 
the McDonnell Douglas test--turning an applicant away and continuing 
to seek other applica~ with equivalent qualifications--is entirely 
missing in the promotion situation, in which one person will be 
selected from a pool of current employees who are qualified for the 
position. The SG argues that the resp has failed to show that he 
was rejected under circumstances such that an inference can be made 
that the rejection was motivated by discrimination, the standard 
established by this Court in McDonnell Douglas, Furnco, and Burdine. 
4. DISCUSSION: The CA5 agrees with the CADC. See 
Mcwilliams v. Escambia County School Bd, 658 F. 2d 326 (CA5 1981); 
~ 
6 • 
Simon v. Honeywell, Inc., 642 F. 2d 754 (CA5 1981). The CA9 and the 
CAlO are to the contrary. See Hagans v. Andrus, 651 F. 2d 622 
(CA9), cert. denied, No. 81-41 (Oct. 5, 1981); Olson v. Philco Ford, 
531 F. ed 474 (CAlO 1976). 
This Court's decisions have repeatedly indicated that the 
McDonell Douglas prima facie case is grounded on the reasonable 
inference that can be drawn in the hiring situation described in 
McDonell Douglas. No similar inference can be drawn merely from the 
fact that a minority member has been passed over in a situation in 
which only one person can be promoted from a pool of qualified 
employees. 
Essentially for the reasons given by the SG, I recommend 
calling for a response with an eye towards a grant. 
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Question Presented 
The issue is whether a prima facie case of employment 
discrimination is made out by showing that an applicant was a member ~ 
of a protected minority, that jlhe applied for a promotion for which 
he was minimally qualified, that he was denied the promotion and 










The case arises in an unusual posture. After resp put on 
his case below, the DC refused the government's motion to dismiss 
and directed the government to articulate its reason for refusing to 
hire resp. At the end of DC made findings of fact -...-------
which bear on the ultimate resp had been 
discriminated against. One of these findings states~ [resp] has /j< 5 
produced no credible evidence that he was as qualified or more ~ 
qualified than other individuals who were detailed [given temporary 
assignments] or promoted during the period in question." App. to 
Pet. for Cert. 54a. The DC concluded, however, that resp "has 
failed to present a prima facie case of racial discrimination in 
that [resp] failed to prove that he was as qualified or more 
qualified than the individuals who were promoted or detailed." App. 
to Pet. for Cert. 59a. It is odd that the DC would not have made a ~ 
finding after a full trial on the ultimate issue to be proved. 
Although petr originally contended that the DC's finding that the 
prima facie test had not been proved represented a conclusion on the 
ultimate issue of discrimination, it has abandoned that contention. 
See Gov't's Brief 5 n.3. 
The DC's factual conclusion is also somewhat troubling. 
During the trial, the DC ruled that it would not allow resp's -----~ 
witnesses to compare resp's qualifications with the people who 
received the jobs resp sought. According to the DC, the only 
credible evidence could come from supervisors who had worked with 
both applicants. Additionally, resp's qualifications seem ~~I --- -
impressive. He holds a Master's Degr ee and has progressed t ards a -
.J • 
~ Ph.D. At the time he sought the postal positions, he had a great 
deal of seniority in the Post Office. He had attended training 
sessions and progressed through a number of levels in the service. 
There is no indication that his work was unsatisfactory. In 1968 he 
was rated as "outstanding." 
Of the four white supervisors who were given the jobs that / 
,t 
resp sought, two did not finish high school. One of the two who did 
finish high school completed eight months of college. Although petr 
may have had legitimate reasons for its choice, the DC's statement -' (_ -----::,, \ \ 
that resp offerred no credible evidence that he was as qualifi!;_9 as 
the other applicants seems clearly erroneous on the basis of the 
candidates' paper credentials. If petr prevails on 
here, the case might be remanded to the CA to allow 
the accuracy of the DC's fact finding. 
the issue r ai ~ea --, 
h/.L 
it to examine ~t,...t-
~ 
A r ~ e (r- The first time that this case was appealed to the CA, the 
r~~ held that to establish a prima facie test under Title VII a 
~ ~ plaintiff only had to show that: he belongs to a protected minority; 
that he applied and was minimally qualified for a job for which the 
employer was seeking applicants; that despite his qualifications he 
was rejected; and that the petition remained open. The CA found 
that the first, third and fourth critera were met. The only 
; 
question was whether resp were qualified for the job he sought. The 
~ CA found that he was qualified (a point which the government 
~ ~A~ concedes) and that the DC had erred in determining that resp had not 
~~ established a prima facie case. It noted alternatively that the DC 
~ should be reversed for requiring resp to show that he was as 
qualified or more qualified than the other applicants for the job. 
Judge Wilkey dissented. He reasoned that a court should 
not apply McDonnell Douglas mechanically. Showing that an applicant 
was minimally qualified for a job does not necessarily raise an 
inference of discrimination. The more complex the job the less 
likely it is that minimal qualifications would be sufficient to 
raise a legally mandatory presumption that an employer had 
discriminated against a minority applicant. In choosing a person 
for a supervisory position, the employer necessarily makes a 
comparative decision. In such a situation, the disgruntled 
applicant should be required to show that he was as qualified as the 
person who was hired. 
The case lAJ~ GVR'd in light of Texas Department of -
On remand, the CADC ~ 
----.- kJ i4 
In a per curiam decision for a up an1 ~ ~ 
panel, the CA essentially restated applicable law. It then stated 
in an apparent bow to Judge Wilkey's former position, "At the prima 
facie stage, as noted above, the plaintiff may be required to go 
c)}-f)G 
th,,.., 
'L I• ~~-~ 
bey~ nd a sho~ ing of m~ m 3 ualifica_1 ions to demonstrat~ that he ---~--· 
possesses whatever qualifications or background experi~ ces the 
em~_Yer has indicate~ re imp~ tant." App. to Pet. for Cert. Ba. 
; 
II. Discussion 
The McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, standard for 
a prima facie case is well established, as are the second and third 
stages of proof required by McDonnell. The Court, however, has I~ 
never addressed directly the issue of what the prima facie test ~ 
~
requires. In McDonnell Douglas, the ·Court listed the four part 
Jo 
test. It stated, however, that the facts will vary with each Title 
VII case and that the application of the prima facie test would vary 
accordingly. See 411 U.S. at 802 n.13. 
~ eamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, shed further 
light on the meaning of the prima facie case. It recognized that 
the standard was designed to place on the rejected applicant the 
/J 
burden of presenting evidence that would establish an inference of ,, 
discrimination. Teamsters noted that "an employer's isolated 
decision to reject an applicant who belongs to a racial minority 
does not show that the rejection was racially based." Id., at 358 
n.44. The McDonnell Douglas test requires that the applicant create 
11· f f d · · · t · "b' h · th t th t t an 1n erence o 1scr1m1na 10n y sowing a e wo mos common 
reasons for rejecting an applicant were not present: "an absolute 
or relative lack of qualifications or the absence of a vacancy in 
the job sought." Ibid. ~ 
v 
In Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, the 
Court restated the McDonnell test. According to Furnco, McDonnell 
made "clear that a Title VII plaintiff carries the burden of showing 
actions taken by the employer from which one can infer, if such 
actions remain unexplained, that it is more likely than not that ,, 
such actions were 'based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under 
the Act."' Id., at 576. Finally i ~ the Court once again 
explained the way in which a plaintiff may establish a le~ally 
- of /L_oduct1' on,~ ' but mandatory presumption that shifts the burden pr not 
persuasion to the defendant. In so doing, it reviewed the previous -
decisions in the area. Burdine did not, however, concentrate on 
establishing a prima facie case. In Burdine, as in previous cases, 
that inquiry was not central to the task before the Court. 
The preceding opinions indicate that the CA erred in 
applying the McDonnell Douglas test mechanically. The prima facie 
test is, as Burdine indicated, a model which is not fixed but which 
provides a general guide to be adapted to varying factual 
'L 
situations. In determining the requirements for a prima facie case, 
the previous cases indicate that two considerations should be kept 
in mind. First, the facts proved must be sufficient to establish an 
inference of discrimination. Second, the burden on a plaintiff at 
the first stage should not be so onerous ~ the third stage is 
· ; 
rendered unnecessary. Both sides to th ~ argument fail to strike a 
balance between these two pro~s ~ ions. 
The SG's argument effectively would eliminate the third 
stage envisioned by McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. The SG would 
require a minority applicant to show as part of the prima facie case 
that he was "more qualified" than the non-minority applicant chosen 
for the job. See Gov't's Brief at 22. Alternatively, the SG would 
require the minority applicant to show evidence of racially 
discriminatory hiring practices and anecdotal evidence which woulg ; 
indicate the possibility 6f racial bias. Placing this burden on the 
plaintiff at the initial stages would require essentially that he 
anticipate the employer's response and offer evidence in advance 
that the employer's decision was pretextual. 
The SG's argument is based on the proposition that 
discrimination in the workplace is no longer pervasive. Thus, when 
an employer chooses an equally qualified white applicant over an 
equally qualified black applicant, there is no basis for inferring 
that the employer's choice was racially motivated. The SG's 
argument is extremely plausible with respect to the ultimate 
determination to be made. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259. The 
initial burden it places on a Title VII plaintiff is, however, 
inconsistent with the congressional findings on discrimination. The 
resp argues persuasively that in amending the Civil Rights Act in 
1972, Congress took notice of the pervasive nature of --discrimination. To require that a plaintiff establish, as part of 
/ 
I l v\ 
his prima facie case, that he was more qualified than other 
applicants undercuts Congress' assessment~ Moreover, the SG's 
position is inconsistent with Teamsters' recognition that a prima 
facie case could be made by showing that there was no "relative lack 
of qualifications." 
It does not seem that allowing an applicant to establish a 
prima facie case by showing that he is as qualified as the other 
applicants will increase the burden on the employer in a significant 
respect. Most frequently employer-defendants move for involuntary 
dismissal, under Rule 4l(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., for failure to 
establish a prima facie case at the close of the plaintiff's 
evidence. The employer thus will already have been put to the 
expense and trouble of going to trial. Making the prima facie case 
,, 
more difficult to establish might discourage litigants from bringing ~ 
frivolous Title VII suits in the first instance. It would seem, 
however, that this disincentive is already built into the system 
since the applicant retains the ultimate burden of persuasion and 
-...) 
the employer has only to articulate a legitimate reason to carry its 
burden of production. 
against litigants who 
Moreover, courts may ~s attorney's 
bring frivolous suits. Although this 
fees 
provision may not be exercised frequently, it does provide employers 
with some protection against such suits. 
The government's position is too extreme as it would 
result in a substantial modification of the McDonnell Douglas 
by collapsing the first and third prongs of the test. 
Correspondingly, the petr's position, and that of the CA's, impos 
too little a burden on the plaintiff to establish a prima facie 
case. The second factor in the McDonnell Douglas prima facie test 
is that the applicant was qualified for the job for which the 
employer was seeking applicants. Teamsters, supra, at 358 n.44, 
I., 
indicated that if there were a relative lack of qualifications one 
of the most common reasons for not hiring an applicant would remain. 
Thus, the Title VII plaintiff, who demonstrated that he was 
minimally qualified, would not have adduced evidence that would 
raise an inference of discrimination. The mere failure to hire a 
minority candidate is not sufficient by itself to raise such an 
inference. 
The two primary reasons for allowing an applicant to -----... 
establish a prima facie case by showing that he was minimally 
qualified are that it promotes the congressional goal of eliminating 
discrimination and that it allows the plaintiff a way of procuring 
evidence that would be hard to obtain during discovery. Neither of 
these arguments offers, however, a basis for reducing the 
plaintiff's initial burden. 
J • 
With respect to the first argument, Congress goal was to 
eliminate discrimination. It would contravene that goal to adopt a 
test that allowed a plaintiff to present evidence that was 
insufficient to raise a legally mandatory presumption of 
discrimination > When the plaintiff cannot show that he was as 
qualified as the applicant who received the job there is simply no 
reason to presume that discrimination was the basis for the 
employer's rejection. 
The second argument made by Title VII plaintiffs is that 
requiring a plaintiff to show only that he is minimally qualified is 
desireable since it places the burden of production on the party who 
has the evidence. Requiring the plaintiff to show that he is as 
qualified as the successful candidate would make him responsible for 
proving facts that he cannot obtain. The difficulty with this 
proposition is two fold. First, the purpose of requiring the 
employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason is to 
frame the issues so that the plaintiff will be able to show, at the 
third stage, that such reasons are pretextual. The~ Donnell 
Douglas allocation of burdens does not contemplate that the employer 
will be a source of evidence helpful to the plaintiff. Although 
'--- ..... --------------
employers often offer such evidence at the second stage of the 
proceeding, nothing requires them to do so. Indeed, it would seem 
to be poor trial strategy for a Title VII to wait until the middle 
of trial to find out what the employer's evidence is going to be. 
; 
If the employee has not already engaged in discovery prior to trial, 
he will be in a poor position to show that the employer's reasons 
are pretextual when the trial reaches that stage. Thus, it would 
-----
-LV o 
seem that the discovery rationale is inconsistent with the 
preparation that a responsible litigant would take. 
The second difficulty with this argument is that it 
presumes that discovery is inadequate. If an employer is not 
forthcoming with information, the applicant can always seek 
sanctions against the employer. Alternatively, a DC might consider 
the employer's failure to release information in determining whether 
the employee had made out a prima facie case. Absent some showing 
that discovery is ineffective, there seems to be little reason to 
structure the prima facie test to aid Title VII plaintiffs in this 
manner. 
Conclusion 
government and resp's position. 
prima facie case should be 
seeks to prove a 
to establish facts that raise an .,, 
show that he was as 
such an inference. 
In situations are 
minimally qualified would also be as qualified to do the job as the 
person hired. Where the job is more complex, there is a greater 
variance between the skills sought and greater need to go beyond 
minimal qualifications to raise an inference of discrimination. 
~ 
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From: Justice Rehnquist 
DEC 9 1982 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-1044 
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE BOARD OF GOV-
ERNORS, PETITIONER v. LOUIS H. AIKENS 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT 
OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[December -, 1982] 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Respondent Louis Aikens filed suit under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et 
seq., claiming that petitioner, the United States Postal Ser-
vice, discriminated against him on account of his race. 
Aikens, who is black, claimed that the Postal Service had dis-
criminatorily refused to promote him to higher positions in 
the Washington, D.C. Post Office where he had been em-
ployed since 1937. After a bench trial, the District Court en-
tered judgment in favor of the Postal Service, but this judg-
ment was reversed by the Court of Appeals. 642 F. 2d 514 
(CA DC 1980). We vacated the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and remanded for reconsideration in the light of 
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 
U. S. 248 (1981). 453 U. S. 902 (1981). On remand, the 
Court of Appeals reaffirmed its earlier holding that the Dis-
trict Court had erred in requiring Aikens to offer direct proof 
of discriminatory intent. 665 F. 2d 1057, 1058 (CA DC 1981) 
(Per Curiam). We granted certiorari to consider the assess-
ment of proof of racial discrimination when an employer has 
selected among applicants for a higher managerial position 1• 
- u. s. - (1982). 
1 We have consistently distinguished disparate treatment cases from 
cases involving facially neutral employment standards that have disparate 
impact on minority applicants. See, e. g., Texas Department of Com mu-
81-1044-0PINION 
2 U. S. POSTAL SERVICE BD. OF GOVS. v. AIKENS 
The Court of Appeals, in its second opinion, held not only 
that the District Court erred in requiring Aikens to offer di-
rect proof of discriminatory intent 2, but also that it erred in 
requiring Aikens to show, as part of his prima facie case, that 
he was "as qualified or more qualified" than the people who 
were promoted. The Postal Service insists that an employee 
who has showed only that he was black, that he had applied 
for a promotion for which he possessed the~ inimum quali-
fications,~1nd that the Postal Service selected a non-minority ---applicant has not established a "prima facie" case of employ-
ment discrimination under Title VII. -
Since the case has been fully tried on the merits in the Dis-
trict Court, one might at first blush wonder why the parties 
are still arguing about the nature of a prima facie case. In-
deed, to the untutored this case, tried to the District Court in 
January, 1979, might seem to be one that could have been 
disposed of in a relatively short span of time (according to ju-
dicial lights) with the District Court making the necessary es-
sential findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the Court 
of Appeals reviewing those findings and conclusions under 
the appropriate standard 3• But we take the case as it comes 
to us. 
We think that some statements in the briefs of the parties 
and of the amici, urging us either to "adhere" to, modify, or 
reconsider, the line of cases beginning with McDonnell Doug-
nity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 252, n. 5 (1981); McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802, n. 14 (1973). 
2 As in any lawsuit, the plaintiff may prove his case by direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence. The trier of fact should consider all the evidence, 
giving it whatever weight and credence it deserves. Thus, we agree with 
the Court of Apeals that the District Court should not have required 
Aikens to submit direct evidence of discriminatory intent. See Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 358, n. 44 
(1977) ("[T]he McDonnell Douglas formula does not require direct proof of 
discrimination.") 
' See Pullman Standard v. Swint, - U. S.-, - (1982). 
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las v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1972), reveal a rp.isunders~ ding 
of that line of cases. Because this misunderstanding may 
have been shared in part by the District Court and by the 
Court of Appeals in the present case, we take the libei:_ty of 
setting forth the facts as well as the law in the p:rfncipal cases 
in tlie M c15onnell-Douglas line. -. 
In MdJoii/iie[l-Dou glas itself, the defendant employer ran 
a newspaper advertisement seeking qualified mechanics. 
The plaintiff, a qualified mechanic who had been laid off by 
the defendant, applied for reemployment. The defendant 
declined to rehire him, even though it continued to hire other 
applicants who responded to the advertisement after the 
plaintiff. The plaintiff's Title VII suit was dismissed by the 
District Court, but the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit reversed. That court held that the reason given by the 
defendant for refusing to rehire plaintiff-plaintiff's partici-
pation in a "stall in" and "lock-in" at defendant's place of busi-
ness-was a "subjective" criterion that carried little weight 
in rebutting charges of discrimination. The Court of Ap-
peals set forth its version of a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion under Title VII. 
Our opinion described the now familiar elements of a prima 
facie case: 
"The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the 
initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima 
facie case of racial discrimination. This may be done by 
showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that 
he applied and was qualified for a job for which the em-
ployer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his 
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his re-
jection, the position remained open and the employer 
continued to seek applicants from persons of complain-
ant's qualifications." Id., at 802. 
We immediately added, however, that "[t]he facts necessar-
ily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specifications above of 
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the prima facie proof required from respondent is not neces-
sarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situa-
tions." Id., at 802, n. 13. 
We returned to the same question in.E,urt,ico Construction 
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567 (1978). The employer's busi-
ness was the rehabilitation of steel mill blast furnaces with 
"fire brick." The employer did not maintain a permanent 
force of bricklayers; instead, it hired a superintendent for 
each project, and then delegated to him the task of securing a 
competent work force. The superintendent who declined to 
hire the plaintiff did not accept applications at the job site, 
but hired only persons he knew to be experienced and compe-
tent in this work or who had been recommended to him as 
similarly skilled. The employer claimed this policy was es-
tablished to ensure that only experienced and highly qualified 
fire bricklayers were employed, because untimely work could 
result in substantial losses both to the steel mill operator and 
to the contractor-employer. Id., at 569-572. 
We agreed with the Court of Appeals that the black plain-
tiffs had made out a prima facie case. We disagreed, how-
ever, with its conclusion that the reasons for the employer's 
hiring practices were illegitimate. In discussing the 
showings required of the parties to Title VII suits, we 
pointed out: 
"The central focus of the inquiry in a case such as this is 
always whether the employer is treating 'some people 
less favorably than others because of their race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.' Int'l. Brotherhood of 
Teamsters v. United States, supra,[431 U. S.,] at 335, n. 
15. The method suggested in McDonnell-Douglas for 
pursuing this mqmry, owever, was never intended to 
be rigid, mechanized or ritualistic. Rather, it is merely 
a sens1 e, or erly way to eva uate the evidence in light 
of common experience as it bears on the critical question 
of discrimination." 438 U. S., at 577. 
)Y 
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Finally, in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981), plaintiff, a woman, claimed 
fiiat'tlie employer's failure to promote her and its later deci-
sion to terminate her had both resulted from gender-based 
discrimination. The District Court found after a bench trial 
that neither decision was discriminatory. Id., at 251. The 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the decision of 
the District Court as to the promotion, but reversed its find-
ing on the termination. 
We reviewed only the part of the case that had been re-
versed by the Court of Appeals, and stated more clearly the 
conse uences of the plaintiffs success in making the showing 
require~b~ ~ nel_ Douglas. The prima acie case in a I 
Title V action is not merely the minimum showing that will 
justify a verdict for the plaintiff, it "creates a presumption 
that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the em-
ployee." Id., at 254, n. 7. If the employer does not rebut 
this presumption by "clearly set[ting] forth, through the in-
troduction of admissible evidence" a legitimate nondiscrimi-
natory reason for his action, id., at 255, the district court 
"must enter judgment for the plaintiff." Id., at 254 (empha-
sis supplied). 
The justification for this seemingly drastic rule can be 
found in Furnco: 
"A prima facie case under McDonnell-Douglas raises 
? 
an inference of discrimination only because we presu~ -£:::-
these acts, if otherwise explained, are more likely than 
not based on the consideration of impermissible factors. 
. . . And we are willing to presume this largely because 
we know that from our experience that more often than 
not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, with-
out any underlying reasons, especially in a business set-
ting. Thus, when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an 
applicant had been eliminated as possible reasons for the 
employer's actions, it is more likely than not the em-
? 
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ployer, whom we generally assume acts only with some 
reason, based his decision on an impermissible consider-
ation such as race." 438 U. S., at 567. 
More succinctly phrased, a prima facie case "eliminates the 
most common non-discriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's 
rejection." Burdine, supra, at 254. For this reason, we / 
have held that an unrebutted prima facie case is sufficiently trJ< 
compelling to require a judgment for the plaintiff as a matter 
of law. 
In the present case, both the District Court and the Court 
of Appeals apparently thought that Aikens' claim against the 
Postal Service fits into the pattern of the McDonnell-Doug-
las line of cases. We disagree. The first and third elements ~ 
of McDonnell-Douglas are undoubtedly present; Aikens be-
longs to a racial minority, and he applied for the promotions 
in question but was denied them. The fourth element, how-
ever, is entirely absent; the position did not remain open, as 
it did in McDonnell-Douglas, but was filled by the applicant 
chosen in preference to Aikens. Indeed, where an employer 
seeks to fill a single managerial position, the position will by 
definition not be open after one of the applicants has been 
chosen. 
The second McDonnell-Douglas element-the showing 
that thepi°ii"intiff was "qualified" for fneTob--is more prob-
lematic. There is no cfoubtthat Aikens had an impressive 
resume. He has a Masters Degree and has completed three 
years of residence towards a Ph.D. He has been rated as 
"an outstanding supervisor whose management abilities are 
far above average." App. 8. There was no derogatory or 
negative information in his Personnel Folder. He had more 
supervisory seniority and training and development courses 
than all but one of the white persons who were promoted 
above him. It is clear that his qualifications were sufficient, '-1.,£--L..1 
in the eyes of the Postal Service, to merit serious r 
consideration. ----
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At this point, however, agreement between the parties, 
and between the courts that have considered this factual is-
sue, breaks down. It is argued that Aikens must show he is 
"as qualified" as the person actually chosen, "better quali-
fied" than the person actually chosen, "relatively qualified," 
or merely "qualified" for the jobs he sought. We believe 
that this contest of comparatives ultimately proves self-
stultifying. 
The fair reading of the McDonnell-Douglas advertisement 
for qualified mechanics is that there was a known, reasonably 
objective basis for determining who was a qualified mechanic, 
and that applicants would be hired on a first come, first 
served basis until the employer had obtained the number of 
mechanics it needed. But where one managerial position is 
open, there may be no totally objective measure of who.,is 
1'g"'ualified," and the employer certamly does not undertake to 
promote more than one applicant. Employers consider a "i~R ~ ge ~ O:r:§., such as each applicant's understanding 
o e organizat10n's goals, ability to work effectively with 
particular superiors and subordinates, maturity, originality, 
initiative, and decision making ability. It will rarely, if ever, 
be possible to quanitfy all the relevant criteria and tally them 
up on a score card. 
In these circumstances, the question is not whether we ~ 11 
"foll w" the M Donnell-Douglas Ime of cases, but whether 
the mc1ples established m ose cases were ever meant to 
applyT o a situation so far removed from their factual context. 
If those principles do not provid-e-the district courts with a 
"sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of 
common experience," Furnco, supra, at 577, they are inag-
plicable under the terms of those decisions. Burdine, supra, 
at~ n. 6; Furnco, supra, at 575-576; International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 358 
(1977); McDonnell Douglas, supra, at 802, n. 13. 
McDonnell-Douglas and Furnco both dealt with entry 
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level jobs, one in a large manufacturing industry and the 
other in the construction industry. In those cases, if the 
plaintiff could meet the four elements of the McDonnell-
Douglas prima facie case-that he belonged to a racial mi-
nority, that he applied and was qualified for a job for which 
the employer was seeking applicants, that he was rejected, 
and that after his rejection the employer continued to seek 
similarly qualified applicants-the plaintiff has in effect nega-
tived the principal broadly applicable reasons that would 
show that the employer's refusal to hire him was not based on 
a discriminatory animus. 
But that simply is not true in the present case. There 
were several applicants for each position, and only one could 
be chosen. The "qualifications" for the position as laid down 
by the Postal Service, while not appearing as clearly from the 
record as might be, were by no means as easy to assess as the 
qualifications for a "mechanic" advertised for in McDonnell-
Douglas. We sim 1 do not think that Aikens' showin that 
h~ ck, th~t he was ufficient y gua 1 e to be seriously 
considered, and...that ~ was I!gt ch.Q_sen, "eliminates the most 
common non-discriminatory reasons" for his rejection. 
Burdine, supra, at 254 (emphasis supplied). 
Were we to attempt' fo revise~the McDonnell-Dougjg,s case 
to fit the facts of Afkens' case, we would be obliged to hold 
that Aikens, merely by showing he was a member of a minor-
ity, tha~ ed for a vacancy, and that the Postal 
Service promoted another of several applicants for the single 
vacancy, judgment should be entered for Aikens in the ab-
sence of any rebutting evidence on the part of the Postal Ser-
vice. This we are unwilling to do; such a showing in these 
circumstances does not justify-the presu:m.~tion thatJlle em-
ployer's acts "if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than 
not based on the consideration of impermissible factors." 
Furnco, supra, at 577. 
Although Aikens' showing does not justify a p~ 
/ 
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of discrimination, it is sufficient to support an inference of 
di$crimi9ation. ThafTs;1f the District Court were to con-
cl~ the Postal Service did treat Aikens less favorably 
than others because of his race, we surely could not say, on 
the basis of the record before us, that such a finding would be 
clearly erroneous. Aikens showed that white persons were 
consistently promoted and detailed over him and all other 
black persons between 1966 and 1974. Aikens had substan-
tially more education than the white employees who were ad-
vanced ahead of him; of the 12, only 2 had any education be-
yond high school and none had a college degree. Aikens 
introduced testimony at trial that the person responsible for 
the promotion decisions at issue had made numerous deroga-
tory comments about blacks in general and Aikens in 
particular. 
We believe that the District Court, which is able to per-
ceive the attitude and demeanor of witnesses, and to evaluate 
their credibility and the weight that should be placed on their 
testimony, is in a far better position than this Court to decide 
whether the Postal Service discriminated againt Aikens. 
The District Court should decide this case in the same man-
ner as it decides questions of fact in the myriad other kinds of 
litigation before it. 
We therefore hold that in a case such as this, where no 
standardized prima facie case can be made out, the district 
court should evaluate all the admissible evidence and then de-
cide the factual question of discrimination. Thus, plaintiffs 
may seek to obtain the benefit of the B~dine .. presu~ticm by 
making out a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, and may 
also seek to prove their case in the ordinary way 4• Of 
• A rough analogy may be found in the law relating to res ipsa loquitur 
in negligence actions. In some circumstances a showing of circumstances 
sufficient to raise res ipsa creates a rebuttable presumption like the 
Burdine presumption. See Prosser, Torts 229-230 (1971). A tort plain-
tiff can seek to show negligence directly without abandoning the benefit of 
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course, a plaintiff who fails to make out a McDonnell Douglas 
primafacie case will not survive a motion for judgment at the 
close of his case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) unless he has 
presented evidence from which the district court can infer 
that he was discriminated against. See Teamsters, supra, at 
358. This case presents one example of that sort of 
evidence. 
All courts have recognized that the questions facing triers 
of fact in discrimination cases are both sensitive and difficult. 
The prohibitions against discrimination contained in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 reflect an important national policy. In 
any Title VII case, regardless whether the prima facie case 
device is available to the plaintiff, the ultimate question is 
"whether the employer is treating 'some people less favor-
ably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin." Furnco, supra, at 577 (quoting Teamsters, 
supra, at 335, n. 15). There will seldom be "eyewitness" tes-
timony as to the employer's mental processes, but this does 
not mean that courts should treat the question of discrimina-
tion differently from other questions of fact. The law often 
obliges finders of fact to inquire into a person's state of mind. 
As Lord Justice Bowen said in treating this problem in an ac-
tion for misrepresentation nearly a century ago: 
"The state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the 
state of his digestion. It is true that it is very difficult 
to prove what the state of a man's mind at a particular 
time is, but if it can be ascertained it is as much as fact as 
anything else." Eddington v. Fitzmaurice , 29 Ch. Div. 
459, 483 (1885). 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the 
case is remanded with directions to remand to the District 
Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
res ipsa. Id., at 231-232. 
drk 12/09/82 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Rives 
Re: No. 81-1044, U.S. Postal Service v. Aikens 
I do not disagree with the basic idea behind Justice 
Rehnquist's opinion but I find it troubling for its lack of clarity. 
My first problem is that he rejects the application of the McDonnell 
Douglas prima facie test to the situation presented in this case 
because proof of its factors does not eliminate the most common non-
discriminatory reasons for the employee's rejection. The opinion 
does not make clear, however, what those reasons are. Two different 
reasons are suggested. See pages 7-8. The first is that McDonnell 
Douglas does not apply because the considerations in hiring a white 
collar worker are less easily quantifiable than those involved in 
hiring factory workers. The second is that this case involves a 
promotion, in which the job is filled, rather than a situation in 
which the job is kept open after the Title VII plaintiff is 
rejected. Because the opinion does not make clear why it finds the 
McDonnell Douglas prima facie test inapplicable, it leaves it 
unclear when it should be applied or whether DC's, in most 
situations, should look at the facts of each case to determine 
whether there is an inference of discrimination. I do not think 
that the latter choice is inconsistent with McDonnell Douglas's 
recognition that its application will vary with the facts of each 
case. It seems, however, that the opinion should give the lower 
courts some guidance on this point. 
2. 
My second problem is that I do not understand the 
distinction that the opinion draws between presumptions and 
inferences. See pages 8-9. I had understood Burdine as stating 
that the McDonnell Douglas test raises an inference of 
discrimination and that that is sufficient to create a legally 
mandatory rebuttable presumption. If Aikens' facts are sufficient 
to support an inference of discrimination, I do not understand why 
that would not result in a rebuttable presumption. The opinion 
appears to draw a distinction between the two situations and the 
method of proof in each. If a plaintiff can establish the McDonnell 
Douglas prima facie test, then the McDonnell Douglas shift of the 
burden of production to the employer is applicable. If a plaintiff 
cannot establish a prima facie test under McDonnell Douglas, the 
opinion suggests that he then should establish an inference of 
discrimination and a more traditional approach is applicable. If I 
am reading the opinion correctly, this seems to be a fairly radical 
change. Although I am unsure of your position on this matter, I 
would have some reservations about joining the opinion until it was 
clearer what it was doing and the extent to which it limited 
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. 
; 
• ·1 ., 
CHAMBERS OF 
.:§u:pumt <!Jou.rt of tfyt ~tit .:§taus 
11Jaslyington, la. C!J. 2llffeJ!.~ 
-JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
December 9, 1982 
Re: No. 81-1044 - United States Postal Service Board of 
Governors v. Aikens 
Dear Bill: 
In due course I hope to circulate a dissent. 
Justice Rehnquist 
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CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
December 9, 1982 
Re: 81-1044 - United States Postal Service 
v. Aikens 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
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JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
Re: 
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~fyht.gto-n.~.QJ. 20ffe~~ 
December 15, 1982 
81-1044 - United States Postal 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
j\uprttttt (!Jllltri llf tfrt ~tb j\hdts 
jilufrittghm, 1J. (!J. 2ilffe~, 
~ 
~I~ 
~ ~? December 15, 1982 
:,~~~~ 
Re: No. 81-1044 U.S. Postal Service v. Aikens 
Dear Lewis: 
After reading your letter of today's date, and then 
talking to you on the phone about it, I have a feeling that 
little, if anything, separates us in our view of this case. 
You said in your letter, and also on the phone, that 
you are primarily troubled by my reading of Burdine. When I 
joined your opinion in McDonnell-Douglas I had no idea that 
the Court was talking about anything other than the normal 
"inference" of one fact that a trier of fact draws from 
other facts which will support the inference. And, as you 
said on the phone, I am not sure that I knew of any very 
precise distinction between an "inference" and a 
"presumption." To the extent that there is any of the kind 
of tension you refer to in your letter between the 
"inference analysis" and the "presumption analysis," I think 
it comes from your footnote 7 in Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. 
There the Court clearly states that it is n..ot merely an 
inferen£e, but a "legally mandatory, rebut ta ble presumption" 
wn"ich arises from the plaintiff's proving his prima facie 
case under McDonnell-Douglas. I confess I paid no attention 
to the footnote when I joined your opinion, and I also 
confess that I wish the footnote weren't there. But it is, 
and as we agreed on the phone I don't think the difference 
between a "legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption," and 
an "inference" makes much difference in the great majority 
of garden variety employment discrimination cases in which a 
plaintiff will try to establish the four elements described 
in McDonnell-Douglas. 
Where it would make a difference is in a case like 
this, where at least one and probably two of the McDonnell-
Douglas elements are not present. In this sort of a case, 
'. 
- 2 -
if we were to bob-tail McDonnell-Douglas, and say that even 
though only two of the four McDonnell-Douglas elements are 
present, nonetheless a "legally mandatory, rebuttable 
presumption" arises, I think the point the government makes 
in their brief is well taken: for a member of a minority 
group to simply show that he was one of several considered 
for a promotion to a managerial job, and that a non-minority 
applicant was chosen in preference to him, should not 
without more give rise to a presumption of discrimination. 
This conviction is what led me to write the opinion the 
way I hope I did: to leave the four element test of 
McDonnell-Douglas absolutely in~tact, and doubtless 
governing 95% of the employment""discrimination litigation in 
this country. But when the plaintiff is unable to prove two 
of the elements of McDonnell-Douglas, as this plaintiff was, 
I think it would be a great mistake to try to "bob-tail" 
McDonnell-Douglas and create a new type of "legally 
mandatory rebuttable presumption" into which his case might 
fit. I think it much better to say that where the four 
elements of the McDonnell-Douglas prima facie case can't be 
made out, the plaintiff is simply remitted to proving 
discrimination the way one proves any other factual element 
in a disputed lawsuit. Triers of fact are still permitted 
to draw reasonable inference from the facts adduced by the 
parties, and the decision of the trier of fact will be 
affirmed unless a Court of Appeals thinks it is clearly 
erroneous. 
This is by no means to say that McDonnell-Douglas 
"doesn't apply" or isn't a "starting point": it is simply to 
say that when one begins with McDonnell-Douglas and finds 
that one or more of the four elements required by that 
decision for the plaintiff's prima facie case is lacking, 
one may not have the benefit of the rebuttable presumption 
flowing from the prima facie case. This is not a rejection 
of McDonnell-Douglas, but an applicatio~ of it. 
I realize from your letter and our telephone 
conversation that the opinion does not say all this quite as 
clearly as I would like it to. 
If it would accommodate the concern which you expressed 
in your letter, I would like to insert the following 
separate paragraph before the first full paragraph beginning 
on page 10 of the first draft: "McDonnell-Douglas thus 
remains the starting point for all Title VII employment 
discrimination case trials. In the great majority of Title 
VII cases, either the plaintiff will be able to make out the 













four elements of the prima facie case described in 
McDonnell-Douglas, or will have no alternative method of 
proving the necessary factual allegations to support a 
recovery. Where, as in this case, the plaintiff does not 
make out a McDonnell-Douglas prima facie case, but can 
present 'enough evidence to permit the trier of fact to 
infer' that the defendant has engaged in illegal 
discrimination, Burdine, supra, at 255, n. 7, the trier of 
fact should permit the plaintiff to proceed as with all 
other contested factual issues, and of course without the 

























Dec~mber 15, 1982 
81-1044 U.S. Postal Service v. Aikens 
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r,'t~-
I agree that the ~cnonnell-nouglas prima facie 
test does not apply to the situation presented in this case. 
ThP fourth element (the position remains open) is absent in 
every case where only a single position is being filled. · 
The McDonnell-Douglas second element (the appli-
cant was qualified) also Rhou1d not apply literally where 
only a single position is at issue. As you state, in a case 
such as the present one, there may be a number of appttcant~ i 
who fairly can be viewed as "qualified". It is essential, 
from management's viewpoint, that the best qualified person 
be selected. The initial burden on a Title VII claimant 
shoulo be to show that he wag at lea~t a~ "wP11 qualified" 
as any other applicant. Your opinion generally is consis-
tent with the foregoing, althouqh I think we should retain 
McDonnell-Douglas as the starting point in these cases. 
",,, 
t Rm troubled -pri.marilv by your ·reading of · ,,,. 
Burdine. My opinion in that case stated that ,.,hen the ,_ic- ,/' 
Donnel test is met, it creates an inference of discr.imina- · 
tion. When the facts proved by a plaintiff are sufficient 
to support such an inference, Ruro'ne said this would result 
ln a rebuttable presumption. Your opinion, as I understand 
it, suqgests some tension between the inferencP analysis and 
a pr.esumpt ion. In my view, the facts must be adequate to __ 1 
justify an inference of aiscrimination. In that event, a ~·~ 
rebuttable presumption existA and the burden of goinq for-
ward shifts to the employer.. The ultimate bur.rlen of persua-' 
sion remains, of course, on the plaintiff.. 
,{' 
Perhaps I didn't make this clear in Burdine, al- , ; 
though th is was my unnerstann ing of it at thP. t 1me. I wou l r1 ' 
hesitate to ioin a different understnna ing now, as it seems · ,,;; 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Rives 
Re: No. 81-1044, U.S. Postal Service v. Aikens 
Justice Rehnquist's opinion states that whenever a 
plaintiff's case does not fit precisely within the McDonnell 
Douglas mold the three stage procedure is inapplicable. His 
letter states that the effect of his opinion will be minimal 
since 95% of employment discrimination will fit this pattern. 
Only those cases that involve promotion will fall outside the 
pattern and be dealt with under the regular two step procedure. 
The primary question I have is the extent to which his opinion 
will limit the application of McDonnell Douglas. 
I would not have guessed that only 5% of the Title VII 
cases involve promotion. Nor would I have thought that the 
remainder of the cases fit precisely the McDonnell Douglas 
pattern. As McDonnell Douglas recognizes, each case will involve 
differing facts. To the extent that a plaintiff's case does not 
fit precisely within the pattern, it seems Justice Rehnquist's 
opinion could be read as saying that McDonnell Douglas is 
inapplicable. Or to the extent a plaintiff attempts to offer 
additional evidence at the initial stage of the trial, his case 
would appear to fall outside of the McDonnell Douglas framework. 
Thus, there is a risk that trial judges either will abandon 
McDonnell Douglas in a large number of cases or try to 
incorporate the two schemes in one trial. 
2 . 
Although I think the paragraph proposed in Justice 
Rehnquist's letter reaffirms the McDonnell Douglas test verbally, 
I am less clear that it would resolve the tension that underlies 
his opinion. It seems to me the simplest way to resolve the 
tension is to get rid of the inference/presumption distinction. 
His opinion could state that in promotion cases the traditional 
McDonnell Douglas criteria do not apply strictly. The question 
of whether the plaintiff has established an inference of 
discrimination {and thereby a legally, mandatory rebuttable 
presumption) will be left to the trier of fact, who will be 
guided by the criteria listed in McDonnell Douglas. The employer 
could then come back and rebut the presumption, as he now can, by 
articulating a legitimate business reason. The plaintiff may 
choose to rest on his prima facie case as proof that the 
employer's reason is pretextual or he may offer additional proof 
~ in response to the reason given by the employer. This is just a 
suggestion but it may accomodate Justice Rehnquist's concerns 
{although I have my doubts) and preserve McDonnell Douglas. 
My analysis may easily be faulty. The opinion may have only a 
limited effect and the proposed paragraph more than sufficient to 
limit the damage. I am not sure, however, that that is the case. 
Nor is it clear to me that the opinion can be limited easily as 
long as the inference/presumption distinction remains. 
~I~ .• ~ 
j~/~· 
,f;o ~ /./ December 20, 1982 
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Dear Bi11: 
I am afraid we are farther apar.t than I had sup-
posed. I have reread your opinion, as well as McDonnell-
Douglas and Burdine. 
For me, the principal negative with your opinion 
is the way it distinguishes McDonnell-Douglas and Burdine. 
It can be read as creating an entirely new anaylsis applica-
ble to promotions. I see no necessity for doing this, and I 
am afraid that your opinion would invite courts to depart 
from what has become a familiar mode of analysis in these 
cases. 
Your concern over fn. 7 in Burdine puzzles me. 
The text of Burdine repeatedly refers to the rebuttable pre-
sumption. s~e, e.g., pp. 254, 255. The role of the pre-
sumption is describeo more fully in fn. 8 and 10. In the 
former, we state that the relationship between nthe presump-
tion created by a prima facie case and the consequential 
burden of production placed on the defendant is a tradition-
al feature of the common law", and that the term "presump-
tion" properly used "refers only to a device for allocating 
the production burden". 
In what respect would your preference for using 
only the term "inferencen differ in result? Surely, under 
McDonnell-Douglas, Furnco and Burdine, when a prima facie 
case is made the burden of production - and only that burden 
- shifts to the defendant. 
I think this case could be written in a straight-
forward manner by starting as you do (p. 3, 4) with the 
statement in McDonnell-Douglas that the facts necessarily 
will vary in Title VII cases and "the specifications {set 
forth in McDonnell-Douglas for] the prima facie proof re-
quired from respondent is not necessarily applicable in ev-
ery respect to differeing factual situations". Then, as 
your opinion does, point out the factual distinction between 
2. 
a promotion case and the employment situation involved in 
McDonnell-Douglas and Burdine. In a case such as this where 
only a single executive position is to be filled, the ele-
ments of a prima facie case - in addition to the applicable 
ones of McDonnell-Douglas - include a showing that the 
plaintiff is at least as well qualified as the person who 
was given the promotion. I like your discussion of factors 
to be considered in determining whether the plaintiff in a 
promotion case was at least as well qualified. 
In addition, where - as in this case - there may 
have been several candidates equally well qualified, lt 
would not be inappropriate to require some evidence of dis-
criminatory intent other than the fact that the plaintiff 
was not chosen. In making judgments to fill high executive 
positions, subjective considerations customarily enter into 
the decisions. ~here may be two candidates whose education 
and experience appear to qualify them both equally well. A 
judgment rationally could be made in favor of one with no 
intent whatever to discriminate against the other. 
If there is a discriminatory intent, there usually 
will be some evidence of it. As your opinion notes, there 
was abundant evin~nce here to create a stronq inference of 
discrimination. All of our cases have required a showing 
sufficient to create such an inference. 
I regret creating a problem for you, but as the 
author of McDonnell-Douglas and Burdine I simply cannot 
agree to an opinion that seems to me to unsettle a good deal 
of what I thlnk we have accomplished by those decisions. If 
you think it inadvisable to revise your opinion substantial-
ly along the above linee (and I would, of course, fully un-
derstand if you decline to do so), I will circulate these 






TO: Justice Rehnquist DATE: Dec. 29, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
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You suggested that I indicate specifically why I 
am hesitant to join your opinion. I am with you, of course, 
through the first four pages. 
My difficulty commences with the second full para-
graph on page 5. There, you emphasize primarily a part of 
what was said in Burdine about a presumption being created 
by a prima facie case. I agree that a "presumption" and 
"inference" do not necessarily have the same consequences. 
But Burdine defines the consequences in cases of this kind. 
The two are used in conjunction: once a prima facie case is 
established, a rebuttable presumption arises. You mention 
only footnote 7. Actually, the text of Burdine repeatedly 
refers to the presumption. See, e.g., pp. 254, 255. Its 
role is described more fully in fn. 8 and 10. In the for-
mer, we state the relationship between the presumption and 
the prima facie case, and also expressly state that the term 
"presumption" properly used "refers only to a device for 
allocation of the production burden". Also, you used the 
word "presume" in Furnco in substantially the same sense: a 
result from the establishment of a prima facie case. 
I am afraid substantial confusion will result from 
the way this paragraph is now written. And, certainly, I 
would not describe our precedents as creating a "seemingly 
drastic rule". 
2. 
If you revise page 5 substantially along the above 
lines, possibly some conforming changes would have to be 
made in the first two sentences (beginning "More succinctly 
phrased ..• ) of your text on page 6. 
I have no difficulty with the two full paragraphs 
on page 6, but again become uneasy with what you seem to say 
primarily on pages 7 and 8. As I read your opinion, you 
- reject the principles of the prior cases as being wholly 
inapplicable to a promotion case. This seems unnecessary. 
This case could be written in a straightforward 
manner by starting, as you do (p. 3,4), with the statement 
in McDonnell-Douglas that the facts necessarily will vary in 
Title VII cases and "the specifications [set forth in 
McDonnell-Douglas for] the prima facie proof required from 
respondent are not necessarily applicable in every respect 
to differing factual situations". Then, as your opinion 
does, point out the factual distinction between a promotion 
case and the employment situations involved in McDonnell-
Douglas and Burdine. In a case such as this, where only a 
single executive positon is to be filled, the elements of a 
prima facie case - in addition to the applicable ones of 
McDonnell-Douglas - include a showing that the plaintiff is 
at least as well qualified as the person who was given the 
promotion. 
3. 
I would agree also that, in a promotion case, es-
tablishing that the plaintiff is at least as we ll qualified 
may not be sufficient to create a prima facie case. Prior 
decisions, particularly Burdine, have emphasized that an 
inference of discrimination must be shown to make out a pri-
ma facie case. Where only a single executive position is to 
be filled, a showing of "at least as well qualified '' does 
not necessarily create this inference. You state good rea-
sons for this view. 
In making judgme nts to fill executive positions, 
subjective considerations customarily enter into the deci-
sions. There may be two exceptionally well qualified candi-
dates whose education and experience appear to qualify them 
both equally well. A choice between them must be made, and 
this may be done with no intent whateve r to discriminate 
against the other. If there is a discriminatory intent, 
there usually will be some evidence of it. As your opinion 
notes, there was abundant evidence here to create a strong 
inference of discrimination, and therefore a rebuttable pre-
sumption that shifts the burden of going forward to the 
defendant. 
On pages 8 and 9 you refer unnessarily, as I view 
it, several times to the "presumption", characterizing it as 
"the Burdine presumption". I doubt that I can go along with 
changing the emphasis in these cases, and treating the re-
sult of a prima facie case here as different from that in 
McDonnell-Douglas and Burdine . 
; 
4 • 
As we said in McDonnell-Douglas: "The critical 
issue before us concerns the order and allocation of proof" 
in a Title VII case. The terms prima facie and presumption 
have been used only for this purpose. The plaintiff must 
make a prima facie case. This requires a sufficient showing 
to create an inference of discrimination. If this is done 
there is a presumption which if unrebutted would justify 
judgment for the plaintiff. But its effect merely is to 
shift to the defendant the burden of going forward with re-
butting evidence. The burden of ultimate persuasion, of 
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December 30, 1982 
81-1044 Postal Service v. ~ikens 
I have reread your opinion, as well as McDonnell-
Douglas and Burdine. I am afraio we are farther apart than 
I had supposed. ,, .. , 
\,:ti:. 
The enclosed memorandum, responding to your sug-
gestion prior to Christmas, makes specific suggestions. 
I will, 
unacceptable. In 
write separ at'e ly. 
:fl' ,, 
of course, un1er.stand if you 
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From: Justice Marshall 
Circulated:JAN 1 1 1983 
Recirculated: -----,,L-/ ___ _ 
7 1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-1044 
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE BQARD OF G~{V-
ERNORS, PETITIONER v. LOUIS fl· AIKENS ) 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED ~TES eot:fuT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[January -, 1983] 
JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting. 
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 
(1973), a unanimous Court established the framework for 
proving employment discrimination under Title VII. The 
structure of proof set out in McDonnell Douglas and succeed-
ing cases fairly takes into account both the difficulty of prov-
ing discriminatory motive and the importance of discouraging 
nonmeritorious suits. The Court today holds that the "prin-
ciples established" in "the McDonnell-Douglas line of cases" 
were never "meant to apply to" claims of discrimination 
against applicants for "higher managerial" positions. Ante, 
at 2--3, 7. This conclusion surely comes as a surprise, for the 
McDonnell Douglas principles have been applied in the man-
agerial context not only by the lower courts, but also by this 
Court in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981). In my view, the distinction 
now drawn between managerial and nonmanagerial cases is 
untenable.' Moreover, even if it were proper to apply a dif-
1 The distinction is also unwieldy. The majority opinion indicates at 
various points that its new analytical framework applies to "higher mana-
gerial" or "managerial" positions, ante at 1, 7, but the majority does not 
even attempt to define these terms. Future courts will initially have to 
determine whether the McDonnell Douglas structure of proof applies to 
the position to which a plaintiff applied, and this will inevitably prompt ad-
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ferent structure of proof to managerial cases, I believe that 
respondent introduced sufficient evidence to establish a pre-
sumption of discrimination as a matter of law. For these 
reasons, I dissent. 
I 
Until today, this Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973), governed "the basic 
allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof in a 
Title VII case alleging discriminatory treatment." Texas 
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 
(1981). 2 McDonnell Douglas and its progeny established a 
three-step inquiry for analyzing the proof in a Title VII case: 
"First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the pre-
ponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of dis-
crimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving 
the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant 
'to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for the employee's rejection.' [411 U. S.], at 802. 
Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the plain-
tiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons of-
fered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but 
were a pretext for discrimination. Id., at 804." Texas 
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 
U. S., at 252-253. 
Critical to the McDonnell Douglas framework is the em-
ployer's duty to "explain[] clearly the nondiscriminatory rea-
ditional litigation. In the labor law area, the definition of the analogous 
concept of supervisory status "has spawned an immense amount of litiga-
tion, generating controversy in hundreds of cases before courts and thou-
sands of cases before the National Labor Relations Board." Note, The 
NLRB and Supervisory Status: An Explanation of Inconsistent Results, 94 
Harv. L. Rev. 1713, 1713 (1981). 
2 See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 335--336, n. 15 (1977). 
81-1044-DISSENT 
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sons for its actions." Id., at 260. 3 To be sure, the employ-
er's duty is a minimal one: it need only explain what it has 
done or produce evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory 
reasons. The burden of persuasion on the issue of dis-
crimination remains with the plaintiff. Id., at 256-257. 
Nevertheless, the employer's explanation is essential to 
"bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to" 
the question of intentional discrimination. Id., at 253. In 
particular, the employer's presentation of a reason for its ac-
tion "frame[s] the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that 
the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demon-
strate pretext." Id., at 255-256. 
When an employer fails to carry its burden of articulating a 
nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision or 
8 The employer's burden here is simply one of production, rather than 
persuasion. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 
450 U. S. 248, 256 (1981); Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. 
Sweeney, 439 U. S. 24, 25, n. 2 (1978). This burden of production serves 
two important functions. It eliminates most of the virtually limitless num-
ber of considerations upon which the employer might have relied in making 
its employment decision. The McDonnell Douglas Corp. analysis thereby 
focuses the issue to be tried in the case. The second important function of 
the employer's burden of production is that it elicits material information 
from the .Party that is in control of the information. A Title VII plaintiff 
can be expected to show that he applied for the job or promotion, he was 
qualified according to the employer's enunciated qualifications, and he was 
rejected in favor of a nonminority candidate. But he cannot know the con-
tents of the employer's personnel files or on what subjective ground the 
employer decided to hire someone else over him. Similarly, the workings 
of a subjective evaluation process are beyond the knowledge of a rejected 
plaintiff. 
Even the most liberal civil discovery is not an adequate substitute for the 
employer's burden of production. The McDonnell Douglas Corp. stand-
ard requires an employer to state in court what legitimate reason it had for 
rejecting the plaintiff. "An articulation not admitted into evidence will 
not suffice. Thus, the defendant cannot meet its burden merely through 
an answer to the complaint or by argument of counsel." Burdine, 450 
U. S., at 255, n. 9. 
; 
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proffers an explanation that is "unworthy of credence," id., 
at 256, a Title VII plaintiff obtains the benefit of the rebutta-
ble presumption of discrimination that arises once a prima fa-
cie case is established under McDonnell Douglas. In this 
situation, the plaintiff is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. 
The threshold showing required to establish the rebuttable 
presumption has never entailed more than simply adducing 
evidence that gives rise to an inference of discrimination. 
The Court made this clear in Teamsters v. United States, 431 
U. S. 324, 358 (1977), when it cited McDonnell Douglas for 
the "general principle that any Title VII plaintiff must carry 
the initial burden of offering evidence adequate to create an 
inference that an employment decision was based on a dis-
criminatory criterion illegal under the Act." (emphasis 
added). We reaffirmed this principle in Burdine, where we 
stated, "The plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that she applied for an available position for which 
she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances 
which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination." 
450 U. S., at 253 (emphasis added). See also Furnco Con-
struction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 576 (1978). 
The Negro plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas, like Aikens, 
submitted proof that he was rejected for an available position 
for which he was qualified. This evidence created an inf er-
ence of discrimination because in the absence of a legitimate 
business reason for the employer's decision, it is more likely 
than not that the applicant's race was a factor in the employ-
er's decision. "As the Court explained in Furnco Construc-
tion Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577 (1978), the prima fa-
cie case 'raises an inference of discrimination only because we 
presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely 
than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors." 
Burdine, 450 U. S., at 254. 4 
• Thus, in order to warrant a presumption of discrimination, McDonnell 
Douglas does not require a plaintiff to eliminate all conceivable, or even all 
common, nondiscriminatory reasons for his rejection. If the applicant 
; 
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I do not see why these considerations are any less appli-
cable when this showing is made by an applicant for a mana-
gerial position than by applicants for nonmanagerial posi-
tions. The Court correctly observes that in making its 
promotion decisions the Postal Service may have considered 
any among "a wide range of factors." Ante, at 7. Undoubt-
edly, many legitimate factors are subjective. Yet employers 
commonly rely on subjective considerations in making em-
ployment decisions outside the "higher managerial" context. 
In many cases such subjective considerations have been 
found legitimate. 5 In others, they have been deemed 
pretextual. 6 The majority's observation that managers and 
mechanics require different qualifications does not justify its 
conclusion that in this case the employer's acts, if otherwise 
unexplained, were somehow less likely to have been based on 
impermissible factors. Since Aikens' proof need only give 
rise to a presumption of discrimination in the absence of any 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for the employ-
ment decision, it is irrelevant how many legitimate consider-
ations could conceivably have justified the Postal Service's 
acts and whether those considerations might have been ob-
jective or subjective. What is relevant is the unlikelihood 
that the Postal Service would have denied Aikens' application 
for no reason. "We know from experience that people do not 
were required to meet this burden at the outset, the employer's subse-
quent explanation of his employment decision would be superflous. 
Rather, the plaintiff is required to do only what Aikens has easily done, 
which is to eliminate the two "most common reasons," Burdine, supra, at 
254 (emphasis supplied), which may legitimately support a denial of em-
ployment-the unavailability of a position and the applicant's failure to sat-
isfy stated qualifications. 
5 See, e.g., Shack v. Southworth, 521 F. 2d 51, 55 (CA6 1975); Causey 
v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F. 2d 416, 424 (CA5 1975); Hochstadt v. Worcester 
Foundation, 11 FEP 1426, 1436 (D Mass. 1976); Van de Vate v. Boling, 379 
F.Supp. 925, 928 (ED Tenn. 1974). 
6 See, e.g., Causey v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F. 2d 416, 422--423 (CA5 
1975); Sabol v. Snyder, 524 F. 2d 1009, 1012 (CAlO 1975); Rogers v. 
EEOC, 11 FEP 416, 419 (CA9 1974). 
; 
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act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying rea-
sons, especially in a business setting." Furnco Construction 
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S., at 577. 
When an employer is unable to articulate any legitimate 
reason for hiring a white applicant over a qualified Negro ap-
plicant, it is reasonable to inf er that decision was based at 
least in part on impermissible considerations. There is no 
reason to believe that discrimination is any less prevalent in 
hiring for supervisory positions than it is in hiring for lower 
level positions. 7 While subjective considerations are rele-
7 When Congress enacted the Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 
which made Title VII fully applicable to federal agencies, it made clear its 
particular concern with the exclusion of minorities from high level posi-
tions. Both the Senate and House Reports .cited the exclusion of Negroes 
from professional and managerial positions as evidence that they were 
"still far from reaching their rightful place in society." S. Rep. No. 92-415 
(92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1971), p. 6; H. Rep. No. 92-238 (92d Cong., 1st Sess. 
1971), p. 4. Congress recognized that the problems of racial discrimina-
tion addressed in the 1964 Civil Rights Act had proved to be more complex, 
deep rooted, and intractable than it believed in 1964: 
"In 1964, employment discrimination tended to be viewed as a series of iso-
lated and distinguishable events, for the most part due to ill-will on the 
part of some identifiable individual or organization. It was thought that a 
scheme that stressed conciliation rather than compulsory processes would 
be most appropriate for the resolution of this essentially 'human' problem, 
and that litigation would be necessary on an occasional basis. Experience 
has proved this view to be false. 
"Employment discrimination as viewed today is a far more complex and 
pervasive phemomenon." S. Rep. No. 92-415, su'{Yra, at 5. 
With regard to the Government particularly, Congress found that the 
concentration of minorities and women in nonsupervisory positions was 
symptomatic of employment discrimination: 
"Statistical evidence shows that minorities and women continue to be ex-
cluded from large numbers of government jobs, particularly at the higher 
grade levels .... 
"This disproportionate distribution of minorities and women throughout 
the Federal bureaucracy and their exclusion from higher level policy-mak-
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vant in hiring a supervisor, evaluations of such subjective cri-
teria as the applicant's "ability to work effectively with par-
ticular superiors and subordinates," ante, at 7, are certainly 
more susceptible to illegitimate considerations than are eval-
uations of objective criteria. 
"[P]rocedures which depend almost entirely upon the 
subjective evaluation and favorable recommendation of 
the immediate [supervisors] are a ready mechanism for 
discrimination against Blacks. . . . We and others have 
expressed a skepticism that Black persons dependent di-
rectly on decisive recommendations from Whites can ex-
pect nondiscriminatory action." Rowe v. General Mo-
tors Corp., 457 F. 2d 348, 359 (CA5 1972) (citations 
omitted). 
See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 482, 497 (1977); Albe-
marle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 433 (1975). If 
anything, it is particularly true with respect to the higher 
levels of employment that "when all legitimate reasons for re-
jecting an applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons 
for the employer's actions, it is more likely than not that the 
ing and supervisory positions indicates the government's failure to pursue 
its policy of equal opportunity." H. Rep. No. 92-238, supra, at 23. 
In the years that followed, Congress recognized the need for additional 
remedies for discrimination which remains pervasive on the highest as well 
as the lowest rungs of the employment ladder both inside and outside the 
Government. See, e. g., 5 U. S. C. §§ 2302(d), 7201, 4313(5) (1978); 
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448 (1980) (discussing the set-aside provi-
sions of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977). Only a few months 
ago, the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights concluded that gross inequal-
ities in the labor force, which have been reduced only marginally over the 
past decade, must be explained by the "effect [of discrimination] on blacks, 
Hispanics and women in their struggle to find jobs commensurate with 
their qualifications and experience." U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, 
Unemployment and Underemployment Among Blacks, Hispanics, and 
Women (Nov. 1982), at 57. 
., 
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employer, who we generally assume acts only with some rea-
son, based his decision on an impermissible consideration 
such as race." Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 
supra, at 577 (emphasis in original). 
The irrelevance of the distinction now drawn between su-
pervisory and nonsupervisory positions is clearly recognized 
in our past decisions. It is possible in any Title VII case that 
the employer had a legitimate subjective reason for its re-
fusal to hire or promote the applicant. In McDonnell Doug-
las the employer asserted that in refusing to hire the plaintiff 
it had relied on subjective hiring judgments. 411 U. S., at 
803; 463 F. 2d 337, 352 (CA8 1972). While we held that em-
ployers may rely on subjective criteria in rebutting charges 
of discrimination, 411 U. S., at 803-804, we certainly did not 
require the plaintiff to anticipate and rebut such justifications 
as part of his prima facie case. Rather, once the plaintiff set 
forth evidence that gave rise to an inference of discrimination 
in the absence of a nondiscriminatory justification for the em-
ployer's decision, the employer was required to articulate a 
legitimate business justification for its action. 
Burdine reaffirmed the appropriateness of the McDonnell 
Douglas standard for all Title VII cases alleging discrimina-
tory treatment. The plaintiff in Burdine sought a promotion 
to the supervisory position of Project Director in the Public 
Service Careers Division of the Texas Department of Com-
munity Affairs. She was denied the promotion and was sub-
sequently discharged before being rehired to a position com-
parable that to which she had originally aspired. Certainly 
these decisions could have rested on the very factors that the 
majority deems relevant to this case, the applicant's "under-
standing of the organization's goals, ability to work effec-
tively with particular superiors and subordinates, maturity, 
originality, initiative, and decision making ability." Ante, at 
7. Yet the unanimous Court in Burdine made clear that the 
McDonnell Douglas "allocation of burdens and order of pres-
; 
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entation of proof'' was fully applicable to that case. 450 
U. S., at 252-256. I am at loss to see any distinction be-
tween this case and Burdine. 
II 
Even assuming that the prima facie case described in Mc-
Donnell Douglas does not, standing alone, justify an infer-
ence of discrimination in a suit involving a supervisory posi-
tion, Aikens certainly introduced sufficient additional 
evidence to warrant such an inference. 8 Since the majority 
gives only passing attention to the evidence, it is necessary to 
set out the stipulated or otherwise uncontroverted facts in 
some detail. 
A 
Aikens, a Negro male, was an employee of the United 
States Postal Service and its predecessor from 1937 until his 
retirement. He was promoted to his first supervisory posi-
tion on October 1, 1952, and held various foreman positions 
until 1960, the highest being ranked PFS-7 under the Postal 
Service's old grading system. From 1960 through 1966, 
8 I therefore believe that the majority errs in concluding that the pre-
sumption was unwarranted in this case. I am somewhat at a loss as to 
why the majority decides this issue. In this case the Postal Service did 
advance reasons below for denying promotions to Aikens. Petitioner con-
tended that by turning down two lateral transfers that were offered to him, 
Aikens failed to acquire necessary experience and familiarity with the 
Postal Service. Since the District Court found that this explanation was 
not pretextual-a finding which was in my view clearly erroneous-its 
resolution of the question whether Aikens' initial showing gave rise to a 
rebuttable presumption was not necessary to the decision below. Rather 
than "tak[ing] the case as it comes to us," ante, at 2, the Court should 
never have taken this case at all. I believe that today's decision is an advi-
sory opinion on an issue that is not properly before us. Nevertheless, I 
take the majority opinion as it comes to me and address my dissenting re-
marks to the merits. 
; 
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Aikens received six promotions or lateral transfers, until he 
attained the position of Assistant Director for Transit Mails 
(PFS-15). He was the first Negro to reach that level. 
From August 1966 to March 1973, there were only four po-
sitions higher than Aikens' in the Washington, D.C., post of-
fice: Director for Installation Services (PFS-17), Assistant 
Director for Operations Division for Distribution (PFS-16), 
Director for Operations Division (PFS-17), and Postmaster 
(PFS-18). During that period, seven white males-L.M. 
Lieb, L.V. Bateman, Jr., E.C. Ray, D.M. Barranca, M.G. 
Thomas, F.A. Miller, and Ellsworth Rapee-were promoted 
or detailed 9 into one or more of these positions over Aikens a 
total of 29 times. The availability of promotions and details 
to high level jobs in the Service was not posted, and candi-
dates were not notified as a matter of course that they were 
under consideration. D.C. Postmaster Carlton Beall appar-
ently made all detail assignments until he was promoted to 
District Postal Manager in July 1971. After Beall's promo-
tion, a promotion advisory board made one set of recommen-
dations that resulted in Lieb's promotion to Assistant Direc-
tor for Operations Division for Distribution and Rapee's 
• A promotion entails a permanent assignment to a position. A detail is 
a temporary assignment to a supervisory position. Under Postal Service 
procedure at the time, an employee had to file a Form 1717 in order to indi-
cate that he or she wanted to be considered for a job. Aikens filed these 
forms for all of the jobs above his position. For a detail, a higher level 
supervisor with authority over the position assigned an employee by sign-
ing a Form 1723 Assignment Order. A detail normally lasted 89 days, but 
frequently was extended by the signing of another Assignment Order for a 
second 89-day period. Although details were to be renewed only once, the 
Postal Service often had employees who stayed on detail for years. The 
D.C. Postmaster and the District Postal Manager were the supervisors re-
sponsible for the positions in which Aikens indicated interest. Carlton 
Beall was the D.C. Postmaster until July 1971, when he was promoted to 
District Postal Manager. Ellsworth Rapee became D.C. Postmaster upon 
Beall's promotion. Detail assignments were made by Beall or by Rapee 
with the concurrence of Beall. 
; 
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promotion to Director for Operations Division. In both 
cases, Aikens was the board's second choice. 
In March of 1973, the Postal Service conducted a reevalua-
tion of its grading system, called the Job Evaluation Program 
(JEP). Under the new grading, Aikens' position of Assist-
ant Director for Transit Mails was rated as PES-20. Three 
other positions in the D.C. area that had been graded PFS-15 
were upgraded to PES-23. Because of the regrading, sev-
eral additional positions were rated above Aikens' position 
and several more junior white males received details or pro-
motions above Aikens. 10 
After the regrading, Aikens was again passed over in favor 
of several junior white males. M.G. Thomas was detailed 
twice and F.A. Miller three times to the position of Assistant 
Director for Operations Division for Distribution. In addi-
tion, on September 29, 1973, A.J. Eckerl replaced D.J. Rob-
ertson as Manager of Personnel, a position that had been up-
graded to PES-23. At the same time, Robertson was 
promoted to Employee and Labor Relations Specialist, a 
newly regraded PES-24 position for which Aikens was quali-
fied. Other whites who were promoted over him included 
W.E. Hahn, J.J. Spelta, and C. Errico. In late 1973, 
Aikens also was passed over for the positions at issue in this 
lawsuit: Mail Processing Officer, Acting Mail Processing 
Representative, Director for Operations Division, and Cus-
tomer Services Representative. 11 These positions were 
filled by Barranca, Miller, Rapee, and Thomas. 
Aikens was undeniably qualified for the jobs to which 
10 Aikens unsuccessfully appealed his regrading. In the appeal, he 
sought a PES--23 rating for his position in order to remain eligible for the 
D.C. Postmaster position. He objected to the anomaly of being graded 
lower than those over whom he had supervisory authority. 
11 Although Aikens was passed over continually during this period, he 
failed to file timely administrative complaints with regard to other in-
stances of discrimination. 5 CFR § 713.214 (complaints must be filed 
within 30-days of discriminatory action). 
; 
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white males were appointed instead of him. The Postal 
Service stipulated below that "there was no derogatory or 
negative information found in plaintiff's Official Personnel 
Folder to indicate that he had not fulfilled the requirements 
of his position." Joint Appendix, at 7 (stipulation of facts). 
"In 1968 Plaintiff was rated as 'an outstanding supervisor 
whose management abilities were far above average.'" Id., 
at 8. 
Indeed, Aikens' credentials appear to have been superior. 
Aikens' educational experience exceeded that of the white su-
pervisors promoted over him. "Plaintiff has a Master's de-
gree and completed 3 years residence on his Ph.D." Id., at 
7. Beall, the Postmaster and later District Postal Manager, 
had completed the tenth grade. Robertson had one and a 
half years of college. Barranca had eight months of college. 
Eckerl, Lieb, Thomas, Errico, and Hahn were high school 
graduates. Rapee, who was detailed as Postmaster, and 
Ray had completed the eleventh grade. Miller had com-
pleted his sophomore year in high school. 12 The educational 
background of Bateman and Spelta is not in the record. 
Ibid. In addition, Aikens had more experience in supervi-
sory positions than any of the whites other than Spelta. He 
had more seniority in the Postal Service than even Spelta. 
Aikens had as many or more training courses and seminars as 
the whites. The promotions and detail records show that 
Aikens had as much or more experience in varied and specific 
supervisory positions than his white colleagues. 
Aikens also introduced anecdotal evidence to show that 
Beall, who was primarily responsible for promotion decisions, 
12 Miller's lack of education was apparently a serious practical handicap. 
A coworker testified at trial that he had to "write all [of Miller's] letters for 
him because he couldn't write a decent report." Transcript, at 228. De-
spite this problem, however, Miller served as Mail Processing 
Respresentative, Tour Superintendent, and Assistant Director for Opera-
tions Division for Distribution. 
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was biased against Negroes. A Negro supervisor testified 
that the Postmaster had stated to him that "[a]ll they [Ne-
groes] want to do is to lay around and breed like yard dogs 
and collect relief checks." Transcript, at 220. A white su-
pervisor testified that Beall once told an all-white meeting: 
"You know, they don't have to set in the back of the bus any-
more." Id., at 250-251. Another Negro supervisor testi-
fied that Beall referred to Negroes nearly all the time as 
"that crowd," and often made sarcastic remarks about 
Aikens' educational achievements. Id., at 252-254. 
Finally, Aikens introduced statistical evidence of the un-
derrepresentation of minorities at higher levels. As of Feb-
ruary 7, 1974, one month after Aikens filed his Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity complaint, whites held a dispropor-
tionate number of high level supervisory positions in the 
Washington, D.C., post office. Although only 14.3% of the 
total workforce of 8,634 were white, 34.1% of PES-1 through 
PES-14 employees were white, and 48.4% of all categories 
PES-15 and higher were white. Aikens remained the only 
Negro at his level or higher until January 1974. 
B 
The Court acknowledges that McDonnell Douglas did not 
limit the means by which a prima facie case may be estab-
lished. Ante, at 3-4. See Furnco Construction Corp. v. 
Waters, supra, at 577; Teamsters v. United States, supra, at 
362. Indeed, the Government has argued at length to this 
Court in this very case that an applicant denied a supervisory 
position may make any number of alternative showings that 
suffice not only to compel his employer to articulate reasons 
for its actions, but also to compel entry of judgment in his fa-
vor "[i]fthe trier of fact believes [his] evidence, and if the em-
ployer is silent in the face of'' that evidence. Burdine, 
supra, at 254. See Brief for the Petitioner, at 21-30. I 
would hold that, as a matter of law, Aikens made such a 
showing in this case. 
; 
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III 
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green a unanimous Court 
established a fair procedure for proving all claims of discrimi-
natory treatment. The fairness and appropriateness of this 
procedure had not been questioned by this Court in any of its 
subsequent opinions. Today, the Court nevertheless ex-
empts a broad class of cases from the McDonnell Douglas 
framework on the basis of an entirely untenable distinction 
between supervisory and nonsupervisory positions. Those 
discriminated against in supervisory, professional and other 
positions to which subjective qualifications are often rele-
vant, will no longer have the fair opportunity to recover that 
this Court previously assured. By making it more difficult 
for victims of discrimination at the higher levels of employ-
ment to seek redress, the Court undermines the unequivocal 
congressional purpose of eliminating discrimination from all 
the workplaces of this nation. I dissent. 
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I think Justice Marshall's dissent is well done, but it 
does not agree with your views as I understand them. As I read it, 
it adopts a low-level test for establishing a prima facie case. A 
Title VII plaintiff must show that "he was qualified according to 
the employer's enunciated qualifications." Seep. 3 n. 3. Although 
the employer has the option of defining its job criteria narrowly, a 
minority applicant who met those criteria and was rejected for a job 
would have established a prima facie case. 
Justice Marshall seems to add a new twist to the McDonnell 
Douglas test. The inference of discrimination does not arise from 
the plaintiff's level of proof but from the employer's failure t ·o 
articulate a legitimate reason for refusing to hire him: 
"When the employer is unable to articulate any 
legitimate reason for hiring a white applicant over a 
qualified Negro applicant, it is reasonable to infer that 
[his] decision was based at least in part on impermissible 
considerations." See page 6. 
., 
Thus, Justice Marshall focuses on the idea that even if the acts 
proved by the plaintiff alone would not establish discrimination, 
these same acts, if otherwise unexplained, do establish 
discrimination. This, however, would place too little emphasis on 
2 . 
the prima facie case since under Justice Marshall's view, any facts 
would suffice so long as they are not explained. 
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Please join me in your dissent in this case. 
Justice Marshall 




STYLISTIC CHANGES THROUGHOUT 








From: Justice Rehnquist 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: _H_iN_' _1_4_ 19_8_3 __ _ 
2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF TIIE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-1044 
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE BOARD OF GOV-
ERNORS, PETITIONER v. LOUIS H. AIKENS 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT 
OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[January -, 1983] 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Respondent Louis Aikens filed suit under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et 
seq., claiming that petitioner, the United States Postal Serv-
ice, discriminated against him on account of his race. 
Aikens, who is black, claimed that the Postal Service had dis-
criminatorily refused to promote him to higher positions in 
the Washington, D.C. Post Office where he had been em-
ployed since 1937. After a bench trial, the District Court en-
tered judgment in favor of the Postal Service, but this judg-
ment was reversed by the Court of Appeals. 642 F. 2d 514 
(CA DC 1980). We vacated the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and remanded for reconsideration in the light of 
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 
U. S. 248 (1981). 453 U. S. 902 (1981). On remand, the 
Court of Appeals reaffirmed its earlier holding that the Dis-
trict Court had erred in requiring Aikens to offer direct proof 
of discriminatory intent. 665 F. 2d 1057, 1058 (CA DC 1981) 
(Per Curiam). We granted certiorari to consider the assess-
ment of proof of racial discrimination when an employer has 
selected among applicants for a higher managerial position 1• 
- u. s. - (1982). 
1 We have consistently distinguished disparate treatment cases from 
cases involving facially neutral employment standards that have disparate 
impact on minority applicants. See, e.g., Texas Department of Commu-
; 
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The Court of Appeals, in its second opinion, held not only 
that the District Court erred in requiring Aikens to offer di-
rect proof of discriminatory intent 2, but also that it erred in 
requiring Aikens to show, as part of his prima facie case, that 
he was "as qualified or more qualified" than the people who 
were promoted. The Postal Service insists that an employee 
who has shown only that he was black, that he had applied for 
a promotion for which he possessed the minimum qualifica-
tions, and that the Postal Service selected a non-minority ap-
plicant has not established a "prima facie" case of employ-
ment discrimination under Title VII. 
Since the case has been fully tried on the merits in the Dis-
trict Court, one might at first blush wonder why the parties 
are still arguing about the nature of a prima facie case. In-
deed, to the untutored this case, tried to the District Court in 
January, 1979, might seem to be one that could have been 
disposed of in a relatively short span of time (according to ju-
dicial lights) with the District Court making the necessary es-
sential findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the Court 
of Appeals reviewing those findings and conclusions under 
the appropriate standards 3• But we take the case as it 
comes to us. 
We think that some statements in the briefs of the parties 
and of the amici, urging us either to "adhere" to, modify, or 
reconsider, the line of cases beginning with McDonnell Doug-
nity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 252, n. 5 (1981); McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802, n. 14 (1973). 
2 As in any lawsuit, the plaintiff may prove his case by direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence. The trier of fact should consider all the evidence, 
giving it whatever weight and credence it deserves. Thus, we agree with 
the Court of Apeals that the District Court should not have required 
Aikens to submit direct evidence of discriminatory intent. See Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 358, n. 44 
(1977) ("[T]he McDonnell Douglas formula does not require direct proof of 
discrimination.") 
3 See Pullman Standard v. Swint, - U.S.-, - (1982). 
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las v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1972), reveal a misunderstanding 
of that line of cases. Because this misunderstanding may 
have been shared in part by the District Court and by the 
Court of Appeals in the present case, we take the liberty of 
setting forth the facts as well as the law in the principal cases 
in the McDonnell-Douglas line. 
In McDonnell-Douglas itself, the defe~dant employer ran 
a newspaper advertisement seeking qualified mechanics. 
The plaintiff, a qualified mechanic who had been laid off by 
the defendant, applied for reemployment. The defendant 
declined to rehire him, even though it continued to hire other 
applicants who responded to the advertisement after the 
plaintiff. The plaintiff's Title VII suit was dismissed by the 
District Court, but the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit reversed. That court held that the reason given by the 
defendant for refusing to rehire plaintiff-plaintiff's partici-
pation in a "stall in" and "lock-in" at defendant's place of busi-
ness-was a "subjective" criterion that carried little weight 
in rebutting charges of discrimination. The Court of Ap-
peals set forth its version of a prima f acie case of discrimina-
tion under Title VII. 
Our opinion described the now familiar elements of a prima 
facie case: 
"The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the 
initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima 
facie case of racial discrimination. This may be done by 
showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that 
he applied and was qualified for a job for which the em-
ployer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his 
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his re-
jection, the position remained open and the employer 
continued to seek applicants from persons of complain-
ant's qualifications." Id., at 802. 
We immediately added, however, that "[t]he facts necessar-
ily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specifications above of 
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the prima f acie proof required from respondent is not neces-
sarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situa-
tions." Id., at 802, n. 13. 
We returned to the same question in Furnco Construction 
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567 (1978). The employer's busi-
ness was the rehabilitation of steel mill blast furnaces with 
"fire brick." The employer did not maintain a permanent 
force of bricklayers; instead, it hired a superintendent for 
each project, and then delegated to him the task of securing a 
competent work force. The superintendent who declined to 
hire the plaintiff did not accept applications at the job site, 
but hired only persons he knew to be experienced and compe-
tent in this work or who had been recommended to him as 
similarly skilled. The employer claimed this policy was es-
tablished to ensure that only experienced and highly qualified 
fire bricklayers were employed, because untimely work could 
result in substantial losses both to the steel mill operator and 
to the contractor-employer. Id., at 569-572. 
We agreed with the Court of Appeals that the black plain-
tiffs had made out a prima facie case. We disagreed, how-
ever, with its conclusion that the reasons for the employer's 
hiring practices were illegitimate. In discussing the 
showings required of the parties to Title VII suits, we 
pointed out: 
"The central focus of the inquiry in a case such as this is 
always whether the employer is treating 'some people 
less favorably than others because of their race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.' Int'l. Brotherhood of 
Teamsters v. United States, supra,[431 U. S.,] at 335, n. 
15. The method suggested in McDonnell-Douglas for 
pursuing this inquiry, however, was never intended to 
be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather, it is merely 
a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light 
of common experience as it bears on the critical question 
of discrimination." 438 U. S., at 577. 
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Finally, in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981), plaintiff, a woman, claimed 
that the employer's failure to promote her and its later deci-
sion to terminate her had both resulted from gender-based 
discrimination. The District Court found after a bench trial 
that neither decision was discriminatory. Id., at 251. The 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the decision of 
the District Court as to the promotion, but reversed its find-
ing on the termination. 
We reviewed only the part of the case that had been re-
versed by the Court of Appeals, 4 and stated more clearly the 
consequences of the plaintiff's success in making the showing 
required by McDonnell Douglas. The primafacie case in a 
Title VII action is not merely the minimum showing that will 
justify a verdict for the plaintiff, it "creates a presumption 
that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the em-
ployee." Id., at 254, n. 7. If the employer does not rebut 
this presumption by "clearly set[ting] forth, through the in-
troduction of admissible evidence" a legitimate nondiscrimi-
natory reason for his action, id., at 255, the district court 
"must enter judgment for the plaintiff." Id., at 254 (empha-
sis supplied). 
The justification for this seemingly drastic rule can be 
found in Furnco: 
"A prima facie case under McDonnell-Douglas raises 
an inference of discrimination only because we presume 
these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely 
than not based on the consideration of impermissible fac-
tors. . . . And we are willing to presume this largely be-
cause we know that from our experience that more often 
than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, 
without any underlying reasons, especially in a business 
'Thus Burdine's failure to be promoted to a managerial position was not 
before us. 
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setting. Thus, when all legitimate reasons for rejecting 
an applicant had been eliminated as possible reasons for 
the employer's actions, it is more likely than not the em-
ployer, whom we generally assume acts only with some 
reason, based his decision on an impermissible consider-
ation such as race." 438 U. S., at 577. 
More succinctly phrased, a prima facie case "eliminates the 
most common non-discriminatory reasons for the plaintiffs 
rejection." Burdine, supra, at 254. For this reason, we 
have held that an unrebutted prima facie case is sufficiently 
compelling to require a judgment for the plaintiff as a matter 
of law. 
In the present case, both the District Court and the Court 
of Appeals apparently thought that Aikens' claim against the 
Postal Service fits into the pattern of the McDonnell-Doug-
las line of cases. We disagree. The first and third elements 
of McDonnell-Douglas are undoubtedly present; Aikens be-
longs to a racial minority, and he applied for the promotions 
in question but was denied them. The fourth element, how-
ever, is entirely absent; the position did not remain open, as 
it did in McDonnell-Douglas, but was filled by the applicant 
chosen in preference to Aikens. Indeed, where an employer 
seeks to fill a single managerial position, the position will by 
definition not be open after one of the applicants has been 
chosen. 
The second McDonnell-Douglas element-the showing 
that the plaintiff was "qualified" for the job-is more prob-
lematic. There is no doubt that Aikens had an impressive 
resume. He has a Masters Degree and has completed three 
years of residence towards a Ph.D. He has been rated as 
"an outstanding supervisor whose management abilities are 
far above average." App. 8. There was no derogatory or 
negative information in his Personnel Folder. He had more 
supervisory seniority and training and development courses 
than all but one of the white persons who were promoted 
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above him. It is clear that his qualifications were sufficient, 
in the eyes of the Postal Service, to merit serious 
consideration. 
At this point, however, agreement between the parties, 
and between the courts that have considered this factual 
issue, breaks down. It is argued that Aikens must show he 
is "as qualified" as the person actually chosen, "better quali-
fied" than the person actually chosen, "relatively qualified," 
or merely "qualified" for the jobs he sought. We believe 
that this contest of comparatives ultimately proves self-
stultifying. 
The fair reading of the McDonnell-Douglas advertisement 
for qualified mechanics is that there was a known, reasonably 
objective basis for determining who was a qualified mechanic, 
and that applicants would be hired on a first come, first 
served basis until the employer had obtained the number of 
mechanics it needed. But where one managerial position is 
open, there may be no totally objective measure of who is 
"qualified," and the employer certainly does not undertake to 
promote more than one applicant. Employers consider a 
wide range of factors, such as each applicant's understanding 
of the organization's goals, ability to work effectively with 
particular superiors and subordinates, maturity, originality, 
initiative, and decision making ability. It will rarely, if ever, 
be possible to quantify all the relevant criteria and tally them 
up on a score card. 
In these circumstances, the question is not whether we will 
"follow" the McDonnell-Douglas line of cases, but whether 
the principles established in those cases were ever meant to 
apply to a situation so far removed from their factual con-
text. 5 If those principles do not provide the district courts 
5Tbe dissent asserts that a primafacie case arose in McDonnell-Doug- I 
las when the black plaintiff "submitted proof that he was rejected for an 
available position for which he was qualified." Post , at 4. The dissent 
thus ignores the third element of the McDonnell-Douglas formulation and 
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with a "sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light 
of common experience," Furnco, supra, at 577, they are in-
applicable under the terms of those decisions. Burdine, 
supra, at 253, n. 6; Furnco, supra, at 575-576; International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 
358 (1977); McDonnell Douglas, supra, at 802, n. 13. 
McDonnell-Douglas and Furnco both dealt with entry 
level jobs, one in a large manufacturing industry and the 
other in the construction industry. In those cases, if the 
plaintiff could meet the four elements of the McDonnell-
Doug las prima facie case-that he belonged to a racial mi-
nority, that he applied and was qualified for a job for which 
the employer was seeking applicants, that he was rejected, 
and that after his rejection the employer continued to seek 
similarly qualified applicants-the plaintiff has in effect nega-
tived the principal broadly applicable reasons that would 
show that the employer's refusal to hire him was not based on 
a discriminatory animus. 
But that simply is not true in the present case. There 
were several applicants for each position, and only one could 
be chosen. The "qualifications" for the position as laid down 
by the Postal Service, while not appearing as clearly from the 
record as might be, were by no means as easy to assess as the 
qualifications for a "mechanic" advertised for in McDonnell-
Douglas. We simply do not think that Aikens' showing that 
he is black, that he was sufficiently qualified to be seriously 
considered, and that he was not chosen, "eliminates the most 
common non-discriminatory reasons" for his rejection. 
Burdine, supra, at 254 (emphasis supplied). 
We do not believe we can revise McDonnell Douglas to fit J 
these facts. To do so, we would be obliged to hold that 
Aikens, merely by showing that he is black, he was qualified 
for a single vacancy, and the Postal Service promoted an-
trivializes the differences in the kinds of qualifications necessary for the po-
sitions in that case and this. 
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other of several non-minority applicants, was presumptively 
the victim of discrimination. This we are unwilling to do; 
such a showing in these circumstances does not justify the 
presumption that the employer's acts "if otherwise unex-
plained, are more likely than not based on the consideration 
of impermissible factors." Furnco, supra, at 577. 
Although the 'ken showin made below does not justify + t-
a presumption o 1scrimination, it is sufficient to support an 
inference of discrimination. That is, if the District Court 
were to conclude that the Postal Service did treat Aikens less 
favorably than others because of his race, we surely could not 
say, on the basis of the record before us, that such a finding 
would be clearly erroneous. Aikens showed that white per-
sons were consistently promoted and detailed over him and 
all other black persons between 1966 and 1974. Aikens had 
substantially more education than the white employees who 
were advanced ahead of him; of the 12, only 2 had any educa-
tion beyond high school and none had a college degree. 
Aikens introduced testimony at trial that the person respon-
sible for the promotion decisions at issue had made numerous 
derogatory comments about blacks in general and Aikens in 
particular. 
We believe that the District Court, which is able to per-
ceive the attitude and demeanor of witnesses, and to evaluate 
their credibility and the weight that should be placed on their 
testimony, is in a far better position than this Court to decide 
whether the Postal Service discriminated againt Aikens. 
The District Court should decide this case in the same man-
ner that it decides questions of fact in the myriad other kinds 
of litigation before it. 
We therefore hold that in a case such as this, where no 
standardized prima facie case can be made out, the district 
court should evaluate all the admissible evidence and then de-
cide the factual question of discrimination. Thus, plaintiffs 
may seek to obtain the benefit of the Burdine presumption by 
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making out a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, and may 
also seek to prove their case in the ordinary way 6• A plain-
tiff, through use of the liberal discovery provided in Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 2(h37, can depose a defendant's employees and obtain 
relevant documents relating to employment decisions. Of 
course, a plaintiff who fails to make out a McDonnell Douglas 
primafacie case will not survive a motion for judgment at the 
close of his case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) unless he has 
presented evidence from which the district court can infer 
that he was discriminated against. See Teamsters, supra, at 
358. This case presents one example of that sort of 
evidence. 
JUSTICE MARSHALL'S dissent contends that this opinion 
"exempts a broad class of cases from the McDonnell-Douglas 
framework on the basis of an entirely untenable distinction 
between supervisory and nonsupervisory positions." Post, 
p. 14. We do no such thing. We hold the McDonnell-Doug-
las presumption inapplicable because by its terms it requires 
that plaintiff prove four elements in order to have the benefit 
of it, and in this case respondent Aikens proved only two of 
those four elements. The dissent also states that even if the 
McDonnell-Douglas presumption does not apply, Aikens 
"certainly introduced sufficient additional evidence to war-
rant such an inference." Post, at 9. We fully agree that the 
evidence introduced by Aikens more than adequately sup-
ports an inference of discrimination, on the basis of which the 
finder of fact would be entirely justified in concluding that 
Aikens had been the victim of discrimination; we summarize 
that evidence earlier in the opinion. The dissent insists on 
6 A rough analogy may be found in the law relating to res ipsa loquitur 
in negligence actions. In some circumstances a showing of circumstances 
sufficient to raise res ipsa creates a rebuttable presumption like the 
Burdine presumption. See Prosser, Torts 229-230 (1971). A tort plain-
tiff can also seek to show negligence directly without abandoning the bene-
fit of res ipsa. Id., at 231-232. 
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equating the "inference" of discrimination with the rebutta-
ble "presumption" brought into play by McDonnell-Douglas, 
post, at 9. The distinction between the two was pointed out 
in footnote 7 of our opinion in Burdine. For the reasons 
stated above, we do not think a presumption is warranted in 
this case. 
All courts have recognized that the questions facing triers 
of fact in discrimination cases are both sensitive and difficult. 
The prohibitions against discrimination contained in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 reflect an important national policy. In 
any Title VII case, regardless whether the prima facie case 
device is available to the plaintiff, the ultimate question is 
"whether the employer is treating 'some people less favor-
ably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin." Furnco, supra, at 577 (quoting Teamsters, 
supra, at 335, n. 15). There will seldom be "eyewitness" tes-
timony as to the employer's mental processes, but this does 
not mean that courts should treat the question of discrimina-
tion differently from other questions of fact. The law often 
obliges finders of fact to inquire into a person's state of mind. 
As Lord Justice Bowen said in treating this problem in an ac-
tion for misrepresentation nearly a century ago: 
"The state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the 
state of his digestion. It is true that it is very difficult 
to prove what the state of a man's mind at a particular 
time is, but if it can be ascertained it is as much as fact as 
anything else." Eddington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. Div. 
459, 483 (1885). 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the 
case is remanded with directions to remand to the District 
Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
; 
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I concur in the judgment of the Court. :.'~_t:r;mot--
agree, however, that resolution of the question presented 
here requires that we abandon the framework for resolving 
Title VII cases established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) /" ~ ~ ~ 
~~G-4>¥-/3~ 
I 
Respondent, who is black, applied for several 
high level positions in the Washington D.C. Post Office. 
Despite his considerable qualifications, the Postal 
Service repeatedly rejected him in favor of white 
applicants. Respondent brought this action under Title 
2. 
VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 u.s.c. §2000e et seq., 
alleging that the Postal Service had discriminated against 
him on account of his race. After a full trial, the 
District Court for the District of Columbia found that the 
respondent had failed to prove a prima facie case under 
McDonnell Douglas since he had not shown that he was "as 
qualified or more qualified" than the other candidates. 
See App. to Pet. for Cert. 59a. The Court of Appeals 
~ ' ~ 
reversed~ ~~e '94.sti;ict Gourt haa s.e-t ~o silJa' a ~ 
~ - Under its view of McDonnell Douglas, a 
~ 
plaintiff automatically establishes a prima facie case 
; 
whenever he proves that he belongs to a racial minority, 
that he applied for an available position for which he 
possessed the "qualifications or background experiences 
the employer has indicated are important," and that a 
3. 
nonminority applicant was selected , insteaa. 1 See 665 F.2d 
105 7, 1060 (CA DC 1981) (per cur iam) . 
The Court~ ctly I believe--rejects this 
view. See ante, at 8. To establish a prima facie case a 
Title VII plaintiff must introduce evidence that 
eliminates the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for 
his rejection. See Texas Department of Community Affairs 
1The Court of Appeals held initially that a Title VII 
plaintiff must show only that he possessed the minimum 
qualifications to perform a job. See 642 F.2d 514, 519 (CA DC 
1980). We vacated the judgment and remanded for reconsideration 
in light of Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 
U.S. 248 (1981). 453 U.S. 902 (1981). On remand the court 
adhered to its earlier holding. 
~I-~ 
the employment decision being made before it determines 
whether a plaintiff has satisfied his initial burden. 
selects 
As the Court recognizes, when an employer 
4~ '.Le, 
one of severJi appiicants for ~ gerial 
,< 
4. 
position, he customarily takes into account a wide range 
Wb-.e:t:,,-~'r:::S-~...-,:,,,~~'J;21~~:t,::~ • ~~ ~ ~ 
of subjectivee consideration~ ~el, as decision making .. 
ability, leadership, and ability to work well with other 
employees. See ante, at 7. A-editional~ ~ ven those 
applicants who meet the employer's minimum objective 
qualififications geAer~ ~ possess varying levels of 
,1 
/)111--~In selecting a person to fill an executive 
f\ 
a.,..~ 




who is mo~t qualified--i.e., the applicant who presents 
the optimal combination of subjective qualifications the 
~~ a.--L-
employer values and outstanding objective qualifications. 
"'\ 
5. 
With respect to this type of employment decision, a 
disappointed minority applicant who can establish only 
that he met the employer's minimum objective 
qualifications simply will not have eliminated the most 
common nondiscriminatory reasons for his rejection. See 
Teamsters, supra, at 358 n. 44. 
..Jc 4-- /J!&4> 
Additionally, when only one position is~ and 
h 1 h f 1 ~f 'f .- 1" · t e emp oyer c ooses rom a poo o Aqual1 1ed app 1cants, 
... ,.. - .J. $;Ai : ~ ,~ . - ,.,,.... 
he necessarily preferf one applicant over another. A 
I\ 
choice has to be made and the employer's isolated decision 
to select a qualified nonminority applicant rather than a 
) h.>-t..,~  ,/ 
qualified minority applicant does not imply that the 
choice was discriminatory. Cf. 
States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n. 44 
I'\ 
Teamsters v. United 
(197 ~ n this respect, 
the decision here differs significantly from the decision 
6. 
in McDonnell Douglas. In that case ,,\he employer rejected 
a qualified minority applicant :...,~ ;;f ~ position 
unfilled and continued to seek qualified applicants. See 
411 U.S., at 802. Because the employer's decision in -
~ cDoRRQll Dougla-s was facially inconsistent with its own 
economic self interest, the plaintiff in that case "was 
rejected under circumstances which [gave] rise to an 
inference of unlawful discrimination." Burdine, supra, at 
253. \ 2-
Thus to the extent the Court holds that the 
Court of Appeals set too low a standard for this type ·of 
employment decision, I agree with its reasoning. The 
Court, however, does not ge- o~ ~o specify the proof that 
would be sufficient to create a prima facie case in this 
~
context. It determines instead that t:-he prima facie case, 
~ 
7. 
and the entire McDonnell Douglas framework, 
inapplicable to managerial decisions. 
~./u,,,Le_ 
The reasons for this 00fiCltlsion are difficult to 
" 
fathom. The Court draws a distinction between evidence 
that establishes a "McDonnell Douglas presumption" and 
evidence that establishes an "inference of 
discrimination." Under its view, a McDonnell Douglas 
presumption arises only when proof of the "standardized 
prima facie case" eliminates the most common 
nondiscriminatory reasons for an employer's decision. If 
it does not, a plaintiff is not entitled to a McDonneil 
Douglas presumption. Ibid. In these situations, the 
Court would require a plaintiff instead to introduce facts 
that create an "inference" of discrimination and "prove 
[his] case in the ordinary way." Ibid. In my view, the 
I 
distinction the Court draws between a ~d prima 
facie case and facts that create an inference of 
discrimination is neither required nor justified by our 
past cases. 
II 
In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), we reaffirmed unanimously 
the basic allocation of burdens and order of proof 
initially set forth in McDonnell Douglas: 
"First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving 
by the preponderance of the evidence a prima 
facie case of discrimination. Second, if the 
plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie 
case, the burden shifts to the defendant 'to 
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for the employee's rejection.' 
[McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.], at 802. Third, 
should the defendant carry this burden, the 
plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were 
8 • 
not its true reasons, but were a pretext for 
discrimination." 450 U.S., at 252-253. 
This framework is designed to bring the trier of fact 
9. 
"expeditiously and fairly" to the ultimate question to be 
proved--whether the challenged employment decision was in 
fact discriminatory. The prima facie case, the initial 
step in this process, requires a Title VII plaintiff to 
raise an inference of discrimination by removing the most 
common nondiscriminatory reasons for his rejection. 2 See 
id., at 253-254. 
---------.--
1t<.. ,t: ~. ~.a..,u;( -
2 JUSTICE MARSHALL'S issenting opinion reasons that it is the 
employer's inability o articulate any legitimate reason for 
prefering a nonminori y applicant that makes it "reasonable to 
infer that [the] deci ion was based ... on impermissible 
considerations." Pot, at 8. This places the burden on the 
wrong party. Under urdine, the plaintiff has the burden of 
proving facts that establish an inference of discrimination. 
Only after the inference is established does the burden shift to 
the employer to rebut the inference by articulating a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason. See/ 450 U.S., at 254 (1981). 
~) 
10. 
In many cases, a plaintiff may satisfy his 
initial burden by proving the four factors noted in 
McDonnell Douglas. See 411 U.S., at 802. But we have 
never held that proof of these factors automatically 
establishes a prima facie case. The facts in each case 
will vary and the prima facie proof specified in McDonnell 
Douglas will not be "necessarily applicable in every 
respect to differing factual situations." See id., at 802 
n. 13. As we stated in Teamsters v. United States, 
"the "importance [of the McDonnell Douglas 
articulation of the prima facie case] lies, not 
in its specification of the discrete elements of ~ " 
proof there required, but in its recognition of 
the general principle that any Title VII 
plaintiff must carry the initial burden of 
offering evidence adequate to create an 
inference that an employment decision was based 
on a discriminatory criterion illegal under the 
Act." 431 U.S., at 358. 
Thus, a court must question whether, in light of the 
particular employment decision involved, the plaintiff's 
11. 
proof raises an inference of discrimination. When a 
plaintiff has met this initial burden, he "in effect 
creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully 
discriminated against [him]." Id., at 254. As we 
explained in Burdine, this presumption is primarily an 
evidentiary device for allocating intermediary burdens of 
proof. It shifts the burden of production to the employer 
to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for 
his decision. See id., at 255, n. 8. ~ > 
Contrary to the Court's view, our cases make 
l!);fiil> 
clear that prima facie case was never intended to be a 
rigid, standardized test. See Furnco Construction Corp. 7 
v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). They establish that I, 
the requirements of the prima facie case will vary in 
accordance with the facts of each case. Nor does the 
12. 
Court's distinction between evidence that gives rise to an 
inference of discrimination and that which gives rise to a 
prima facie case find support in our precedent. The two 
concepts instead are interrelated. Evidence that gives 
rise to an inference of discrimination is sufficient to 
establish a prima facie case and shift the burden of 
production to the employer. See Burdine, supra, at 254: 
Furnco, supra, at 577: Teamsters, supra, at 358. 
III 
In my view, the proper method of analysis--and 
the one most consistent with our past opinions--is to 
adapt the prima facie cas~ ticular employment 
~ 
decision being made. As discussed above there are two 
13. 
VIA-~ 4v.J-L- d!c:> ~ ~ 
considerations/\ A-ei'.'e that~ · · · !\of the &--LL 
typical McDonnell Douglas factors. I ~ as 
/~~} 
~ ~ ere only a single executive position is to be 
"' 
filled, the elements of a prima facie case--in addition to 
the applicable ones of McDonnell Douglas--include a 
showing that the plaintiff is at least as well qualified 
as the person who was given the promotion. Absent such a 
showing, a Title VII plaintiff will not have eliminated 
the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for his 
rejection. 
Further, where only a single managerial position 
is to be filled from a pool of applicants, even a showing 
~ r},,UJI- h.u ~ ~ 
of relative qualifications Jn-¥ -net be sufficient to create 
" 
an inference of discrimination. A plaintiff may be 
required to come forward with additional evidence that 
14. 
indicates that the employer's decision was based on 
impermissible considerations. A plaintiff may rely on 
statistical or anecdotal evidence, or he may introduce 
evidence of employment practices that contradict normal 
expectations. Thus, an employer's decision to select a 
nonminority applicant, who previously had been supervised 
by the minority applicant, would constitute probative 
evidence of an employer's discriminatory motive. See 
Burdine, supra, at 254 n. 6. 
As both the Court's opinion and JUSTICE 
MARSHALL'S dissenting opinion make clear, respondent 
produced abundant evidence that he was at least as 
qualified if not more qualified than the other applicants. 
He also proved that the Postal Service repeatedly passed 
over him and chose white employees who had held positions 
15. 
inferior to his own. In addition, he introduced anecdotal 
and statistical evidence of racial discrimination. In my 
view, there was abundant evidence to create a strong 
inference of discriminatory motive. Accordingly, I agree 
that the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be 
vacated and remanded for further consideration. 
-
I ~KA .M.-~j_ ~ - _j fL_, 
~~c. ~~A~ 
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here requires that we abandon the framework for resolving 
Title VII cases established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
I 
; 
Respondent, who is black, applied for several 
high level positions in the Washington D.C. Post Office. 
Despite his considerable qualifications, the Postal 
Service repeatedly rejected him in favor of white 
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I concur in the judgment of the Court. I ee:flnot 
agree, however, that resolution of the question presented 
here requires that we abandon the framework for resolving 
Title VII cases established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
I 
; 
Respondent, who is black, applied for several 
high level positions in the Washington D.C. Post Office. 
Despite his considerable qualifications, the Postal 
Service repeatedly rejected him in favor of white 
applicants. Respondent brought this action under Title 
2. 
VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 u.s.c. §2000e et seq., 
alleging that the Postal Service had discriminated against 
him on account of his race. After a full trial, the 
District Court for the District of Columbia found that 
respondent had failed to prove a prima facie case under 
McDonnell Douglas since he had not shown that he was "as 
qualified or more qualified" than the other candidates. 
See App. to Pet. for Cert. 59a. The Court of Appeals 
reversed because the District Court had set too high a 
standard. Under its view of McDonnell Douglas, a 
plaintiff automatically establishes a prima facie case 
whenever he proves that he belongs to a racial minority, 
that he applied for an available position for which he 
possessed the "qualifications or background experiences 
the employer has indicated are important," and that a 
3. 
nonminority applicant was selected instead. 1 See 665 F.2d 
1057, 1060 (CA DC 1981) (per curiam). 
The Court--correctly I believe--rejects this 
view. See ante, at 8. To establish a prima facie case a 
Title VII plaintiff must introduce evidence that 
eliminates the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for 
his rejection. See Texas Department of Community Affairs 
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). The most common 
reasons for an employment decision, however, will vary 
depending on the industry and the level of employment 
.,. 
involved. Accordingly, a court must consider the type of 
1rhe Court of Appeals held initially that a Title VII 
plaintiff must show only that he possessed the minimum 
qualifications to perform a job. See 642 F.2d 514, 519 (CA DC 
1980). We vacated the judgment and remanded for reconsideration 
in light of Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 
U.S. 248 (1981). 453 U.S. 902 (1981). On remand the court 
adhered to its earlier holding. 
employment decision being made before it determines 
whether a plaintiff has satisfied his initial burden. ----As the Court recognizes, when an employer 
selects one of several qualified applicants for a high 
~ 
level managerial position, he customarily takes into 
f\ 
4. 
account a wide range of subjective considerations, such as 
decision making ability, leadership, and ability to work 
well with other employees. See ante, at 7. Typically, a 
second variable enters into the employment decision: the 
applicants who meet the employer's minimum objective 
; 
qualifications generally will possess varying levels of 
ability. In selecting a person to fill a high level 
managerial position, it is customary for an employer to 
choose the applicant who presents the optimal combination 
of subjective qualifications the employer values and 
... \ 
5. 
outstanding objective qualifications. Thus, a 
disappointed minority applicant who can establish only 
that he met the employer's minimum objective 
qualifications simply will not have eliminated the most 
common nondiscriminatory reasons for his rejection. See 
Teamsters, supra, at 358 n. 44. 
Add1tionally, when only one position is open and 
the employer chooses from a pool of qualified applicants, 
he necessarily prefers one applicant over another. A 
choice has to be made and the . employer's isolated decision 
to select a qualified n9nminority applicant rather than a 
qualified minority applicant does not imply that the 
choice was di scr imina tory. Cf. Ibid. . In this respect, 
" 
I 
the decision here differs significantly from the decision 
in McDonnell Douglas. In that case the employer rejected 
6. 
~ - ("'UA. 6-~-'-5<-,' '~ J 
a qualified minority applicant but left the position 
'1 
I unfilled and continued to seek~ fied applicants. See 
" 
411 U.S., at 802. Because the employer's decision in 
McDonnell Douglas was facially inconsistent with its own 
economic self interest, the plaintiff in that case "was 
rejected under circumstances which [gave] rise to an 
inference of unlawful discrimination." Burdine, supra, at 
253. 
Thus to the extent the Court holds that the 
Court of Appeals set too low a standard for this type of 
~ 
employment decision, I agree with its reasoning. The 
.,. 
Court, however, does not go on to specify the proof that 
would be sufficient to create a prima facie case in this 
~ 
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and the entire McDonnell Dou las framework, are 
inapplicable to manageria 
The reasons for h.Js conclusion are difficult to 
fathom. The Court draws a distinction between eviden e 
that establishes a "McDonnell Douglas presumption" 
evidence that establishes an "inference of 
" 
discrimination." Under its view, a McDonnell Douglas 
presumption arises only when proof of the "st~ a~ ~ ::::::=--~ 
./ 
prima facie case" eliminates the most common I 
nondiscriminatory reasons for an employer's decision. If 
it does not, a plaintiff is not entitled to a presumption 
of discrimination. Ibid. In these situations, the Court 
would require a plaintiff instead to introduce facts that 
create an "inference" of discrimination and "prove [his] 
case in the ordinary way." Ibid. In my view, the 
,·~ . 
distinction the Court draws between a standardized prima 
facie case and facts that create an inference of 
discrimination is neither required nor justified by our 
past cases. 
II 
In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 {1981), we reaffirmed unanimously 
the basic allocation of burdens and order of proof 
initially set forth in McDonnell Douglas: 
"First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving 
by the preponderance of the evidence a prima 
facie case of discrimination. Second, if the 
plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie 
case, the burden shifts to the defendant 'to 
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for the employee's rejection.' 
[McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.], at 802. Third, 
should the defendant carry this burden, the 
plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were 
; 
8. 
not its true reasons, but were a pretext for 
discrimination." 450 U.S., at 252-253. 
This framework is designed to bring the trier of fact 
9. 
"expeditiously and fairly" to the ultimate question to be 
proved--whether the challenged employment decision was in 
fact discriminatory. The prima facie case, the initial 
step in this process, requires a Title VII plaintiff to 
raise an inference of discrimination by removing the most 
common nondiscriminatory reasons for his rejection. 2 See 
id., at 253-254. ~ ~J 
~ b{ ~ 1/UAAr' fvv Hu_ ~f-
~ ~~ ~ 
2JUSTICE MARSHAL 's dissenting op n1on reasons~ that it is the  
employer's inabili y to articulate ny legitimate reason for 4fi' 
prefering a nonmin rity applicant tat makes it "reasonable to 
infer that [the] d cision was based .•. on impermissible ~'- _ 
considerations." P st, at 8. This plaoe.s . tbQ J.n1~en on the~---~ 
w~on9--P.Et;y. Under · , the plaintiff has the burden of 
proving facts that establish an inference of discrimination. 
Only after the inference is established does the burden shift to 
the employer to rebut the inference by articulating a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason. t:ee 450 u.s., at 254 (198:) "/\') 
~ :.. U/k-~ #___./ 
In many cases, a plaintiff may satisfy his 
initial burden by proving~ four factors noted in 
I\ 
McDonnell Douglas. See 411 U.S., at 802. But we have 
never held that proof of these factors automatically 
establishes a prima facie case. The facts in each case 
10. 
will vary and the prima facie proof specified in McDonnell 
Douglas will not be "necessarily applicable in every 
respect to differing factual situations." See id., at 802 
n. 13. As we stated in Teamsters v. United States, 
"the "importance [of the McDonnell Douglas 
articulation of the prima facie case] lies, not 
in its specification of the discrete elements of ~; 
proof there required, but in its recognition of 
the general principle that any Title VII 
plaintiff must carry the initial burden of 
offering evidence adequate to create an 
inference that an employment decision was based 
on a discriminatory criterion illegal under the 
Act." 431 U.S., at 358. 
Thus, a court must question whether, in light of the 
particular employment decision involved, the plaintiff's 
11. 
proof raises an inference of discrimination. When a 
plaintiff has met this initial burden, he "in effect 
creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully 
discriminated against [him]." Id., at 254. As we 
explained in Burdine, this presumption is primarily an 
evidentiary device for allocating intermediary burdens of 
proof. It shifts the burden of production to the employer 
to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for 
his decision. See id., at 255, n. 8. 
Contrary to the Court' 
Ha(.. 





rigid, standardized test. See Furnco Construction Corp. 
v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). !Pfley e'"Stablish that 
tbe r€qttireme~ts gf ~he..p~ima f.acie case wiJl vaE-y in 
accordance witb e°Re faots gf ea-e.b caet. Nor does the 
12. 
Court's distinction between evidence that gives rise to an 
inference of discrimination and that which gives rise to a 
5~ 
precedent. ~fhe two 
I\ 
prima facie case find support in our 
concepts io ~ d are interrelated. Evidence that gives 
rise to an inference of discrimination is sufficient to 
establish a prima facie case and shift the burden of 
production to the employer. See Burdine, supra, at 254; 
Furnco, supra, at 577; Teamsters, supra, at 358. 
III 
In my view, the proper method of analysis--and 
the one ~ t consistent with our past opinions--is to 
~
adapt the prima facie case to the particular employment 
'\ 






considerations here that require modification of the 
typical McDonnell Douglas factors. In a case such as 
this, where only a single executive position is to be 
filled, the elements of a prima facie case--in addition to 
the applicable ones of McDonnell Douglas--include a 
showing that the plaintiff is at least as well qualified 
as the person who was given the promotion. Absent such a 
showing, a Title VII plaintiff will not have eliminated 
the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for his 
rejection. 
Further, where only a single managerial position 
is to be filled from a pool of applicants, even a showing 
of relative qualifications may not be sufficient to create 
· an inference of discrimination. A plaintiff may be 









indicates that the employer's decision was based on 
impermissible considerations. A plaintiff may rely on 
statistical or anecdotal evidence, or he may introduce 
evidence of employment practices that contradict normal 
expectations. Thus, an employer's decision to select a 
nonminority applicant, who previously had been supervised 
by the minority applicant, would constitute probative 
evidence of an employer's discriminatory motive. See 
Burdine, supra, at 254 n. 6. 
As both the Court's opinion and JUSTICE 
MARSHALL's dissenting opinion make clear, respondent 
produced abundant evidence that he was at least as 
qualified if not more qualified than the other applicants. 
He also proved that the Postal Service repeatedly passed 
over him and chose white employees who had held positions 
15. 
inferior to his own. In addition, he introduced anecdotal 
and statistical evidence of racial discrimination. In my 
view, there was abundant evidence to create a strong 
inference of discriminatory motive. Accordingly, I agree 
that the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be 
vacated and remanded for further consideration. 
.,r-. . -
lfp/ss 02/03/83 RIVESA SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Rives DATE: Feb. 3, 1983 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Aikens 
I have now read with some care your draft of 
Jan. 31. It is evident that you have devoted a great deal 
of thought to the case, and it may be that there is no 
clearer way to write out our position. 
I must say, however, that I do not think the 
force of the opinion will be clear to the casual type 
reading often done by courts and lawyers. 
Our basic difficulty with the Court's opinion is 
that it appears to scrap - as you state in the opening 
; 
paragraph - the framework of analysis established by prior 
cases. As indicated in my memorandum to Justice Rehnquist 
of December 29, it seems to me that his rejection focuses 
on the term "presumption" as used particularly in Burdine. 
If I understand it correctly, he thinks a prima facie case 
under the McDonnell/Burdine forumla results in shifting 
the burden of going forward and nothing more. Perhaps I 
should not have used the term "presumption", although as 
2. 
we have agreed the term serves merely the evidentiary 
purpose of shifting this burden. 
Rather than agreeing to this, WHR apparently 
prefers to hold that the McDonnell/Burdine pr ima facie 
case reasoning does not apply at all to situations where a 
single managerial position is to be filled. 
Part II of your draft says pretty much all of 
this. My difficulty with the draft is Part I. After 
summarizing the facts, and setting forth very well what 
should be considered where a managerial position is open, 
you address the Court's distinction "between evidence that 
establishes a McDonnell/Douglas presumption and evidence 
that establishes an "inference of discrimination". (draft 
p. 7) Then you say: 
"Under the this, a McDonnell-Douglas presumption 
arises only when proof of the 'standardized ~; 
pr ima facie case' eliminates the most common 
non-discriminatory reasons for an employer's 
decision. If it does not, a plaintiff is not 
entitled to a presumption of discrimination. In 
these situations, the Court would require a 
plaintiff instead to introduce facts that create 
an 'inference' of discrimination and 'prove his 
case in the ordinary way'". 
This simply is not clear to me, perhaps because 
I have not reread Rehnquist's opinion and do not know what 
he means by a "standardized prima facie case". In any 
3. 
event, I would like for you to educate me on this part of 
the draft. 
I particularly would like for you to consider a 
different arrangement. Perhaps it could be as follows: 
After an introduction (that I may dictate), move your 
present Part II to the front of our opinion as a Part I -
before stating any facts. You might preface what you have 
written with a sentence to the effect that it is well to 
summarize the cases that have established a consistent 
analytical approach to Title VII employment and promotion 
cases. 
Then Part II could apply the analysis to this 
case, recognizing that only two of the specific McDonnell 
factors apply. We could state what you and I both have 
said (see my rider) as to what properly may be considered 
by an employer when filling a single executive position. 
A brief Part III could address WHR's rejection 
of the Court's prior analysis. As you say, why he does 
this is difficult to "fathom". I simply do not understand 
it. 
The last part could be quite brief along the 
lines of a rider I have dictated. 
* * * 
4. 
I do not want to make a major production out of 
this. You have an important Court opinion to write. You 
might put Aikens aside until you get a draft of the Court 
opinion; though we must circulate this Aikens opinion no 
later than Tuesday February 15 so that Rehnquist will have 
a chance to reply before the Friday Conference. 
A fall back position, Rives, is simply to state 
that I write separately because I do not agree with my 
understanding of the reasoning of the Court's opinion. 
Then say that I nevertheless do not read its opinion as 
rejecting the consistent approach to these cases carefully 
developed in our precedents. I would summarize the prior 
precedents as you have done and apply the basic analysis 
to the particular facts of this case. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
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MEMORANDUM 
TO: Rives DATE: Feb. 3, 1983 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Aikens 
I have now read with some care your draft of 
Jan. 31. It is evident that you have devoted a great deal 
of thought to the case, and it may be that there is no 
clearer way to write out our position. 
I must say, however, that I do not think the 
force of the opinion will be clear to the casual type 
reading often done by courts and lawyers. 
Our basic difficulty with the Court's opinion is 
that it appears to scrap - as you state in the opening 
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paragraph - the framework of analysis established by prior 
cases. As indicated in my memorandum to Justice Rehnquist 
of December 29, it seems to me that his rejection focuses 
on the term "presumption" as used particularly in Burdine. 
If I understand it correctly, he thinks a prima facie case 
under the McDonnell/Burdine forumla results in shifting 
the burden of going forward and nothing more. Perhaps I 
should not have used the term "presumption", although as 
2. 
we have agreed the term serves merely the evidentiary 
purpose of shifting this burden. 
Rather than agreeing to this, WHR apparently 
prefers to hold that the McDonnell/Burdine pr ima facie 
case reasoning does not apply at all to situations where a 
single managerial position is to be filled. 
Part II of your draft says pretty much all of 
this. My difficulty with the draft is Part I. After 
summarizing the facts, and setting forth very well what 
should be considered where a managerial position is open, 
you address the Court's distinction "between evidence that 
establishes a McDonnell/Douglas presumption and evidence 
that establishes an "inference of discrimination". 
p. 7) Then you say: 
(draft 
"Under the this, a McDonnell-Douglas presumption 
arises only when proof of the 'standardized :' 
pr ima f acie case' eliminates the most common 
non-discriminatory reasons for an employer's 
decision. If it does not, a plaintiff is not 
entitled to a presumption of discrimination. In 
these situations, the Court would require a 
plaintiff instead to introduce facts that create 
an 'inference' of discrimination and 'prove his 
case in the ordinary way'". 
This simply is not clear to me, perhaps because 
I have not reread Rehnquist's opinion and do not know what 
he means by a "standardized prima facie case". In any 
3. 
event, I would like for you to educate me on this part of 
the draft. 
I particularly would like for you to consider a 
different arrangement. Perhaps it could be as fol lows: 
After an introduction (that I may dictate), move your 
present Part II to the front of our opinion as a Part I -
before stating any facts. You might preface what you have 
written with a sentence to the effect that it is well to 
summarize the cases that have established a consistent 
analytical approach to Title VII employment and promotion 
cases. 
Then Part II could apply the analysis to this 
case, recognizing that only two of the specific McDonnell 
factors apply. We could state what you and I both have 
said (see my rider) as to what properly may be considered 
' ; 
by an employer when filling a single executive position. 
A brief Part III could address WHR's rejection 
of the Court's prior analysis. As you say, why he does 
this is difficult to "fathom". I simply do not understand 
it. 
The last part could be quite brief along the 
lines of a rider I have dictated. 
* * * 
... 
4. 
I do not want to make a major production out of 
this. You have an important Court opinion to write. You 
might put Aikens aside until you get a draft of the Court 
opinion; though we must circulate this Aikens opinion no 
later than Tuesday February 15 so that Rehnquist will have 
a chance to reply before the Friday Conference. 
A fall back position, Rives, is simply to state 
that I write separately because I do not agree with my 
understanding of the reasoning of the Court's opinion. 
Then say that I nevertheless do not read its opinion as 
rejecting the consistent approach to these cases carefully 
developed in our precedents. I would summarize the prior 
precedents as you have done and apply the basic analysis 
to the particular facts of this case. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in the judgment. 
I join the opinion of JUSTICE POWELL, adding only a comment 
on my understanding of the proof necessary to establish a pr ima 
facie case of racial discrimination in hiring or promotion under 
Title VII. As I understand the reach of McDonnell Douglas v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), it provides a rough, flexible guide 
for all Title VII cases of the amount and type of proof that an 
individual plaintiff must show to establish a prima facie case of 
disparate treatment. As a general reformulation of the McDonnell 
Douglas factors, applicable to all plaintiffs alleging discrimi-
nation in hiring or promotion, one could say that the plaintiff 
in a Title VII action would establish a prima facie case upon 
proof (i) "that he belongs to a racial minority," 411 U.S., at 
802; (ii) that he applied for a job and possessed objective qual-
ifications fairly comparable to other applicants that merited the 
employer's serious consideration; (iii) that, despite his quali-
fications, he was rejected (iv) under circumstances that, absent 
other explanation, eliminate the most common legitimate reasons 
for his rejection. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 
358, n. 44 (1977). This fourth factor is flexible, and the show-
ing it requires depends on the circumstances of the particular 
case. In McDonnell Douglas itself, a showing that the job re-
mained open was sufficient, in combination with the other fac-
tors, to establish a prima f acie case. As JUSTICE POWELL sug-
gests, ante, at 7, a showing that the employer promoted a subor-
dinate instead of the plaintiff may satisfy this final element. 
Statistical or anecdotal evidence is also relevant. 
"" 
- 2 -
It appears clear from the record here that respondent made 
more than an ample showing to establish a prima facie case. I 
agree with JUSTICE POWELL, however, that resolution of this fac-
tual question is more appropriately left to the courts below. I 
therefore concur that the judgment of the Court of Appeals should 
be vacated and the case remanded for further consideration. 
-
lfp/ss 02/03/83 Rider A, p. 11 (Aikens) 
AIKENS11 SALLY-POW 
The foregoing line of cases establishes a 
framework of reasoning that has been applied in each of our 
prior decisions. In should be applied in the present case. 
As the Court notes, two of the specific factors identified 
in McDonnell-Douglas are not present where a sinqle 
executive position is to be filled. Yet, the burden remains 
on the plaintiff to produce evidence that gives rise to an 
inference of discrimination. If so, he has created a prima 
facie case shifting the burden of production to the 
employer. On the facts of record here, it is clear that 
respondent produced abundant evidence to make out a prima 
facie case. He proved that the Postal Service had 
repeatedly passed over him and chosen white employees who 
had held positions subordinate to his own. In addition, he 
introduced anectdotal and statistical evidence of racial 
·~ 





discrimination. rn my view, his evidence created more than 
an inference of discriminatory motivP. Accordingly, I agree 
with the judgment of the Court . 





Rider A, p. 11 (Aikens) 
The foregoing line of cases establishes a 
framework of reasoning that has been applied in each of 
our prior decisions. In should be applied in the present 
case. As the Court notes, two of the specific factors 
identified in McDonnell-Douglas are not present where a 
single executive position is to be filled. Yet, the 
burden remains on the plaintiff to produce evidence that 
gives rise to an inference of discrimination. If so, he 
has created a prima facie case that shifts the burden of 
production to the employer. On the facts of record here, 
it is clear that respondent produced abundant evidence to 
make out a pr ima facie case. In addition to impressive 
qualifications, he proved that the Postal Service had 
; 
repeatedly passed over him and chosen white employees who 
had held positions subordinate to his own. In addition, 
he introduced anectdotal and statistical evidence of 
racial discrimination. In my view, his evidence created 
more than an inference of discriminatory motive. 
Accordingly, I agree with the judgment of the Court. 
lfp/ss 02/03/83m Rider A, p. 4 (Aikens) 
AIKENS4 SALLY-POW 
As the Court recognizes, when an employer 
selects one of several qualified applicants for a high 
level managerial position, the sitaution is quite 
different from the employment decision that is made in 
cases such as McDonnell-Douglas and Burdine. Whether 
minimum objective qualifications is merely the threshold 
inquiry. Normally, an employer wishes to fill managerial 
positions with the best qualified applicant. And making a 
; 
fair and intelligent judgment may require a weighing of 
qualities not always apparent from information of record. 
For example, consideration normally would be given to an 
applicant's leadership qualities and ability to work well 
with others. Depending upon the level and authority of 
2. 
the position, the capacity of the applicant to make sound 
decisions could be critical. 
Additionally, when there are several fully 
qualified applicants who can be viewed as satisfying all 
of the foregoing factors, the employer necessarily must 
prefer one applicant over others. A choice has to be 
made, and thus an employer's decision to select a 
qualified non-minority applicant does not imply that the 
choice was discriminatory. See Teamsters, supra, at 358 
n. 44. In this respect, the decision here differs 
significantly from the decision in McDonnell-Douglas. In 
that case, where a non-managerial job was open, the 
employer rejected a qualified minority applicant but left 
the position unfilled and continued to seek qualified 
applicants. See 411 U.S., at 802. Because the employer's 
3. 
decision was facially inconsistent with its own economic 
self interest, the plaintiff in that case "was rejected 
under circumstances which [gave] rise to an inference of 
unlawful discrimination." Burdine, supra, at 253. In 
view of the foregoing considerations, I agree that the 
Court of Appeals applied a standard that is wholly 
inapplicable to this type of employment decision. My 
difficulty with the Court's opinion is that it appears to 
reject, as inapplicable to managerial decisions, the prima 
facie case analysis and the entire McDonnell-Douglas 
framework. 
The reasons for this apparent rejection of our 
precedents are difficult to fathom. The Court draws a 
distinction between evidence that establishes a 
"McDonnell-Douglas presumption" and evidence that 
4. 
establishes an "inference of discrimination", a 
distinction not heretofore drawn. Under the Court's view, 
a McDonnell-Douglas presumption arises only when proof of 
the "standardized prima facie case" eliminates the most 
common non-discriminatory reasons for an employer's 
decision. If it does not, a plaintiff is not entitled to 
a presumption of discrimination. 
lfp/ss 02/03/83 
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Rider A, p. 4 (Aikens) 
As the Court recognizes, when an employer 
selects one of several qualified applicants for a high 
level managerial position, the s i taut ion is quite 
different from the employment decision · that is made in 
cases such as McDonnell-Douglas ano Burdine. Whether an 
applicant has minimum objective qualifications is merely 
the threshold inquiry. Normally, an employer wishes to 
fill managerial positions with the best qualified 
applicant. And making a fair and intelligent judgment may 
require a weighing of qualities not always apparent from 
information of record. For example, consideration 
normally would be given to an applicant's leadership 
qualities and ability to work well with others. Depending 
upon the level and authority of the position, the capacity 
of the applicant to make sound decisions could be 
er i tical. 
Additionally, when there are several fully 
qualified applicants who can be viewed as satisfying all 
of the foregoing factors, the employer necessarily must 
prefer one applicant over others. A choiae has to be 
made, and thus an employer's decision to select a 
2. 
qualified non-minority applicant does not necessarily 
imply that the choice was discriminatory. See Teamsters, 
supra, at 358 n. 44. In this respect, the decision here 
differs significantly from the decision in McDonnell-
Douglas. In that case, where a non-managerial job was 
open, the employer rejected a qualified minority applicant 
but left the position unfilled and continued to seek 
qualified applicants. See 411 U.S., at 802. Because the 
employer's decision was facially inconsistent with its own 
economic self interest, the plaintiff in that case "was 
rejected under circumstances which [gave] rise to an 
inference of unlawful discrimination." Burdine, supra, at 
253. In view of the foregoing considerations, I agree 
that the Court of Appeals applied a standard that simply 
does not apply to this type of employment decision. My 
~ 
difficulty with the Court's opinion is that it appears to 
reject, as inapplicable to managerial decisions, the prima 
facie case analysis and the entire McDonnell-Douglas 
framework. 
The reasons for this apparent rejection of our 
precedents are difficult to fathom. The Court draws a 









establishes an "inference of discrimination", a 
distinction not heretofore drawn. Under the Court's view, 
a McDonnell-Douglas presumption arises only when proof of 
the "standardized prima facie case" eliminates the most 
common non-discriminatory reasons for an employer's 
decision. If it does not, a plaintiff is not entitled to 
a presumption of discrimination. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-1044 
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE BOARD OF GOV-
ERNORS, PETITIONER v. LOUIS H. AIKENS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[February -, 1983) 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment. 
I concur only in the judgment of the Court, as its reasoning 
appears to depart from the consistent approach to Title VII 
cases that our precedents have developed. The Court ap-
parently perceives a distinction between evidence that estab-
lishes a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 
411 U. S. 792 (1973), and evidence that establishes an infer-
ence of discrimination. See ante, 9-11. If a plaintiff is able 
to make out a prima facie case, he is entitled to a "presump-
tion of discrimination" that shifts the burden of production in 
accordance with the analytical framework established in Mc-
Donnell Douglas. See id., at 9-10. If, however, a plaintiff 
can prove only an "inference of discrimination," the Court ap-
parently would find the McDonnell Douglas framework inap-
plicable. See id., at 10. In my view, the distinction the 
Court perceives finds no support in our precedents-prece-
dents that I do not understand the Court to reject. Instead, 
our cases make clear that evidence that gives rise to an infer-
ence of discrimination is sufficient to establish a prima facie 
case. They do not indicate, as the Court suggests, that the 
McDonnell Douglas framework is inapplicable to the type of 
employment decision presented here. 
; 
81-1044-CONCUR 
2 U. S. POSTAL SERVICE BD. OF GOVS. v. AIKENS 
I 
In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 
450 U. S. 248 (1981), we reaffirmed unanimously the basic 
allocation of burdens and order of proof initially set forth in 
McDonnell Douglas: 
"First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the pre-
ponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of dis-
crimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving 
the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant 
'to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for the employee's rejection.' [McDonnell Douglas, 411 
U. S.], at 802. Third, should the defendant carry this 
burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legiti-
mate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true 
reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination." 450 
U. S., at 252-253. 
This framework is designed to bring the trier of fact "expe-
ditiously and fairly" to the ultimate question to be proved-
whether the challenged employment decision was in fact dis-
criminatory. See id., at 253. 
The prima facie case, the initial step in this process, re-
quires a Title VII plaintiff to raise an inference of discrimina-
tion by removing the most common nondiscriminatory rea-
sons for his rejection. See id., at 253-254. In many cases, a 
plaintiff may satisfy this initial burden by proving only the 
four factors noted in McDonnell Douglas. See 411 U. S., at 
802. · But we have never held that proof of these factors 
automatically establishes a prima facie case. The facts in 
each case will vary and the prima facie proof specified in Mc-
Donnell Douglas will not be "necessarily applicable in every 
respect to differing factual situations." See id., at 802, n. 13; 
Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577 
(1978). As we stated in Teamsters v. United States, 431 
u. s. 324 (1977): 
81-1044-CONCUR 
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"the "importance [of the McDonnell Douglas articulation 
of the prima facie case] lies, not in its specification of the 
discrete elements of proof there required, but in its rec-
ognition of the general principle that any Title VII plain-
tiff must carry the initial burden of offering evidence ad-
equate to create an inference that an employment 
decision was based on a discriminatory criterion illegal 
under the Act." Id., at 358. 
Thus, a court must question whether, in light of the particu-
lar employment decision involved, the plaintiff's proof raises 
an inference of discrimination. When a plaintiff has met this 
initial burden, he "in effect creates a presumption that the 
employer unlawfully discriminated against [him]." Id., at 
254. As we explained in Burdine, this presumption is pri-
marily an evidentiary device for allocating intermediate bur-
dens of proof. It shifts the burden of production to the em-
ployer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for his decision.* See id., at 255, n. 8. 
As our cases make clear, we have never created a distinc-
tion between evidence that establishes an inference of dis-
*The Court seeks to justify its distinction between an inference of dis-
crimination and a presumption of discrimination by relying on footnote 7 in 
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 
(1981). See ante, at 11. In my view, the Court reads too much into this 
footnote. As we noted in Burdine, the term "prima facie case" has been 
used in two ways. See 450 U. S., at 254, n. 7. It may refer either to the 
level of proof necessary to withstand a motion for a directed verdict or to 
an evidentiary device that shifts the burden of production to the defendant. 
Footnote 7 only stands for the proposition-a proposition that should have 
been evident from the analytical framework established in McDonnell 
Douglas-that proof of a prima facie case does more than allow a plaintiff to 
withstand a motion for a directed verdict. It shifts the burden of produc-
tion. As we subsequently explained, "the term 'presumption' properly 
used refers only to a device for allocating the production burden." See 
Burdine, SU'{Yr'a , at 255, n. 8. (quoting F. James and G. Hazard, Civil Pro-
cedure § 7.9 (2d ed. 1977)). 
81-1044-CONCUR 
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crimination and evidence that gives rise to a presumption of 
discrimination. Rather the two concepts are interrelated. 
Evidence that gives rise to an inference of discrimination is 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case and shift the burden 
of production to the employer. See Burdine, supra, at 254; 
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577 
(1978); Teamsters, supra, at 358. This analytical framework 
has been applied consistently both by this Court and the 
lower courts. Departing from it would create uncertainty 
and invite litigation. 
II 
As the Court notes, t:wo of tae-speeific-faetol!S-i4mtified-in----
Mc.Donnell Douglas are absent where a single executive po-
sition is to be.Jllled from a pool of qualified of applicants. 
(_ 
See ante, at ~- When an employer selects one of several 
- qualified applicants' for a high level managerial position, the 
situation is quite different from the employment decision that 
is made in cases such as McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. 
Whether an applicant possesses minimum objective qualifica-
tions is merely the threshold inquiry. Normally, an em-
ployer wishes to fill managerial positions with the most quali-
fied applicant. And making a fair and intelligent judgment 
may require a weighing of qualities not always apparent from 
information of record. For example, consideration normally 
would be given to an applicant's leadership qualities and abil-
ity to work well with others. Depending upon the level and 
authority of the position, the capacity of the applicant to 
make sound decisions could be critical. 
Additionally, when there are several qualified applicants 
who can be viewed as satisfying all of the foregoing factors, 
the employer necessarily must prefer one applicant over oth-
ers. A choice has to be made, and thus an employer's deci-
sion to select a qualified non-minority applicant does not nec-
essarily imply that the choice was discriminatory. See 
Teamsters, supra, at 358, n. 44. In this respect, the decision 
; 
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here differs significantly from the decision in McDonnell-
Douglas. In that case, where a non-managerial job was 
open, the employer rejected a qualified minority applicant 
but left the position unfilled and continued to seek other ap-
plicants. See 411 U. S., at 802. Because the employer's de-
cision was facially inconsistent with its own economic self in-
terest, the plaintiff in that case "was rejected under 
circumstances which [gave] rise to an inference of unlawful 
discrimination." Burdine, supra, at 253. 
Thus, in the context of a high level managerial employment 
decision, a minority plaintiff who seeks to raise an inference 
of discrimination must prove more than that he was qualified 
and that a nonminority applicant was selected for the posi-
tion. t No purpose would be served by trying to specify in 
advance the evidence that will be sufficient to satisfy this ini-
tial burden. Each case must be judged on its own facts 
within the established analytical framework. See Burdine, 
supra, at 252-253. It is necessary also to keep in mind that 
the burden imposed by the prima facie case requirement need 
not be onerous. Id., at 253. 
On the facts of record in this case, it is clear that respond-
ent produced abundant evidence to make out a prima facie 
case. In addition to impressive qualifications, he proved 
t JUSTICE MARSHALL'S dissenting opinion reasons that "[w]hen an em-
ployer is unable to articulate any legitimate reason for hiring a white appli-
cant over a qualified Negro applicant, it is reasonable to infer that [the] 
decision was based ... on impermissible considerations." Post, at 8. 
This view, for the first time, would shift the burden of production to the 
defendant even though the plaintiff has not met his initial burden. Our 
prior decisions have stressed that the plaintiff must establish an inference 
of discrimination initially. Only after this inference is established does the 
burden shift to the employer to rebut the inference by articulating a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. See Burdine, supra, at 
254; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577 (1978); 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 358, and n. 44 (1977); McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802 (1973). 
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that the Postal Service had passed over him repeatedly and 
chosen white applicants who had held positions subordinate 
to his own. In addition, he introduced anecdotal and statisti-
cal evidence of racial discrimination. In my view, respond-
ent's evidence created more than an inference of discrimina-
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II 
In this case, the District Court for the 
District of Columbia found that respondent had not 
established a prima facie case since he had failed to 
1 prove the second of the four McDonnell Douglas factors. 
1 In McDonnell Douglas, we stated that a plaintiff may 
establish a prima facie case by showing: 
"(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) 
that he applied and was qualified for a job for 
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) 
that, despite his qualifications, he was 
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, 
the position remained open and the employer 
continued to seek applicants from persons of 
complainant's qualifications." 411 U.S., at 
802. 
; 
We noted, however, that this model would vary iccording to 
the facts and circumstances of each case. See id., at 
802, n. 13. 
.~ I 
2. 
He had not shown that he was "as qualified or more 
qualified" than the individuals who were promoted. See 
App. to Pet. for Cert. 59a. The Court of Appeals reversed 
because the District Court had set too high a standard. 
See 665 F.2d 1057, 1060 (1982) (per curiam). Although it 
recognized that "Title VII cases involving professional 
and managerial positions raise uniquely difficult issues 
not found in cases involving lower-level jobs," it held 
that a plaintiff could prove the second McDonnell Douglas 
factor by showing that he "possesses whatever 
; 
qualifications or background experiences the employer has 
indicated are important." Ibid. Since the court viewed 
the other three McDonnell Douglas factors as having been 
established, 2 it remanded for further consideration of 
Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages. 
3. 
respondent's qualifications in light of its articulation 
of the applicable standard. 
In my view, the proof required by the Court of 
Appeals is insufficient to raise an inference of 
discrimination where a single executive position is to be 
filled from a pool of qualified applicants. When an 
employer selects an applicant for a managerial or 
professional position, the situation is quite different 
from the employment decision made in cases such as 
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. Whether an applicant 
,,. , 
possesses minimum objective qualifications is merely the 
2The Court of Appeals initially had found that 
respondent had proved each of the four McDonnell Douglas 
factors. See Aikens v. United States Postal Service, 642 
F.2d 514, 517 {CADC 1980), vacated and remanded, 453 U.S. 
902 {1981). On remand, the court apparently adhered to 
its earlier etermination that the other three factors had 
been proved as it remanded to the District Court only for 
reconsider tion of the second factor. 
4. 
threshold inquiry since the applicants who meet the 
minimum requirements normally will present an employer 
with a wide range of qualifications and credentials. An 
employer of course will wish to fill the position with the 
most qualified applicant. Yet making a fair and 
intelligent judgment may require a weighing of qualities 
not always apparent from information of record. For 
example, consideration normally would be given to an 
applicant's leadership qualities and ability to work well 
with others. Depending upon the level and authority of 
; 
the position, the capacity of the applicant to make sound 
decisions could be critical. 
Additionally, when there are several qualified 
applicants who can be viewed as satisfying all of the 
foregoing factors, the employer necessarily must prefer 
5. 
one applicant over others. A choice has to be made, and 
thus an employer's decision to select a qualified non-
minorit~person lfrom a pool of applicants does not 
necessarily imply that the choice was discriminatory. See 
Teamsters, supra, at 358 n. 44. In this respect, this 
case differs significantly McDonnell Douglas, where the 
employer rejected a qualified minority applicant but left 
the position unfilled and continued to seek other 
applicants. See 411 U.S., at 802. Because the employer's 
decision was facially inconsistent with its own economic 
, 
self interest, the plaintiff in that case "was rejected 
under circumstances which [gave] rise to an inference of 
unlawful discrimination." Burdine, supra, at 253. No 
similar inference can be drawn in this case where the job 
was not left open. 
I • 
6. 
The employment decision at issue here 
illustrates what our cases consistently have recognized: 
the proof necessary to establish a prima facie case will 
vary from the model set forth in McDonnell Douglas 
depending on the particular facts and circumstances of 
each case. See Burdine, supra, at 253, n. 6; McDonnell 
Douglas, supra, at 802, n. 13. This does not mean, 
however, as the Court seems to believe, that the McDonnell 
WI/( ,t 
Douglas factors ar-e. nd le,nger relevant in determining 
" 
whether a plaintiff has raised an inference of 
; 
discrimination. They continue to provide a rough guide to 
the type of evidence that a plaintiff must introduce. 
Thus, if a plaintiff's "absolute or relative 1 
I 
lack of qualifications" prevents him from being seriously 
,,. ... .J T fl. *"" I 1-- C. C . h .. 
considered for a position, there would be little reason to 
If 
7. 
infer that the employer rejected him for discriminatory 
reasons. See Teamsters, supra, at 358, n. 44. As noted 
above, in the context of a managerial or professional 
position, a plaintiff must possess at least ~ elativ~'-.l 7 
/ 
--/-~~'4-, fJ o~.tr/ 
objective qualifications to be considered seriously and7 ~ . ~ 
~~roof of these qualifications normally will be a predicate I 
/ 
I~ 
to establishing a prima facie case. It is trueJ that ~ 
, ,) ~ I~ r.2-~~,..h-£-t"-' .,, 
employer may have legitimate subjective reasons for 
.I 
preferring one applicant over another, {§__ut a plaintiff's 
showing of relative objective qualifications goes far 
; 
towards raising an inference of discriminatio~ Moreover, 
we have recognized that a plaintiff normally must adduce 
additional evidence that demonstrates that he "was 
rejected under circumstances which give rise to an 
inference of unlawful discrimination." See Burdine, 
8. 
supra, at 253. When the position does not remain open, as 
it did in McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff may introduce 
other evidence that indicates that the employer's decision 
.,.__ ll- (.,.-., -C:. G·-e..-• , : , '" 
,... ..,._ cl"-" t. ... '",. 
' departs from the course that normally would 1, . 
-!.- { ( 
be expected of 
a rational, nondiscriminatory businessman. 
The McDonnell Douglas factors provide a guide to 
determining whether a plaintiff has proved a prima facie 
case; they were never intended to establish an inflexible 
rule. Each case must be assessed in light of its own 
particular facts to determine if a plaintiff has 
; 
introduced evidence that raises an inference of 
discrimination. In this case, respondent produced 
-~ ~,l f 
abundant evidence to show thath( was at least as r--
! ~ I ·~'"'-' 7 
• 1 q~A,..( 
qualified as the individualj who were Mired. He also I 




a '-L,.,-t.e. _..,, /, tA.AJ M · './- ,,, ~.L, 
"") 
repeatedly and chosen white applicants who had held 
positions subordinate to his own--an apparent departure 
from the normal course of business. In addition, 
respondent introduced an cdotal and statistical evidence 
of racial discrimination. ~R-t~ appe-ar,s-to. be 
m~QUgh evid.......,_1'o~ stablish~ prima facie case, 
of this factual question is more appropriately 
left to the courts below. Accordingly, I agree that the 
Court of Appeals' judgment should be vacated and the case 
remanded for further consideration. 
; 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-1044 
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE BOARD OF GOV-
ERNORS, PETITIONER v. LOUIS H. AIKENS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[February -, 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment. 
I concur only in the judgment of the Court, as its reasoning 
departs from the consistent approach to Title VII cases that 
our precedents have developed. The Court apparently per-
ceives a distinction between evidence that establishes a 
prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
411 U. S. 792 (1973), and evidence that establishes an infer-
ence of discrimination. See ante, 9-11. If a plaintiff is able 
to make out a prima facie case, he is entitled to a "presump-
tion of discrimination" that shifts the burden of production in 
accordance with the analytical framework established in Mc-
Donnell Douglas. See id., at 9-10. If, however, a plaintiff 
can prove only an "inference of discrimination," the Court ap-
parently would find the McDonnell Douglas framework inap-
plicable. See id., at 10. In my view, the Court's distinction 
finds no support in our precedents. Instead, our cases make 
clear that evidence that gives rise to an inference of dis-
crimination is sufficient to establish a prima facie case. They 
do not indicate, as the Court suggests, that the McDonnell 
Douglas framework is inapplicable to the type of employment 
decision presented here. 
I 
In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 
; 
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450 U. S. 248 (1981), we reaffirmed unanimously the basic 
allocation of burdens and order of proof initially set forth in 
McDonnell Douglas: 
"First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the pre-
ponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of dis-
crimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving 
the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant 
'to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for the employee's rejection.' [McDonnell Douglas, 411 
U. S.], at 802. Third, should the defendant carry this 
burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legiti-
mate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true 
reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination." 450 
U. S., at 252-253. 
This framework is designed to bring the trier of fact "expe-
ditiously and fairly" to the ultimate question to be proved-
whether the challenged employment decision was in fact dis-
criminatory. See id., at 253. 
The prima facie case, the initial step in this process, re-
quires a Title VII plaintiff to raise an inference of discrimina-
tion by removing the most common nondiscriminatory rea-
sons for his rejection. See id., at 253-254. In many cases, a 
plaintiff may satisfy this initial burden by proving only the 
four factors noted in McDonnell Douglas. See 411 U. S., at 
802. But we have never held that proof of these factors 
automatically establishes a prima facie case. The facts in 
each case will vary, and the prima facie proof specified in Mc-
Donnell Douglas is not "necessarily applicable in every re-
spect to differing factual situations." Id., at 802, n. 13; see 
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577 
(1978). As we stated in Teamsters v. United States, 431 
u. s. 324 (1977): 
"The importance [of the McDonnell Douglas articulation 
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of the prima facie case] lies, not in its specification of the 
discrete elements of proof there required, but in its rec-
ognition of the general principle that any Title VII plain-
tiff must carry the initial burden of offering evidence ad-
equate to create an inference that an employment 
decision was based on a discriminatory criterion illegal 
under the Act." Id., at 358. 
Thus, a court must question whether, in light of the particu-
lar employment decision involved, the plaintiff's proof raises 
an inference of discrimination. 1 When a plaintiff has met 
this initial burden, he "in effect creates a presumption that 
the employer unlawfully discriminated against [him]." 
Burdine, 450 U. S., at 254. This presumption is primarily 
an evidentiary device for allocating intermediate burdens of 
proof. It shifts the burden of production to the employer to 
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its deci-
sion. 2 See id., at 255 and n. 8. 
'JUSTICE MARSHALL's dissenting opinion reasons that "[w]hen an em-
ployer is unable to articulate any legitimate reason for hiring a white appli-
cant over a qualified Negro applicant, it is reasonable to infer that [the] 
decision was based ... on impermissible considerations." Post, at 8. 
This view, for the first time, would shift the burden of production to the 
defendant even though the plaintiff has not met his initial burden. Our 
prior decisions have stressed that the plaintiff initially must establish an 
inference of discrimination. Only then does the burden shift to the em-
ployer to rebut the inference by articulating a legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason for its decision. See Texas Department of Community Af-
fairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,254 (1981); Furnco Construction Corp. v. 
Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577 (1978); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 
324, 358, and n. 44 (1977); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 
792, 802 (1973). 
2 The Court seeks to justify its distinction between an inference of dis-
crimination and a presumption of discrimination by relying on footnote 7 in 
Burdine, supra. See ante, at 11. In my view, the Court reads too much 
into this footnote. As we noted in Burdine, the term "prima facie case" 
has been used in two ways. See 450 U. S., at 254, n. 7. It may refer 
either to the level of proof necessary to withstand a motion for a directed 
; 
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As our cases make clear, we have never created a distinc-
tion between evidence that establishes an inference of dis-
crimination and evidence that gives rise to a presumption of 
discrimination. Rather the two concepts are interrelated. 
Evidence that gives rise to an inference of discrimination is 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case and shift the burden 
of production to the employer. See id., at 254; Furnco, 
supra, at 577; Teamsters, supra, at 358. This analytical 
framework has been applied consistently both by this Court 
and the lower courts. Departing from it would create uncer-
tainty and invite litigation. 
II 
In this case, the District Court found that respondent had 
not established a prima facie case since he had failed to prove 
the second of the four McDonnell Douglas factors. 3 He had 
not shown that he was "as qualified or more qualified" than 
the individuals who were promoted. See Aikens v. Bolger, 
Civ. Action No. 77-0303 (DDC Feb. 26, 1979). The Court of 
Appeals reversed because the District Court had set too high 
verdict or to an evidentiary device that shifts the burden of production to 
the defendant. Footnote 7 stands only for the proposition-a proposition 
evident from the analytical framework established in McDonnell Doug-
las-that proof of a prima facie case does more than allow a plaintiff to 
withstand a motion for a directed verdict. It shifts the burden of produc-
tion. As we subsequently explained, "'[t]he word "presumption" properly 
used refers only to a device for allocating the production burden.' " See 
Burdine, su'{J1'a, at 255, n. 8. (quoting F. James and G. Hazard, Civil Pro-
cedure § 7.9, p. 255 (2d ed. 1977) (footnote omitted)). 
3 In McDonnell Douglas, we stated that a plaintiff may establish a prima 
facie case by showing: 
"(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was quali-
fied for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, de-
spite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, 
the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants 
from persons of complainant's qualifications.'' 411 U. S., at 802. 
We noted, however, that this model would vary according to the facts and 
circumstances of each case. See id., at 802, n. 13. 
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a standard. See 665 F. 2d 1057, 1060 (CADC 1982) (per 
curiam). Although it recognized that "Title VII cases in-
volving professional and managerial positions raise uniquely 
difficult issues not found in cases involving lower-level jobs," 
it held that a plaintiff could prove the second McDonnell 
Douglas factor by showing that he "possesses whatever 
qualifications or background experiences the employer has 
indicated are important." Ibid. Since the court viewed the 
other three McDonnell Douglas factors as having been estab-
lished, 4 it remanded for further consideration of respondent's 
qualifications in light of its articulation of the applicable 
standard. 
In my view, the proof required by the Court of Appeals is 
insufficient to raise an inference of discrimination where a 
single executive position is to be filled from a pool of qualified 
applicants. When an employer selects an applicant for a 
managerial or professional position, the situation is quite dif-
ferent from the employment decision made in cases such as 
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. Whether an applicant 
possesses minimum objective qualifications is merely the 
threshold inquiry since the applicants who meet the minimum 
requirements normally will present an employer with a wide 
range of qualifications and credentials. A:i;t"responsible em-
ployer of course will wish to fill the position with the best 
qualified applicant. Yet making a fair and intelligent judg-
ment may require a weighing of qualities not always appar-
ent from information of record. For example, consideration 
normally would be given to an applicant's leadership qualities 
• The Court of Appeals initially had found that respondent had proved 
each of the four McDonnell Douglas factors . See Aikens v. United States 
Postal Service , 642 F. 2d 514, 517-518 (CADC 1980), vacated and re-
manded, 453 U. S. 902 (1981). On remand from this Court, the Court of 
Appeals apparently adhered to its earlier determination that the other 
three factors had been proved, as it remanded to the District Court only 
for reconsideration of the second factor. 
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and ability to work well with others. Depending upon the 
level and authority of the position, the capacity of the appli-
cant to make sound decisions could be critical. 
Additionally, when there are several qualified applicants 
who can be viewed as satisfying all of the foregoing factors, 
the employer necessarily must prefer one applicant over oth-
ers. A choice has to be made, and thus an employer's deci-
sion to select a qualified non-minority person from a pool of 
applicants does not necessarily imply that the choice was dis-
criminatory. See Teamsters, supra, at 358 n. 44. In this 
respect, this case differs significantly from McDonnell Doug-
las, where the employer rejected a qualified minority appli-
cant but left the position unfilled and continued to seek other 
applicants. See 411 U. S., at 802. Because the employer's 
decision was facially inconsistent with its own economic self 
interest, the plaintiff in that case "was rejected under cir-
cumstances which [gave] rise to an inference of unlawful dis-
crimination." Burdine, supra, at 253. No similar inference 
can be drawn in this case where the job was not left open. 
The employment decision at issue here illustrates what our 
cases consistently have recognized: the proof necessary to es-
tablish a prima facie case will vary from the model set forth in 
McDonnell Douglas depending on the particular facts and 
circumstances of each case. See Burdine, supra, at 253, n. 
6; McDonnell Douglas, supra, at 802, n. 13. This does not 
mean, however, as the Court seems to believe, that the Mc-
Donnell Douglas factors are no longer relevant in determin-
ing whether a plaintiff has raised an inference of discrimina-
tion. They continue to provide a rough guide to the type of 
evidence that a plaintiff must introduce. 
Thus, if a plaintiff's "absolute or relative lack of qualifica-
tions" prevents him from being seriously considered for a po-
sition, see Teamsters, supra, at 358, n. 44, there would be 
little reason to infer that the employer rejected him for dis-
criminatory reasons. As noted above, to be seriously consid-
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ered for a managerial or professional position, a plaintiff 
must at least possess objective qualifications that are fairly 
comparable to those of the other applicants. Proof of these 
qualifications normally will be a predicate to establishing a 
prima facie case. We have emphasized, however, that 
establishing such a case requires a plaintiff to demonstrate 
that he "was rejected under circumstances which give rise to 
an inference of unlawful discrimination." See Burdine, 
supra, at 253. This often will require a plaintiff to introduce 
additional evidence. 5 If, for example, the position remains 
unfilled, as in McDonnell Douglas, this could be viewed as a 
departure from conduct ordinarily expected of an employer, 
giving rise to such an inference. 
III 
The McDonnell Douglas factors provide a guide to deter-
mining whether a plaintiff has proved a prima facie case; they 
were never intended to establish an inflexible rule. Each 
case must be assessed in light of its own particular facts to 
determine if a plaintiff has introduced evidence that raises an 
inference of discrimination. In this case, respondent pro-
duced abundant evidence to show objectively that he was at 
least as qualified as the individuals who were given the posi-
tions. He also proved that the Postal Service had passed 
over him repeatedly and chosen white applicants who had 
held positions subordinate to his own-an apparent depar-
ture from the normal course of business. In addition, re-
spondent introduced anecdotal and statistical evidence of ra-
cial discrimination. It appears to be clear that an inference 
5 As indicated above, an employer-in filling a managerial or profes-
sional position-often will have legitimate, subjective business reasons for 
preferring one applicant over another. See infra, at-. Where these 
reasons are known only to the employer, as frequently will be the case, 
they must be brought out by the employer after the plaintiff has estab-
lished a prima facie case. 
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of discrimination arises from this evidence, establishing a 
prima facie case. But resolution of this factual question is 
more appropriately left to the courts below. Accordingly, I 
agree that the Court of Appeals' judgment should be vacated 
and the case remanded for further consideration. 
1st DRAFT 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-1044 
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE BOARD OF GOV-
ERNORS, PETITIONER, v. LOUIS H. AIKENS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[February -, 1983] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in the judgment. 
I join the opinion of JUSTICE POWELL, adding only a com-
ment on my understanding of the proof necessary to establish 
a prima facie case of racial discrimination in hiring or promo-
tion under Title VII. As I understand the reach of M cDon-
nell Douglas v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973), it provides a 
rough, flexible guide for all Title VII cases of the amount and 
type of proof that an individual plaintiff must show to estab-
lish a prima facie case of disparate treatment. As a general 
reformulation of the McDonnell Douglas factors, applicable 
to all plaintiffs alleging discrimination in hiring or promotion, 
one could say that the plaintiff in a Title VII action would es-
tablish a prima facie case upon proof (i) "that he belongs to a 
racial minority," 411 U. S., at 802; (ii) that he applied for a 
job and possessed objective qualifications fairly comparable 
to other applicants that merited the employer's serious con-
sideration; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was re-
jected (iv) under circumstances that, absent other explana-
tion, eliminate the most common legitimate reasons for his 
rejection. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 
358, n. 44 (1977). This fourth factor is flexible, and the 
showing it requires depends on the circumstances of the par-
ticular case. In McDonnell Douglas itself, a showing that 
the job remained open was sufficient, in combination with the 
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other factors, to establish a prima facie case. As JUSTICE 
POWELL suggests, ante, at 7, a showing that the employer 
promoted a subordinate instead of the plaintiff may satisfy 
this final element. Statistical or anecdotal evidence is also 
relevant. S~t. al~ "feta~ ~Nftltt?t ~~mmuni4v ~,·rs v, furd1',,,e 460 IJ. 5, ,;.I/,~ ~3 (l'l(I). 
It appears clear from the record here that respondent 'J 
made more than an ample showing to establish a prima facie 
case. I agree with JUSTICE POWELL, however, that resolu-
tion of this factual question is more appropriately left to the 
courts below. I therefore concur that the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals should be vacated and the case remanded 
for further consideration. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
f~rttttt ~l1ttrt of tqt 1itnUth Jhttt~ 
Jht#ftittgton. J. ~. 2.llffeJt' 
February 23, 1983 
No. 81-1044 U. S. Postal Service Bd. of Gov. 
v. Aikens 
Dear Lewis, 
I plan to join your separate opinion in 
this case. Do you have any objection to my 
supplemental explanation as set forth in the 
attached draft? I do not want to take liberties 





February 24, 1983 
81-1044 U.S. Postal Service v. Aikens 
John: 
I am glad that you are talking to Bill Rehnquist 
hope of making changes in his opi.nion that would 
a Court. ~his would he constructive. 
My efforts in this respect, both verbally and by 
the enclosed memo of December 29, were not fruitful. But 
these occurred before it was clear that Bill's views would 
not be acceptable to four other Justices. 
My memo, of course, is not as detailed or careful-
ly thought out as the opinion I have circulated. It does 
identify the concerns that I brought to Bill's attention 
some time ago - verbally as well as in the memo. 
I should add that Sandra showed me her opinion 
before she circulated it. She views it as consist~nt with 
mine, and thinks it would be helpful to trial courts to have 






.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~uprtmt (lfMtti llf tlft ~nitth ~tlrlt.tl' 
'Jfaglfington. ~. (lf. 2.t!ffe)l.' 
February 25, 1983 




This morning I spent a good deal of time reviewing 
the Burdine opinion and the various circulations in 
this case. I gather that all of us in the majority 
agree that when the four factors specifically outlined 
in the McDonnell Douglas opinion are present, these 
consequences result: 
(1) Plaintiff's evidence raises an inference of 
discrimination; 
(2) That evidence establishes a prima facie case; 
and 
{3) If that evidence is unrebutted, judgment must 
be entered for plaintiff. 
We also all agree that this case does not fit 
precisely into the McDonnell Douglas four-factor 
formula because the job did not remain open after 
plaintiff's application was rejected. We apparently 
also all agree that there is enough evidence in the 
record to support a judgment for the plaintiff if the 
District Court makes the proper findings, and we also 
agree that as appellate judges we cannot resolve the 
factual questions ourselves. In other words, none of 
us is prepared to say that judgment should be entered 
in plaintiff's favor as a matter of law. It seems to 
me that our area of agreement is broad enough to enable 
us to fashion a consensus on an opinion. 
Where we part company, as I understand the 
writing, is on the question whether in Title VII 
litigation there is any difference between an 
• ' ' . 
-2-
"inference of discrimination" and a "presumption" that 
requires that judgment be entered in favor of the 
plaintiff if the presumption is unrebutted. You 
emphasize the function of the presumption as a 
procedural, burden-shifting device. Bill, on the other 
hand, focuses on the substantive character of the 
presumption if the plaintiff's evidence is not 
rebutted. I am persuaded that there is not any 
necessary conflict between your two positions, although 
you may use the word "inference" differently. 
If a case fits precisely into the McDonnell 
Douglas four-factor formula, I think Bill agrees with 
you that the burden shifts to the employer. I think, 
however, that you agree with him that if the McDonnell 
Douglas "presumption" (or "inference") is unrebutted, 
judgment must be entered for the plaintiff. 
If a case does not satisfy all four McDonnell 
Douglas factors, Bill says--as I understand him--that 
the question whether plaintiff has made out a prima 
facie case depends on the stren th of the inferences to 
be drawn from the plaintiff's evidence, andt hat- The 
job of drawing those inferences is one that should 
initially be performed by the trial judge. You seem to 
say--and please correct me if I am wrong--that whenever 
the plaintiff's evidence raises an "inference of 
discrimination", he has made out a prima facie case 
which entitles him to judgment if that inference is not 
rebutted. In other words, any "inference of 
discrimination" no matter how slight has the same legal 
consequences as the McDonnell Douglas presumption. 
Let me suggest a hypothetical case that may 
identify the linguistic problem that seems to be 
present. Assume that a Title VII plaintiff has sued 
the estate of a deceased employer and therefore the 
defense counsel was simply unable to adduce any 
evidence to rebut the plaintiff's case. The 
plaintiff's case consists of proof: (1) that she is a 
woman; (2) that she is a lawyer well qualified to work 
as a law clerk; (3) that a judge each year hires three 
applicants; (4) that in the year in question two male 
and two female lawyers applied and the employer hired 
two males and one female and rejected the plaintiff. 
- ) 
$ 




Facts of this kind might establish a case that could be 
described in at least three different ways: (1) they do 
not raise any inference of discrimination because they 
are equally consistent with guilt or innocence; (2) 
they raise an inference of discrimination against 
female applicants but the inference is so weak that 
judgment should be entered in favor of the defendant 
even though the inference is unrebutted; or (3) the 
inference of discrimination is so strong that judgment 
must be entered in favor of the plaintiff if no 
rebuttal evidence is offered. 
It seems to me that Bill uses the term "inference 
of discrimination" in a way that leaves room for weak 
inferences that do not require the entry of judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff, whereas you seem to use the 
term as one that compels the entry of judgment in favor 
of the plaintiff whenever the inference is unrebutted. 
If I am correct in identifying the point that 
separates the two of you, I feel sure we can work out 
language that will resolve the difference. (Perhaps, 
for example, Bill might be willing to substitute a 
phrase such as "evidence of discrimination" for 
"inference"--at least when he is talking about weak 
inferences.) If I do not fairly understand your 




To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Rives 
Re: No. 81-1044, United States Postal Service v. Aikens 
In Justice Rehnquist's second draft, he stated that the 
evidence in this case was insufficient to establish a prima facie 
case, but indicated that the same evidence might be sufficient to 
establish an inference of discrimination. Although the second draft 
was far from clear as to when a prima facie case would be 
established, it was arguable that the opinion limited McDonnell 
Douglas to its facts. Thus, when the position was not an assembly 
line job or when the position did not remain open, a prima facie 
case would not have been established and the McDonnell Douglas 
framework would be inapplicable. 
His third draft is somewhat of an improvement, hut it 
still represents a substantial departure from McDonnell Douglas. 
This new draft differs from the second in that it suggests that a 
; 
prima facie case might have been made out on the facts in this case. 
See ante, at 9. The difficulty with the third draft is that it 
7 
retains the ,E~~~nference aistinction. Thus, reading the 
opinion in the most favorable light, it establishes a two-track 
system. In some cases, the same evidence will be sufficient to 
establish both an inference of discrimination and a presumption of 
discrimination. But in others, the evidence will be sufficient to 
establish only an inference of discrimination. 
2. 
This scheme has two problems. First, it is unclear how 
one distinguishes between the amount of evidence necessary for a 
presumption of discrimination and that necessary for an inference of 
discrimination, except that more proof is needed to establish the 
former than the latter. Because this two-tier system is 
unexplained, it will create considerable uncertainty. Second, 
because it is unclear what difference exists between the two 
systems, it is probable that DC's will never attempt to apply the 
McDonnell Douglas framework to Title VII cases. It will be easier 
for them to find simply that the plaintiff met the lower standard of 
proof--that he established an inference of discrimination--and not 
reach any conclusion as to the applicablity of the McDonnell Douglas 
framework. In practice, it is likely that the McDonnell Douglas 
framework will remain available but simply never used. This would 
deprive the lower courts of the guidance that the McDonnell Douglas 
framework provides. 
I do not see that the present draft is sufficiently close~ 
to warrant joining. I have attached a copy of a draft of our 
opinion revised in light of Justice Rehnquist's new draft. I did 
not see the need to make changes other than minor changes in the 
wording. The only possibility that occurred to me would be to aaa a 
footnote pointing out the difficulty in distinguishing between 
inferences and presumptions of discrimination. A call could be 
placed after the word "inapplicable" on the first page, the seventh 
line from the bottom of the first paragraph (call marked in pencil). 
3. 
I have attached a draft of a proposed footnote. I am not sure 
whether this footnote is necessary or appropriate as it may look too 
much as if you are heaping insult on injury since the changes that 
spur the footnote were made ostensibly to accomodate vour views. 
; 
·"" . 
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81-1044 U.S. Postal Service v. Aikens 
Dear John: 
As busy as we all are with our own cases (in 
addition to the general work of the Court), I particularly 
appreciate your undertaking the role of "mediator" between 
Bill and me. Yet, in candor, I do not think we can get 
together on the basis of the outline in your letter. 
I see no reason why the Court should depart at 
this late date from the basic framework of McDonnell 
,. 
Douglas/Burdine. I understand and respect Bill's 
differing views, but I do not agree with them. I am 
distressed also that three Justices apparently would 
severely undercut existing precedents, as would be the 
result of Thurgood's opinion. Once the Court starts 
2. 
chipping away at the rationale of precedents, each of us 
is invited to join in the process. 
So much for generalities, and I turn now to 
specifics. 
As I read Bill's opinion, it holds that a Title 
VII plaintiff may prove his case in two ways. He may seek 
to establish a prima facie case by proving the four 
factors noted in McDonnell Douglas. Proof of these 
factors entitles him to a "presumption of discrimination" 
and shifts the burden of production to the employer. 
Where, however, "no standardized prima facie case can be 
made out," a plaintiff may seek to establish an "inference 
of discrimination." p. 9. In such cases, a court would 
depart from the allocation of burdens and order of proof 
established in McDonnell Douglas. 
~ ~·ft'. '· ... 
3. 
The distinction Bill draws between presumptions 
and inferences is, at least to me, unclear. The latest 
draft of his opinion states that in this case "there may 
well be additional evidence in the record" that would 
' 
~~~ 
establish a presumption, seep. 9, but it never speeifies 
I\ 
how one determines when a presumption has been established 
and when it has not. This distinction could well confuse 
lower courts as they try to decide which method of proof 
is applicable to the case before them. 
I agree with your statement that a plaintiff 
should show more than a "weak inference of discrimination" 
to establish a prima facie case. But, it is not clear to 
me that Bill's and my opinion differ significantly on this 
point. Neither of us distinguishes between weak and 
strong inferences. Each refers only to establishing an 
4. 
"inference of discrimination," and each entrusts this 
determination to the trier of fact. It may be true, as 
you observe, that Bill's opinion would leave more room for 
judges to dismiss a plaintiff's case. But it provides no 
framework for determining whether the employer has acted 
for discriminatory reasons. In this respect, it leaves 
the trier of fact free to find a prima facie case when 
there has been proof of only a weak inference of 
discrimination. I suppose it also would leave a court 
free to reject proof as strong as that made out by Aikens. 
~ 
My opinion,. I be] i eve, give/triers of fact s~m~ 
latitude in judging the strength of the inference of 
discrimination to be drawn from the evidence. At the same 
time, it notes that the McDonnell Douglas factors continue 
to provide a rough guide for making this determination. 
5. 
As the McDonnell Douglas framework provides the trial 
court with both flexibility and guidance in assessing the 
strength of a plaintiff's evidence, I see no reason for us 
to depart from it by distinguishing between inferences and 
presumptions of discrimination. 
I certainly am not unmindful of the desirability 
of having a Court. Yet, I am unwilling to join an opinion 
that seems to me to cast doubt as to what the Court has 
; 
onsiderable latitude. Changing the framework of analys· 
I have no objection, of course, to your showing 
this letter to Bill. He and I have had quite an exchange 








Rider A, p. ~ (Aikens) 
r 
The foregoing line of cases establishes a 
framework of reasoning that has been applied in each of 
our prior decisions. In should be applied in the present 
case. As the Court notes, two of the specific factors 
identified in McDonnell-Douglas are not present where a 
single executive position is to be filled. Yet, the 
burden remains on the plaintiff to produce evidence that 
gives rise to an inference of discrimination. If so, he 
has created a prima facie case that shifts the burden of 
production to the employer. On the facts of record here, 
it is clear that respondent produced abundant evidence to 
make out a pr ima fac ie case. In addition to impressive 
qualifications, he proved that the Postal Service had 
., 
repeatedly passed over him and chosen white employee s who 
had held positions subordinate to his own. In addition, 
he introduced anectdotal and statistical evidence of 
racial discrimination. In my view, his evidence created 
more than an inference of discriminatory motive. 
Accordingly, I agree with the judgment of the Court. 
< .,,. 
'I.. ,,,. "' :,· 'll¥ 
J·. i 
February 28, 1983 
j fiP 81-1044 U.S. Postal Service v. Aikens 
Dear John: 
: .. ~ 
·'th '.I 




As busy as we all are with our own cases (in acai-
tion to the general work of the Court), I oarticularly ap-
preciate your undertakinq the role of "mediator" between 
Bill and me. Yet, in candor, I do not think we can get to-
gether on the basis of the outline in your l~tter. 
I see no reason why the Court should depart at 
this late date from the basic framework of McDonnell Doug-
las/Burdine. t understand and respect Bill's differing 
views, but I do not agree with them. I am distressed also 
that three Justices apparently would severely undercut ex-
isting precedents, as would be the result of Thurgood's 
opinion. Once the Court starts chipping away at the ration-
ale of precedents, each of us is invited to join in the 
process. . 1,.,, ~· .; 
So much for qeneralities, and I turn now to 
specifics. ,, 
As I read Bill's opinion, it holds that a Title 
VII plaintiff may prove his case in two ways. He may seek ~ 
to establish a prima facie case by proving the four factorq 
noted in McDonnell Douglas. Proof of these factors entitles 
him to a "Presumption of discrimination" and shifts the bur-
den of production to the employer. Where, however, "no 
standardized prima facie case can be made out," a plaintiff 
may seek to establish an "inference of discrimination." p. 
9-10. In such cases, a court would depart from the alloca-
tion of burdens and order of proof established in McDonnell 
Douglas. 
'i'he distinction Bill <!raws between presumptions 
and inferences is, at least to me, unclear. The latest 
draft of his opinion states that in this case "there may 
well be additional evidence in the record" that would estab-
lish a presumption, seep. 9, but does not indicate how one 
determines when a presumption has been established and when 
it has not. This distinction could well confuse lower 






courts as they try to decide which method of proof is appli-
cable to the case bef.or.e them. 
I agree that a plaintiff shou11 show more than a 
"weak inference of discrimination" to establish a prima 
facie case. But, it is not clear to me that Bill's and my 
opini.ons oiffer signi.ficantly on this point. 'Neither of us 
distinguishes between weak and strong inferences. Each re-
fers only to establishing an "infer~nce of discrimination," 
and each entrusts this determination to the trier of fact. 
It may be true, as you observe, that Bill's opinion would 
leave more room for judges to dlsmiss a plaintiff's case. 
But it provides no framework for determining whether the 
employer has acted for discriminatory re~,:;ons. In this re-
spect, it leaves the trier of fact free to find a prima 
facie case when there has been proof of only a weak infer-
ence of discrimination. I suppose it also would leave a 
court free to ~e;ect proof as strong as that mane out by 
Aikens. 
My opi.nion does qive triera of fact some latitude 
in judging the strength of the inference of discrimination 
to be drawn from the evldence. At the same time, i.t notes 
that the McDonnell Douglas factors continue to provide a 
rough guide for making this determination. ~s the McDonnell 
Douglas framework provides the trial court with both flexi-
bility and guidance in assessing the strength of a plain-
tiff'~ evidence, I see no reason for us to depart from it by 
distinguishing between inference~ and presumptions of 
discrimination. 
I certainly am not unmindful of the desirability 
of having a Court. Yet, I a.m unwilling to ioin an opinion 
that seems to me to cast doubt as to what the Court has said 
and intendea in our prior decisions. 
I have no objection, of course, to your showing 
this letter to Bill. He and I have had quite an exchange on 
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No. 81-1044 
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United States Postal Service v. Louis H Aikens 
[March __ , 1983] 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Respondent Louis Aikens filed suit under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 u.s.c. § 2000e et seq., 
claiming that petitioner, the United States Postal Service, 
discriminated against him on account of his race. Aikens, who is 
black, claimed that the Postal Service had discriminatorily 
refused to promote him to higher positions in the Washington, 
D.C. Post Office where he had been employed since 1937. After a 
bench trial, the District Court entered judgment in favor of the 
Postal Service, but this judgment was reversed by the Court of 
Appeals. 642 F. 2d 514 (CADC 1980). We vacated the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals and remanded for reconsideration in light of 
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 




reaffirmed its earlier holding that the District Court had erred 
in requiring Aikens to offer direct proof of discriminatory 
intent. 665 F. 2d 1057, 1058 (CADC 1981) (per curiam). We 
granted certiorari to consider the assessment of pioof of racial 
discrimination when an employer has selected among applicants for 
a higher managerial position. 1 
The Court of Appeals, in its second opinion, held not only 
that the District Court erred in requiring Aikens to offer direct 
proof of discriminatory intent, 2 but also that it erred in 
requiring Aikens to show, as part of his prima facie case, that 
he was "as qualified or more qualified" than the people who were 
promoted. The Postal Service insists that an employee who has 
shown only that he was black, that he had applied for a promotion 
for which he possessed the minimum qualifications, and that the 
Postal Service selected a non-minority applicant has not 
established a "prima facie" case of employment discrimination 
lwe have consistently distinguished disparate treatment 
cases from cases involving facially neutral employment standards 
that have disparate impact on minority applicants. See, e.g., 
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 US .• 248, 
252, n. 5 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 
802, n. 14 (1973). 
2As in any lawsuit, the plaintiff may prove his case by 
direct or circumstantial evidence. The trier of fact should 
consider all the evidence, giving it whatever weight and credence 
it deserves. Thus, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the 
District Court should not have required Aikens to submit direct 
evidence of discriminatory intent. See Teamsterse v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 324, 358, n. 44 (1977) ("[T]he McDonnell Douglas 
formula does not require direct proof of discrimination.") 
No. 81-1044 
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under Title VII. 
Since the case has been fully tried on the merits in the 
District Court, one might at first blush wonder why the parties 
are still arguing about the nature of a prima facie case. 
Indeed, to the untutored this case, tried to the District Court 
in January, 1979, might seem to be one that could have been 
disposed of in a relatively short span of time (according to 
judicial lights) with the District Court making the necessasry 
essential findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the Court 
of Appeals reviewing those findings and conclusions under the 
appropriate standards. 3 But we take the case as it comes to us. 
We think that some statements in the briefs of the parties 
and of the amici, urging us either to "adhere" to, modify, or 
reconsider, the line of cases beginning with McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1972), reveal an imprecise 
, 
understanding of that line of cases. Because this approach may 
have been shared in part by the District Court and by the Court 
of Appeals in the present case, we take the liberty of setting 
forth the facts as well as the law in the principal cases in the 
McDonnell Douglas line. 
In McDonnell Douglas itself, the defendant employer ran a 
3see Pullman Standard v. Swint, U.S. __ , . (1982). 
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newspaper advertisement seeking qualified mechanics. The 
plaintiff, a qualified mechanic who had been laid off by the 
defendant, applied for reemployment. The defendant declined to 
rehire him, even though it continued to hire other applicants who 
responded to the advertisement after the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff's Title VII suit was dismissed by the District Court, 
but the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. That 
court held that the reason given by the defendant for refusing to 
rehire plaintiff--plaintiff's participation in a "stall in" and 
"lock-in" at defendant's place of business--was a "subjective" 
criterion that carried little weight in rebutting charges of 
discrimination. The Court of Appeals set forth its version of a 
prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII. 
Our opinion described the now familiar elements of a prima 
facie case: 
"The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry 
the initial burden under the statute of establishing a 
prima facie case of racial discrimination. This may be 
done by showing {i} that he belongs to a racial 
minority; {ii} that he applied and was qualified for a 
job for which the employer was seeking applicants; 
{iii} that, despite his qualifications, he was 
rejected; and {iv} that, after his rejection, the 
position remained open and the employer continued to 
seek applicants from persons of complainant's 
qualifications." Id., at 802. 
; 
We immediately added, however, that "[t]he facts necessarily will 
vary in Title VII cases, and the specifications above of the 
prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily 
No. 81-1044 
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applicable in every respect to differing factual situations." 
Id., at 802, n. 13. 
We returned to the same question in Furnco Construction 
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The employer's business 
was the rehabilitation of steel mill blast furnaces with "fire 
brick." The employer did not maintain a permanent force of 
bricklayers; instead, it hired a superintendent for each project, 
and then delegated to him the task of securing a competent work 
force. The superintendent who declined to hire the plaintiff 
/ 
dignot accept applications at the job site, but hired only 
persons he knew to be experienced and competent in this work or 
who had been recommended to him as similarly skilled. The 
employer claimed this policy was established to ensure that only 
experienced and highly qualified fire bricklayers were employed, 
because untimely work could result in substantial losses both to 
the steel mill operator and to the contractor-employer. Id., at 
569-572. 
We agreed with the Court of Appeals that the black 
plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case. We disagreed, 
however, with its conclusion that the reasons for the employer's 
hiring practices were illegitimate. In discussing the showing 
required of the parties to Title VII suits, we pointed out: 
"The central focus of the inquiry in a case such 
as this is always whether the employer is treating 
'some people less favorably than others because of 
their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.' 
No. 81-1044 
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Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsteres v. United States, 
supra, [431 U.S.,] at 335, n. 15. The method suggested 
in McDonnell Douglas for pursuing this inquiry, 
however, was never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or 
ritualistic. Rather, it is merely a sensible, orderly 
way to evaluate the evidence in light of common 
experience as it bears on the critical question of 
discrimination." 438 U.S., at 577. 
Finally, in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), plaintiff, a woman, claimed that 
the employer's failure to promote her and its later decision to 
terminate her had both resulted from gender-based discrimination. 
The District Court found after a bench trial that neither 
decision was discriminatory. Id., at 251. The Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit upheld the decision of the District Court 
as to the promotion, but reversed its finding on the termination. 
We reviewed only the part of the case that had been reversed 
by the Court of Appeals, 4 and stated more clearly the 
consequences of the plaintiff's success in making the showing ~; 
required by McDonnell Douglas. 
"Establishment of the prima facie case in effect 
creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully 
discriminated against the employee. If the trier of 
fact believes the plaintiff's evidence, and if the 
employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the 
court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no 
issue of fact remains in the case." Texas Department 
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 
(emphasis supplied). 
4Thus Burdine's failure to be promoted to a managerial 
position was not before us. 
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The justification for a-f-~ring that judgment be 
entered for the plaintiff in these circumstances can be found in 
Furnco. 
"A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises 
an inference of discrimination only because we presume 
these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely 
than not based on the consideration of impermissible 
factors .... And we are willing to presume this largely 
because we know that from our experience that more 
often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary 
manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a 
business setting. Thus, when all legitimate reasons 
for rejecting an applicant had been eliminated as 
possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is more 
likely than not the employer, whom we generally assume 
acts only with some reason, based his decision on an 
impermissible consideration such as race." 438 U.S., 
at 577. 
More succinctly phrased, a prima facie case "eliminates the most 
common non-discriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's rejection." 
Burdine, supra, at 254. For this reason, we have held that an 
unrebutted prima facie case is sufficiently compelling to require 
a judgment for the plaintiff as a matter of law. 
In the present case, both the District Court and the Court 
of Appeals apparently thought that Aikens' claim against the 
Postal Service fits into the pattern of the McDonnell Douglas 
line of cases. We disagree. The first and third elements of 
McDonnell Douglas are undoubtedly present; Aikens belongs to a 
racial minority, and he applied for the promotions in question 
but was denied them. The fourth element, however, is entirely 
absent; the position did not remain open, as it did in McDonnell 
Douglas, but was filled by the applicant chosen in preference to 
No. 81-1044 
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Aikens. Indeed, where an employer seeks to fill a single 
managerial position, the position will by definition not be open 
after one of the applicants has been chosen. 
The second McDonnell Douglas element--the showing that the 
plaintiff was "qualified" for the job--is more problematic. 
There is no doubt that Aikens had an impressive resume. He has a 
Masters Degree and has completed three years of residence towards 
a Ph.D. He has been rated as "an outstanding supervisor whose 
management abilities are far above average." App. 8. There was · 
no derogatory or negative information in his Personnel Folder. 
He had more supervisory seniority and training and development 
courses than all but one of the white persons who were promoted 
above him. It is clear that his qualifications were sufficient, 
in the eyes of the Postal Service, to merit serious 
consideration. 
At this point, however, agreement between the parties, and 
between the courts that have considered this factual issue, 
breaks down. It is argued that Aikens must show he is "as 
qualified" as the person actually chosen, "better qualified" than 
the person actually chosen, "relatively qualified," or merely 
"qualified" for the jobs he sought. We believe that this COF'}·test '<--
of comparatives ttltimately t3roves -self-sttl-ltifying. 
The fair reading of the McDonnell Douglas advertisement for 
qualified mechanics is that there was a known, reasonably 
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objective basis for determining who was a qualified mechanic, and 
that applicants would be hired on a first come, first served 
basis until the employer had obtained the number of mechanics it 
needed. But where one managerial position is open, there may be 
no totally objective measure of who is "qualified," and the 
employer certainly does not undertake to promote more than one 
applicant. Employers consider a wide range of factors, such as 
each applicant's understanding of the organization's goals, 
ability to work effectively with particular supervisors and 
subordinates, maturity, originality, initiative, and decision 
making ability. It will rarely, if ever, be possible to quantify 
all the relevant criteria and tally them on a scorecard. 5 
In these circumstances, the question is not whether we will 
"follow" the McDonnell-Douglas line of cases, but how much 
guidance those cases provide for the trier of fact in a 
dissimilar factual situation such as this one. McDonnell Douglas 
and Furnco both dealt with entry level jobs, one in a large 
manufacturing industry and the other in the construction 
industry. In those cases we made it clear that if the plaintiff 
5But the procedural significance of the prima facie case 
gives us some guidance concerning the showing that a plaintiff 
must make to establish that he was "qualified," in order to shift 
the burden of production to the employer. An employer filling a 
managerial or professional position may have legitimate, 
subjective business reasons, known only to the employer, for 
preferring one applicant over another. Where this is the case, 
these reasons should form part of the employer's burden of 
production in response to the plaintiff's prima facie case, 
rather than part of the plaintiff's prima facie case itself. 
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can meet the four elements of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie 
case- -that he belonged to a racial minority, that he applied and 
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking 
applicants, that he was rejected, and that after his rejection 
the employer continued to seek similarly qualified applicants--
the plaintiff has in effect negatived the most common 
explanations that would rebut his allegations of discriminatory 
animus. 
But that simply is not true in the present case. The 
"qualifications" for the position as laid down by the Postal 
Service, while not appearing as clearly from the record as might 
be, were by no means as easy to assess as the qualifications for 
a "mechanic" advertised for in McDonnell Douglas. In addition, 
there were several applicants for each position, and only one 
could be chosen. Hence, as we have noted, the position did not 
remain open after Aikens was rejected. Under these 
; 
circwnstances, · we do not think that, simply by showing that he is 
black, that he was sufficiently qualified to be seriously 
considered, and that the Postal Service did not give him the job 
but promoted one of several non-minority applicants, Aikens 
nondisc~ inator reasons" for his 
./ 
~--r_a_, at~~- Stated dif eren 
/ 
, / that these acts by employer ~ if 
oth ~;,w'ise unexplained /e m e likely than ~ base on tire 
¥nsideratio i p{rmissible ctors." Furnco, supra, t 577. 








just'/ 1{ pn,.sumptio~ 
~ ayntif-f-. ·~ 
discriminated a 
J,d -+-
Even though a plain-t:iff lik ~ Aikens may be unable 
standardized prima facie case by proving the existenee of the ~ 
__.---four factors described in MeDom:1eJ J Doug] as, we have rep~at~: 
~ ~ do c.""S ,vor /JA/2. ff1A-J ~ ..,l!A~ 
emphasized that t~e cue othe:r ways fG-E-a plai~9vail s,_ 
d qp ; "" ~J&p tas£ WP '(' ./-1,J A.A- ....,...., d,,i_, C,../1..-t.-- ._;._()A..fz_~d t,.. ~ f (x..~ -R /...,.... 
irr a! itl~ VI~ ca.~ Q~ See pp. 3-4, supra (quoting 0 from McDonnell 
Douglas and Furnco); see also Burdine, supra, at 253, n. 6; 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977). In an 
appropriate case, the four McDonnell Douglas factors serve to 
focus the court's attention on a limited number of probative 
facts, but these are not the only items of evidence that may tend 
to show that the employer discriminated against the plaintiff. 
Other types of circumstantial or direct evidence may be 
available. A plaintiff might introduce anecdotal or statistical 
evidence of discriminatory attitudes and practices by the 
; 
employer. Or he might show that the employer engaged in 
irregular business practices such as promoting subordinates over 
him. More infrequently, a plaintiff may be able to present 






own case. Although such evidence as this does not coincide with 
the standardized four-factor prima facie case described in the 
McDonnell Douglas case, we emphasize that, if supported by 
credible proof, it may establish a nonstandardized prima facie 
case. 7 In other words, if a plaintiff presents a sHffieien 
. \._~ ~d! ......,.-c... ""'~~__._/ 
strong case ev1dence'"\t-hat showd that 1t was more likely than not 
that the employer discriminated against him Hnder the normal .._ 
- ...... ·- ,,._,- - ·· ·1111;.. -- - ,- - ~ -
7of course, two of the McDonnell Douglas factors are 
absolute prerequisites to recovery in any Title VII hiring or 
promotion case- -that the plaintiff is a member of a protected 
category of persons, and that he or she was not chosen for the 
job in question. Another McDonnell Douglas factor, that the 
plaintiff was qualified for the job, raises more complexities 
when the selection process involves subjective qualifications, 
see p. _ _ , supra, but it is evident that a rejected applicant 
who is clearly unfit for the job cannot prevail in a Title VII 
suit. Thus a plaintiff cannot establish a l.>-F~'HTl'fl-B~·-e.J~ ~ ~~~~~f"<..-
. ation and shift th-e---httt:-den of prodtret-ion to trre-emp-3:ey.. 
without proving that he or she possessed objective qualifications 
fairly comparable to other applicants that merited the employer's 
serious consideration. Thus, in attempting to make out a 
nonstandardized prima facie case, the plaintiff is required to 
adduce proof that closely resembles three of the McDonnell 
Douglas factors. 
., 
In a significant sense, therefore, it is a matter of semantics 
whether the nonstandardized prima facie case is, on the one hand, 
described in terms of four factors, the fourth of which is so 
flexible that it can accommodate any type of probative evidence~ 
or, on the other hand, characterized as a flexible concept that 
varies with the evidence presented. What is important to bear in 
mind is that a prima facie case is made out if, but only if, the 
plaintiff's evidence standing unrebutted · ...... m ......... o~r~e;;._~----~ 
likely than not that the defendant acte in a discriminatory 
manner. As this definition makes clear, a prima facie case can 
be made out even if plaintiff has not egated all conceivable 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the employer's action. 
But if the plaintiff has not elimi ated the most common such 
reasons, then the trier of fact ould be unable to infer that it 
is more likely than not that e plaintiff was the victim of 
discrimination. · 
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plaintiff as a matter of law because he has met his burden of 
showing discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, 
as with the standardized prima facie case, the effect of the 
pres umption is to shift the burden of production to the employer 
to avert the entry of judgment against him. See Burdine, supra, 
at 255, n. 8. 
We recognize that in a case in which the evidence does not 
fit neatly into the standardized McDonnell Douglas prima facie 
case, the tasks facing both the plaintiff and the trier of fact 
are more difficult. For in a standardized case like McDonnell 
Douglas or Furnco, four relatively straightforward inquiries will 
determine whether a prima facie case has been established; this 
is simply not true in cases like the present one. But the 
plaintiff, through use of the liberal discovery provided in Fed • ., 
R. Civ. P. 26-37, can depose a defendant's employees and obtain 
relevant documents relating to employment decisions. The court 
is called upon to exercise a greater degree of judgment when it 
decides, in a nonstandardized case presenting a variety of types 
f}..._....p!~--4')./ ~ ~~A..J ~ 
of evidence , whether i:-t-:i:-s-mo r e ilk-e-1:-y- Lh a II no t--eh-a-t:-t.w.-cc.---.:_ 
~/!..~ • 
.plain t iff was d i s er: imiR-a-t-e.d-ag..a..i-~ But it should not be 
forgotten that a Title VII lawsuit is a civil action, not unlike 
other civil actions, and that triers of fact are customarily 
given the difficult task of weighing and balancing the evidence 




The trier of fact may be called upon to evaluate the 
strength of the plaintiff's case at two points in the trial. 
First, at the close of the plaintiff's case, the defendant may 
make a Rule 4l(b) motion to dismiss. If the plaintiff has 
established a standardized prima facie case by establishing 
precisely the four factors set forth in McDonnell Douglas, then 
the Rule 4l(b) motion must be denied. Similarly, if the 
plaintiff has established a nonstandardized prima facie case--by 
.t. ~ ~~ presenting evidence s:;:; ;;;11gb to i;h~w, in the absence of 
J.Qc,wz 4.- -h....:-.. .f} 6'-<f +o ~-<-
rebuttal, that plaintift was more likely than not the victim of 
I\ 
unlawful discrimination--the Rule 4l(b) motion must be denied. 
Indeed, if judgment for the defendant were granted, that decision 
would be reversible error, because the plaintiff has established 
a right to a rebuttable presumption in his or her favor. 
stanaa~gized or nonstandardized, then the court has 
exercise of aiscretion. trial g 
forward with the pre eQtation 
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proven discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. At .so_ 
_.--this stage,,, the three-step analytical framework set forth in 
.....-c> ..,..-- ~ . J..e.;,, °'-~ '!? 1-:_f-- c.,;._ 
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine ~ des a men t al r'6-a-amap for -
evaluating all of the evidence in light of common experience and 
~ 
common sense. It tells tt..h e trier-of Ea o t l first to look at the 
plaintiff's case and assess its strength, then to examine the 
~~ h> f"k_~f<l{h......,pi~ 
defendant's justifications and decide whether D • 
~--..S .) /1 A 
pretextual. 8 If they a r:-e- f)-F-e-~tltt-1, th e-p±-a-i-A-t-i-f-Lµrev.ail.s-, ----Q_,, 
/\ 
bee au s e---i-fl--e-s-s-e~e-p-3: a i 11 ti ff ' s ev i d-ene e Le 11d-trrg-to- s-l'l-ow ~ 
.,,..--a-i-se . . L . i --( 3-!"-i1TI 111 a I on na-s 
supra, at 255-256. 
~L been effe~t~v~~y r ebutt-ed... See Burdine, 
To the extent that this is the teaching of 
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, it is of course applicable to 
every Title VII case, whether or not the plaintiff's proof fits 
8 In Burdine, supra, we reaffirmed the basic allocation of 
burdens and order of proof initially set forth in McDonnell 
Douglas: 
"First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the 
preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of 
discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in 
proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the 
defendant '.to articulate some legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.' 
[McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.], at 802. Third, should 
the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must 
then have the opportunity to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by 
the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a 
pretext for discrimination." 450 U.S., at 252-253. 
; 
This framework is designed to bring the trier of fact 
"expeditiously and fairly" to the ultimate question to be proved-
-whether the challenged employment decision was in fact 
discriminatory. See id., at 253. 
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within the four-factor standardized prima facie case. 
Applying these considerations to the case at hand, we 
conclude, first, that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that 
a presumption of discrimination is justified any time a white 
applicant is promoted to a job for which a qualified black man 
applied. 642 F. 2d, at 517; 665 F. 2d, at 1058-1059. It did 
not, however, analyze the record in light of the considerations 
we have just set forth. We are therefore not fully apprised of 
all of the evidence relevant to the question whether Aikens was 
the victim of discrimination. Nor is it the task of a reviewing 
court to sift the evidence in the first instance. The District 
Court, which is able to perceive the attitude and demeanor of 
witnesses, and to evaluate their credibility and the weight that 
should be placed on their testimony, is in a far better position 
than either this Court or the Court of Appeals to decide in the 
first instance whether the Postal Service discriminated against 
; 
Aikens. 
Court, on remand, would be able to find sufficient 
evidence in the record to establish a nonstandardized prima faci 
case. The record might show that, had there been no rebuttal, 
Aikens would have been entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 
and that a decision to the contrary would have been reversible 
error. But that is not necessary to permit Aikens to prevail. 
---t!Al-4:::.U--.l...L-.~·~,e-R-S-'- C-a~ -fa 11 S - S h Or t Of a pr i ~ fa Cl e-c-ase--(J-i,...¥-1-'-ttt1, 
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].egally_:manda / presumpt- ·n ju~t des~ bed, it 
tha it. j / ies at 1 st a permissible inferen/eof 
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~ n the facts presented to us in the two opinions 
the Court of Appeals, if the District Court were to conclude 
Service treated Aikens less favorably than others 
under the Rule 52(a) standard of appellate 
review that judgment would surely _:__e up~~ 
~ ::::- that white persons, who had been his 
subordinates, were consistently promoted and detailed over him 
between 1966 and 1974. He had substantially more education than 
the white employees who were advanced ahead of him: of the 12, 
only two had any education beyond high school and none had a 
college degree. Aikens introduced testimony at trial that the 
person responsible for the promotion decisions at issue had made 
,. , 
numerous derogatory comments about blacks in general and Aikens 
in particular. He also introduced statistical evidence tending 
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All courts have recognized that the questions facing triers 
of fact in discrimination cases are both sensitive and difficult. 
The prohibitions against discrimination contained in the Civil 
Rightrs Act of 1964 reflect an important national policy. In any 
Title VII case, whether or not a standardized prima facie case is 
available to the plaintiff, the ultimate question is "whether the 
employer is treating 'some people less favorably than others 
because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 
Furnco, supra, at 577 (quoting Teamsters, supra, at 335, n. 15). 
There will seldom be "eyewitness" testimony as to the employer's 
~on ef d4-scrimimrtro-rt-d:· ffer:ent-J:l.] f:rGm t.b~ .--J:>-. 
i..k 
~ e law often obliges finders of fact to inquire into a 
person's state of mind. As Lord Justice Bowen said in treating 
this problem in an action for misrepresentation nearly a century 
ago: 
"The state of a man's mind is as much a fact as 
the state of his digestion. It is true that it is very 
difficult to prove what the state of a man's mind at a 
particular time is, but if it can be ascertained it is 
as much as fact as anything else." Eddington v. 
Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. Div. 459, 483 (1885). 
; 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case 
is remanded with directions to remand to the District Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
I 
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[March -, 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins, I 
concurring in the judgment. 
I concur only in the judgment of the Court. The reasoning I 
of the plurality opinion appears to depart from the consistent 
approach to Title VII cases that our precedents have devel-
oped. As I read the opinion, it perceives a distinction be- I 
tween evidence that establishes a prima facie case under 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973), 
and evidence that establishes an inference of discrimination. 
See ante, at 9-11. If a plaintiff is able to make out a prima 
facie case, he is entitled to a "presumption of discrimination" 
that shifts the burden of production in accordance with the 
analytical framework established in McDonnell Douglas. 
See ante, at 10. If, however, a plaintiff proves only an "in- 1 
ference of discrimination," the plurality apparently would 
find the McDonnell Douglas framework inapplicable. 1 See 
id., at 10. In my view, this distinction finds no support in 
our precedents. Instead, our cases make clear that evidence 
1 The plurality opinion indicates that the evidence in this case may have 
been sufficient to establish both an inference and a presumption of dis-
crimination. See ante, at 9. But the opinion does not explain how or why 
it distinguishes between these two levels of proof. In creating this distinc-
tion, the plurality departs from our precedents and-in my view-inter-
j ects a confusing and unexplained distinction into Title VII law. 
I 
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2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-1044 
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE BOARD OF GOV-
ERNORS, PETITIONER v. LOUIS H. AIKENS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[March - , 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins, I 
concurring in the judgment. 
I concur only in the judgment of the Court. The reasoning I 
of the plurality opinion appears to depart from the consistent 
approach to Title VII cases that our precedents have devel-
oped. As I read the opinion, it perceives a distinction be- 1 
tween evidence that establishes a prima facie case under 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U. S. 792 (1973), 
and evidence that establishes an inference of discrimination. 
See ante, at 9-11. If a plaintiff is able to make out a prima 
facie case, he is entitled to a "presumption of discrimination" 
that shifts the burden of production in accordance with the 
analytical framework established in McDonnell Douglas. 
See ante, at 10. If, however, a plaintiff proves only an "in- 1 
ference of discrimination," the plurality apparently would 
find the McDonnell Douglas framework inapplicable. 1 See 
id., at 10. In my view, this distinction finds no support in 
our precedents. Instead, our cases make clear that evidence 
1 The plurality opinion indicates that the evidence in this case may have 
been sufficient to establish both an inference and a presumption of dis-
crimination. See ante, at 9. But the opinion does not explain how or why 
it distinguishes between these two levels of proof. In creating this distinc-
tion, the plurality departs from our precedents and-in my view-inter-
jects a confusing and unexplained distinction into Title VII law. 
., 
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that gives rise to an inference of discrimination is sufficient to 
establish a prima facie case. They do not indicate, as the 
plurality suggests, that the McDonnell Douglas framework 
may be inapplicable to the type of employment decision pre- I 
sented here. 
I 
In Texas Deparlment of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 
450 U. S. 248 (1981), we reaffirmed unanimously the basic 
allocation of burdens and order of proof initially set forth in 
McDonnell Douglas: 
"First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the pre-
ponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of dis-
crimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving 
the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant 
'to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for the employee's rejection.' [McDonnell Douglas, 411 
U. S.], at 802. Third, should the defendant carry this 
burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legiti-
mate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true 
reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination." 450 
U. S., at 252-253. 
This framework is designed to bring the trier of fact "expe-
ditiously and fairly" to the ultimate question to be proved-
whether the challenged employment decision was in fact dis-
criminatory. See id., at 253. 
The prima facie case, the initial step in this process, re-
quires a Title VII plaintiff to raise an inference of discrimina-
tion by removing the most common nondiscriminatory rea-
sons for his rejection. See id., at 253-254. In many cases, a 
plaintiff may satisfy this initial burden by proving only the 
four factors noted in McDonnell Douglas. See 411 U. S., at 
802. But we have never held that proof of these factors 
automatically establishes a prima facie case. The facts in 
each case will vary, and the prima facie proof specified in 
81-1044-CONCUR 
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McDonnell Douglas is not "necessarily applicable in every 
respect to differing factual situations." Id., at 802, n. 13; see 
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577 
(1978). As we stated in Teamsters v. United States, 431 
u. s. 324 (1977): 
"The importance [of the McDonnell Douglas articulation 
of the prima facie case] lies, not in its specification of the 
discrete elements of proof there required, but in its rec-
ognition of the general principle that any Title VII plain-
tiff must carry the initial burden of offering evidence ad-
equate to create an inference that an employment 
decision was based on a discriminatory criterion illegal 
under the Act." Id., at 358. 
Thus, a court must question whether, in light of the particu-
lar employment decision involved, the plaintiff's proof raises 
an inference of discrimination. 2 When a plaintiff has met 
this initial burden, he "in effect creates a presumption that 
the employer unlawfully discriminated against [him]." Bur-
dine, 450 U. S., at 254. This presumption is primarily an 
evidentiary device for allocating intermediate burdens of 
proof. It shifts the burden of production to the employer to 
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its deci-
sion. 3 See id., at 255 and n. 8. 
2 JUSTICE MARSHALL'S dissenting opinion reasons that "[w]hen an em-
ployer is unable to articulate any legitimate reason for hiring a white appli-
cant over a qualified Negro applicant, it is reasonable to infer that [the] 
decision was based ... on impermissible considerations." Post, at 8. 
This view, for the first time, would shift the burden of production to the 
defendant even though the plaintiff has not met his initial burden. Our 
prior decisions have stressed that the plaintiff initially must establish an 
inference of discrimination. Only then does the burden shift to the em-
ployer to rebut the inference by articulating a legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason for its decision. See Texas Department of Community Af-
fairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 254 (1981); Furnco Construction Corp. v. 
Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577 (1978); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 
324, 358, and n. 44 (1977); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 
792, 802 (1973). 
3 The plurality seeks to justify its distinction between an inference of dis- 1 
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As our cases make clear, we have never created a distinc-
tion between evidence that establishes an inference of dis-
crimination and evidence that gives rise to a presumption of 
discrimination. Rather the two concepts are interrelated. 
Evidence that gives rise to an inference of discrimination is 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case and shift the burden 
of production to the employer. See id., at 254; Furnco, 
supra, at 577; Teamsters, supra, at 358. This analytical 
framework has been applied consistently both by this Court 
and the lower courts. Departing from it could create uncer-
tainty and invite litigation. 
II 
In this case, the District Court found that respondent had 
not established a prima facie case since he had failed to prove 
the second of the four McDonnell Douglas factors. 4 He had 
crimination and a presumption of discrimination by relying on footnote 7 in 
Burdine, supra. See ante, at 11. In my view, the plurality reads too I 
much into this footnote. As we noted in Burdine, the term "prima facie 
case" has been used in two ways. See 450 U. S., at 254, n. 7. It may 
refer either to the level of proof necessary to withstand a motion for a di-
rected verdict or to an evidentiary device that shifts the burden of produc-
tion to the defendant. Footnote 7 stands only for the proposition-a prop-
osition evident from the analytical framework established in McDonnell 
Douglas-that proof of a prima facie case does more than allow a plaintiff to 
withstand a motion for a directed verdict. It shifts the burden of produc-
tion. As we subsequently explained, "'[t]he word "presumption" properly 
used refers only to a device for allocating the production burden."' See 
Burdine, supra, at 255, n. 8. (quoting F. James and G. Hazard, Civil Pro-
cedure § 7.9, p. 255 (2d ed. 1977) (footnote omitted)). 
• In McDonnell Douglas, we stated that a plaintiff may establish a prima 
facie case by showing: 
"(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was quali-
fied for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, de-
spite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, 
the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants 
from persons of complainant's qualifications." 411 U. S., at 802. 
We noted, however, that this model would vary according to the facts and 
., 
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not shown that he was "as qualified or more qualified" than 
the individuals who were promoted. See Aikens v. Bolger, 
Civ. Action No. 77-0303 (DDC Feb. 26, 1979). The Court of 
Appeals reversed because the District Court had set too high 
a standard. See 665 F. 2d 1057, 1060 (CADC 1982) (per 
curiam). Although it recognized that "Title VII cases in-
volving professional and managerial positions raise uniquely 
difficult issues not found in cases involving lower-level jobs," 
it held that a plaintiff could prove the second McDonnell 
Douglas factor by showing that he "possesses whatever 
qualifications or background experiences the employer has 
indicated are important." Ibid. Since the court viewed the 
other three McDonnell Douglas factors as having been estab-
lished, 5 it remanded for further consideration of respondent's 
qualifications in light of its articulation of the applicable 
standard. 
In my view, the proof required by the Court of Appeals is 
insufficient to raise an inference of discrimination where a 
single executive position is to be filled from a pool of qualified 
applicants. When an employer selects an applicant for a 
managerial or professional position, the situation is quite dif-
ferent from the employment decision made in cases such as 
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. Whether an applicant 
possesses minimum objective qualifications is merely the 
threshold inquiry since the applicants who meet the minimum 
requirements normally will present an employer with a wide 
range of qualifications and credentials. A responsible em-
ployer of course will wish to fill the position with the best 
circumstances of each case. See id., at 802, n. 13. 
6 The Court of Appeals initially had found that respondent had proved 
each of the four McDonnell Douglas factors. See Aikens v. United States 
Postal Service, 642 F. 2d 514, 517-518 (CADC 1980), vacated and re-
manded, 453 U. S. 902 (1981). On remand from this Court, the Court of 
Appeals apparently adhered to its earlier determination that the other 
three factors had been proved, as it remanded to the District Court only 
for reconsideration of the second factor. 
; 
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qualified applicant. Yet making a fair ·and intelligent judg-
ment may require a weighing of qualities not always appar-
ent from information of record. For example, consideration 
normally would be given to an applicant's leadership qualities 
and ability to work well with others. Depending upon the 
level and authority of the position, the capacity of the appli-
cant to make sound decisions could be critical. 
Additionally, when there are several qualified applicants 
who can be viewed as satisfying all of the foregoing factors, 
the employer necessarily must prefer one applicant over oth-
ers. A choice has to be made, and thus an employer's deci-
sion to select a qualified non-minority person from a pool of 
applicants does not necessarily imply that the choice was dis-
criminatory. See Teamsters, supra, at 358 n. 44. In this 
respect, this case differs significantly from McDonnell Doug-
las, where the employer rejected a qualified minority appli-
cant but left the position unfilled and continued to seek other 
applicants. See 411 U. S., at 802. Because the employer's 
decision was facially inconsistent with its own economic self 
interest, the plaintiff in that case "was rejected under cir-
cumstances which [gave] rise to an inference of unlawful dis-
crimination." Burdine, supra, at 253. No similar inference 
can be drawn in this case where the job was not left open. 
The employment decision at issue here illustrates what our 
cases consistently have recognized: the proof necessary to es-
tablish a prima facie case will vary from the model set forth in 
McDonnell Douglas depending on the particular facts and 
circumstances of each case. See Burdine, supra, at 253, n. 
6; McDonnell Douglas, supra, at 802, n. 13. This does not 
mean, however, as the Court seems to believe, that the 
McDonnell Douglas factors are no longer relevant in deter-
mining whether a plaintiff has raised an inference of dis-
crimination. They continue to provide a rough guide to the 
type of evidence that a plaintiff must introduce. 
Thus, if a plaintiff's "absolute or relative lack of qualifica-
tions" prevents him from being seriously considered for a po-
81-1044-CONCUR 
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sition, see Teamsters, supra, at 358, n. 44, there would be 
little reason to infer that the employer rejected him for dis-
criminatory reasons. As noted above, to be seriously consid-
ered for a managerial or professional position, a plaintiff at 
least must possess objective qualifications that are fairly 
comparable to those of the other applicants. Proof of these 
qualifications normally will be a predicate to establishing a 
prima facie case. We have emphasized, however, that 
establishing such a case requires a plaintiff to demonstrate 
that he "was rejected under circumstances which give rise to 
an inference of unlawful discrimination." See Burdine, 
supra, at 253. This often will require a plaintiff to introduce 
additional evidence. 6 If, for example, the position remains 
unfilled, as in McDonnell Douglas, this could be viewed as a 
departure from conduct ordinarily expected of an employer, 
giving rise to such an inference. 
III 
The McDonnell Douglas factors provide a guide to deter-
mining whether a plaintiff has proved a prima facie case; they 
were never intended to establish an inflexible rule. Each 
case must be assessed in light of its own particular facts to 
determine if a plaintiff has introduced evidence that raises an 
inference of discrimination. In this case, respondent pro-
duced abundant evidence to show objectively that he was at 
least as qualified as the individuals who were given the posi-
tions. He also proved that the Postal Service had passed 
over him repeatedly and chosen white applicants who had 
held positions subordinate to his own-an apparent depar-
6 As indicated above, an employer-in filling a managerial or profes-
sional position-often will have legitimate, subjective business reasons for 
preferring one applicant over another. See supra, at ~- Where these 
reasons are known only to the employer, as frequently will be the case, 
they must be brought out by the employer after the plaintiff has estab-
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ture from the normal course of business. In addition, re-
spondent introduced anecdotal and statfstical evidence of ra-
cial discrimination. It appears to be clear that an inference 
of discrimination arises from this evidence, establishing a 
prima facie case. But resolution of this factual question is 
more appropriately left to the courts below. Accordingly, I 
agree that the Court of Appeals' judgment should be vacated 
and the case remanded for further consideration. 
~u:punu (!Jltu.d llf t4.t 'Jttuittb ~bd.tll 
~aglfhtghttt. ~. <!J. 2llpJt.~ 
CHAMBERS OP 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
March 2, 1983 
Re: 81-1044 - U.S. Postal Svs. v. Aikens 
Dear Lewis, Bill, & Sandra: 
The more I have studied what has been written in 
this case the more firmly I have become convinced that 
an opinion to which we could all subscribe should be 
draftable. I have therefore thought it worthwhile to 
try to redraft the portions of Bill's opinion that 
Lewis finds most difficult to accept but yet to retain 
the central analysis with which I agree. I am 
enclosing the results of that attempt to see if you 
think there is any possibility that it might at least 
provide the basis for a draft that we could all accept. 
(Lewis and Sandra wTil both ' recognize a good deal of 
plagiarism in the paragraphs that are new). 
The reasons why we should make every effort to 
obtain a Court opinion in this case are too obvious to 
restate. I would only add that if I have been 
unfaithful either to Bill's analysis or to Lewis' 







.. drk 03/02/83 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
.From: Rives 
Re: No. 81-1044, United States Postal Service v. Aikens 
Justice Stevens' draft in Aikens is an improvement over 
Justice Rehnquist's draft. Yet, it is not without its problems. 
Under his draft, a plaintiff has three alternatives ~ e may prove a 
"standardized prima facie" case. This case would be applicable in 
employment situations similar to those in McDonnell Douglas and 
would be established on pr~ of the four factors specified in 
McDonnell Douglas. Secon~ may prove a "nonstandardized prima 
facie case." This case is applicable when the employment situation 
or the factual situation departs from that in McDonnell Douglas. A 
plaintiff may establish a nonstandardized case by adducing evidence 
along the lines of yours and Justice O'Connor's concurring opinions 
/ 
; 
in Aikens. See pp. 11-13 & n. 7. Justice Stevens states that a 
plaintiff must "presen[t] a sufficiently strong case--evidence that 
shows that it was more likely than not that the employer 
discriminated against him." p. 12. If a plaintiff establishes 
either a standardized or a nonstandardized prima facie case, ~ s 
entitled to a legally mandatory rebuttable presumption. Third, if a 
plaintiff fails to prove either a standardized or a nonstandardized 
case: 
( 
·. "then the court has room for the exercise of discretion. 
The court may choose to let the trial go forward with the 
presentation of the defendant's evidence, for Rule 4l(b) 
clearly states that the court "may decline to render any 
judgment until the close of all the evidence." Or it may 
decide the case on the merits and render judgment against 
the plaintiff, if it determines as a matter of law that 
the evidence produced by the plaintiff, even if 
unrebutted, is insufficient to show discrimination by a 
preponderance of the evidence." p. 14. 
2. 
Justice Stevens would retain the three-step analytical framework set 
forth in McDonnell Douglas as a "mental road map" for evaluating all 
of the evidence in a case. Its function is to "tel[l] the trier of 
fact first to look at the plaintiff's case and assess its strength, 
then to examine the defendant's justifications and decide whether 
they are genuine or pretextual." p. 15 
My difficulty with Justice Stevens' draft is that it 
retains, without saying it, the inference/presumption distinction ------
that was present in Justice Rehnquist's drafts. Justice Stevens' 
draft recognizes that there will be strong inferences of 
discrimination that will be sufficient to establish a 
nonstandardized prima facie case. It also recognizes that the 
plaintiff's evidence, as a matter of law, may not be sufficient t~ ; 
show discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. This leaves 
a middle category where the trial court, in its discretion, may 
allow the case to go ahead. This middle category seems to be what 
Justice Rehnquist had termed an "inference of discrimination" and 
what Justice Stevens had termed in his letter to you a "weak 
inference of discrimination." 
There are several problems with introducing this "middle 
category" into Title VII analysis. Since proof of the middle 
category does not shift the burden of production, it renders any 
? 
3. 
procedural effect of the McDonnell Douglas framework relatively 
meaningless. The allocation of burdens and order of proof in 
McDonnell Douglas no longer provide a procedural mechanism for 
focusing the substantive inquiry as to whether the challenged 
employment decision was in fact discriminatory. As restated in 
Justice Stevens' draft, the McDonnell Douglas framework provides 
only a "mental roadmap." Indeed, if a plaintiff has introduced only 
encough evidence to satisfy this middle category, it does not make 
any sense to speak of shifting the burden of production to the 
employer. 
Curiously enough, the opinion appears almost to create a 
two stage analysis in which the burden of persuasion is shifted to 
the employer. Justice Stevens characterizes the trial court's task 
as assessing the strength of the plaintiff's case and assessing the 
credibility of the employer's case. His opinion then states, "[i)f 
the [employer's justifications] are pretextual, the plaintiff 
prevails, because in essence the plaintiff's evidence tending to 
show discrimination has not been effectively rebutted." p. 15. 
This formulation implies that the employer bears the burden of 
proving that its reasons were not pretextual. Thus, even when the 
plaintiff has not introduced enough evidence to establish a 
nonstandardized prima facie case, the employer may find itself 
saddled with a greater burden than if the plaintiff had adduced 
evidence giving rise to a stronger inference of discrimination. 
The problem with the opinion does not lie just in matters 
of phrasing. Instead, it seems that the introduction of a middle 
category, in which the plaintiff does not make out a prima facie 
( 
4. 
case but still survives a 4l(b} moition, renders the whole McDonnell ~-----------------..... _____ , 
Douglas scheme superfluous. As discussed in my earlier memo, to the 
,----- ----- --
extent that will be easier for DC's to rely on this lesser standard 
of proof, there is a substantial possiblity that the McDonnell 
Douglas framework will not be used. Further, the opinion does not 
explain why this middle category is necessary or how it advances the 
analysis. While the opinion is done with a deft touch, I am not 
sure that it is consistent with the analysis that was established in 
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. 
drk 03/03/83 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Rives 
Re: No. 81-1044, United States Postal Service v. Aikens 
I have attached a marked up copy of Justice Stevens' draft 
in Aikens. There are two problems that I sought to remedy, both of 
which are related. The opinion, as written by Justice Stevens, 
holds that even if a plaintiff does not establish a "standardized 
prima facie case," he may seek to establish a "nonstandardized prima 
facie case." My primary difficulty with Justice Stevens' 
articulation of the nonstandardized prima facie case is that it sets 
too high a threshold for the nonstandardizea prima facie case. 
Justice Stevens would find that a plaintiff has 
established a prima facie case only when he "shows that it was more 
likely than not that the employer discriminated against him." p. ! 
~ 
12. This means, I believe, that a plaintiff may establish a prima 
facie case under Justice Stevens' view only when he has proved 
discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence--i.e., shown that 
it was more likely than not that the employer discriminated against 
him. As I understand the analysis in Burdine, this sets too high a 
standard for proof of the prima facie case. Under Burdine, a prima 
facie case will be proved when a plaintiff has established an 
inference of discrimination. Evidence that establishes an inference 
2. 
of discrimination allows a trier of fact to presume that the 
plaintiff has proved the presumed fact--discriminatory motive--by a 
preponderance of the evidence, unless the employer rebuts this 
presumption by meeting his burden of production. Thus, if the 
employer fails to articulate a legitimate business reason for his 
actions, the plaintiff is entitled to prevail. If the employer does 
meet his burden the presumption drops from the case. As you explain 
in footnote 10 of Burdine, this does not destroy the probative value 
of the evidence adduced at the prima facie stage. It simply means 
that we no longer will presume that it is more likely than not that 
the employer acted for discriminatory reasons. The plaintiff then 
has an opportunity to prove that the employer's reasons were 
pretextual. 
Justice Stevens' higher standard is derived from Furnco. 
seep. 10 (quoting Furnco, 438 U.S., at 577). But I do not believe 
that Furnco mandates this level of proof as a prerequisite to 
establishing a prima facie case. The full quotation from which 
Justice Stevens' standard is drawn provides: 
"A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an 
inference of discrimination only because we presume these 
acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not 
based on the consideration of impermissible factors." 
; 
As I read Furnco, proof of a prima facie case allows a trier to fact 
to presume that the it was more likely than not--i.e., to presume 
that the plaintiff has proved by a preponderance of the evidence--
that the employer's action was based on impermissible factors. 
Thus, Furnco states the effect of proving a prima facie case, not 
the evidence necessary to establish one. I do not believe that 
Furnco or Burdine requires that a plaintiff prove discrimination by 
3. 
a preponderance of the evidence in order to establish a prima facie 
case. 
Because Justice Stevens may have read too much into 
Furnco, he ends up setting a very high standard for a plaintiff to 
establish a nonstandardized prima facie case. This results in two 
problems. First, few plaintiffs will ever make out a prima facie 
case, standardized or nonstandardized. The standardized prima facie 
case will be applicable only when a plaintiff falls within the fact 
situation of McDonnell Douglas and the nonstandardized prima facie 
case will be applicable only when a plaintiff can establish 
discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. 
This leads to a second problem. Because both these 
standards are relatively unavailable, there is a need for a lower 
level of proof. This level of proof exists whenever a plaintiff can 
survive a motion for a directed verdict but cannot establish 
discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Although Justice 
Stevens leaves this middle category nameless throughout much of the 
opinion, he finally terms it a "permissible inference" on page 17. 
The result of Justice Stevens' opinion, as Justice Rehnquist's ~ 
; 
before him, is to establish a presumption/inference distinction that 
is unwarranted by the prior opinions. The creation of the 
permissible inference distinction results, I believe, from his 
misreading of Furnco and his setting the standard for a prima facie 
case too high. 
All this is a long explanation of the changes I made. 
First, I tinkered with the statement of the "more likely than not" 
test to bring it into accord with what I believe is the letter and 
4 . 
spirit of Furnco. Second, once the level of proof for the 
nonstandardized prima facie case was lowered, there was no need to 
retain the category of "permissible inferences." Since the category 
of permissible inferences emerges clearly only at the last of the 
opinion in a couple of references, I excised those paragraphs. 
I am not completely satisfied with the opinion as marked. 
I believe the "more likely than not" language in Furnco confuses the 
issue by stating the effect of the presumption, rather than what is 
necessary to establish it. I think your explanation is clearer, 
fairer to both plaintiffs and defendants, and more consistent with 
precedent. Perhaps I am too close to the opinion to take a balanced 
view, but I think Justice Stevens' opinion would limit substantially 
the application of the McDonnell Douglas framework. 
; 
.inprtmt <lf 4tltrt qf tlf t ~tb ~tatt.e 
-aslpng ~. <!}. 2llffe.l!-' 
First let me say that I am most appreciative of your 
willingness to act as a "mediator" between Lewis and me in 
this case. I think Lewis and I had concluded after earlier 
exchanges that we were like "east is east, and west is west, 
and never the twain shall meet." 
Respecting the revisions in my circulating draft which 
are contained in the substitute which you enclose with your 
letter of March 2nd, I can give you a general response. The 
changes appearing on pages 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, and most of 11 
are satisfactory to me, and I think in many instances 
represent improvements on my most recent circulating draft. 
Subject to the approval of the Chief and Byron, I would 
accept them. 
With respect to some of the changes on page 11, and the 
changes on pages 12, 13, 14, 15, and parts of 16 and 17, I 
don't doubt that they represent as good an attempt as can be 
made to "harmonize" the approach I have taken and the ' 
approach Lewis has taken. But I fear that the result of 
accepting them would be to produce internal inconsistencies 
in the opinion as a whole that would prove more confusing to 
lower courts than if my present circulation came down as a 
plurality opinion. Regrettable as that would be, it would 
get it off of all our minds for a while, and give us a 
chance to take another look at the question when it comes 
back, as it inevitably will if this case is decided in that 
manner. 
At this late date, it occurs to me that it might have 
been possible to write the opinion more narrowly than is 
required to respond to the issues framed by the parties, and 
simply point out the undesirability of dealing with 
arguments about inferences and presumptions when the 
- 2 -
District Court had conducted a full bench trial and made 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. I fear, however, 
that I may lack the necessary energy and dedication to go 
back to the drawing boards at this stage of the case. 
Justice Stevens 





C HAMBERS OF 
.ju.prtnu C!Jcu.rt ltf tqt ~th .jta!ts 
jl:utJrngLm. ~. C!J. 2llffe,., 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
March 9, 1983 
Re: No. 81-1044 U.S. Postal Service v. Aikens 
Dear Lewis: 
I enclose a copy of the "new" Aikens opinion. You 
will find it at least slimmer, if not better, than before. 
I have tried to pretermit any discussion about whether 
the McDonnell Douglas presumption should have been applied 
in this case, and simply dwelled on the fact that an 
appeals court reviewing a judgment of the trial court 
after a full trial should not get tangled up in questions 
about presumptions. 
If you think you could join this, I am hopeful that 
the Chief, Byron, and John, and perhaps Sandra, might also 
Join. If you don't think it is "joinable," I think it 
better to have the case come down in its present form, 













From: Justice Rehnquist 
Circulated: ________ _ 
Recirculated:-- -----
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED ST s 
No. 81-1044 
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE BOARD 
ERNORS, PETITIONER v. LOUIS H. AI 1 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO TH 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[March -, 1983] 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Co 
Respondent Louis Aikens filed suit under Title VII of t '-..... 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et 
seq., claiming that petitioner, the United States Postal Serv-
ice, discriminated against him on account of his race. 
Aikens, who is black, claimed that the Postal Service had dis-
criminatorily refused to promote him to higher positions in 
the Washington, D. C. Post Office where he had been em-
ployed since 1937. After a bench trial, the District Court en-
tered judgment in favor of the Postal Service, but the Court 
of Appeals reversed. 642 F. 2d 514 (CADC 1980). We va-
cated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded for re-
consideration in light of Texas Department of Community 
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981). 453 U. S. 902 
(1981). 
On remand, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its earlier 
holding that the District Court had erred in requiring Aikens 
to off er direct proof of discriminatory intent. It also held 
that the District Court erred in requiring Aikens to show, as 
part of his prima facie case, that he was "as qualified or more 
qualified" than the people who were promoted. 665 F. 2d 
1057, 1058, 1059 (CADC 1981) (Per Curiam). We granted 
certiorari. 1 -- U. S. -- (1982). 
1We have consistently distinguished disparate treatment cases from 
cases involving facially neutral employment standards that have disparate 
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The Postal Service argues that an employee who has 
shown only that he was black, that he applied for a promotion 
for which he possessed the minimum qualifications, and that 
the employer selected a non-minority applicant has not estab-
lished a "'J)'rima f acie" case of employment discrimination 
under Title VII. Aikens argues that he submitted sufficient 
evidence that the Postal Service discriminated against him to 
warrant a finding of a prima facie case. 2 Because this case 
was fully tried on the merits, it is surprising to find the par-
ties and the Court of Appeals still addressing the question 
whether Aikens made out a prima facie case. We think that 
by framing the issue in these terms, they have unnecessarily 
evaded the ultimate question of discrimination vel non. 3 
By establishing a prima facie case, the plaintiff in a Title 
impact on minority applicants. See, e. g., Texas Deparlment of Commu-
nity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248,252 n. 5 (1981); McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802 n. 14 (1973). 
2 Aikens showed that white persons were consistently promoted and de-
tailed over him and all other black persons between 1966 and 1974. 
Aikens has been rated as "an outstanding supervisor whose management 
abilities are far above average." App. 8. There was no derogatory or 
negative information in his Personnel Folder. He had more supervisory 
seniority and training and development courses than all but one of the 
white persons who were promoted above him. He has a Masters Degree 
and has completed three years of residence towards a Ph.D. Aikens had 
substantially more education than the white employees who were advanced 
ahead of him; of the 12, only two had any education beyond high school and 
none had a college degree. He introduced testimony that the person re-
sponsible for the promotion decisions at issue had made numerous deroga-
tory comments about blacks in general and Aikens in particular. If the 
District Court were to find, on the basis of this evidence, that the Postal 
Service did discriminate against Aikens, we do not believe that this would 
be reversible error. 
• As in any lawsuit, the plaintiff may prove his case by direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence. The trier of fact should consider all the evidence, 
giving it whatever weight and credence it deserves. Thus, we agree with 
the Court of Apeals that the District Court should not have required 
Aikens to submit direct evidence of discriminatory intent. See Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 358 n. 44 
; 
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VII action creates a rebuttable "presumption that the em-
ployer unlawfully discriminated against" him. Texas De-
partment of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 
254 (1981). See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 
U. S. 792 (1973). To rebut this presumption, "the defendant 
must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible 
evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. Burdine, 
supra, at 255. In other words, the defendant must "pro-
duc[e] evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone 
else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son." Id., at 254. 
But when the defendant fails to persuade the district court 
to dismiss the action for lack of a prima f acie case,' and re-
sponds to the plaintiff's proof by offering evidence of the rea-
son for the plaintiff's rejection, the fact finder must then de-
cide whether the rejection was discriminatory within the 
meaning of Title VII. At this stage, the McDonnell-Bur-
dine presumption "drops from the case," id., at 255, n. 10, 
and "the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specific-
ity." Id., at 255. After Aikens presented his evidence to 
the District Court in this case, the Postal Service's witnesses 
testified that he was not promoted because he had turned 
down several lateral transfers that would have broadened his 
Postal Service experience. See Tr. 311-313, 318-320, 325; 
Pet. App. 53a. The District Court was then in a position to 
decide the ultimate factual issue in the case. 
The "factual inquiry'' in a Title VII case is ''whether the de-
fendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff." 
Burdine, supra, at 253. In other words, is "the employer 
(1977) ("[T]he McDonnell Douglas formula does not require direct proof of 
discrimination.") 
•1t appears that at one point in the trial the District Court decided that 
Aikens had made out a primafacie case. When Aikens concluded his case 
in chief, the Postal Service moved to dismiss on the ground that there was 
no prima facie case. Tr. 256. The District Court denied this motion. 
Tr. 259. See Pet. App. 47a. 
81-1044-0PINI0N 
4 U. S. POSTAL SERVICE BD. OF GOVS. v. AIKENS 
... treating 'some people less favorably than others because 
of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."' 
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577 
(1978), quoting Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U. S. 324, 355, n. 15 (1977). The prima facie 
case method established in McDonnell Douglas was "never 
intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather, it is 
merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in 
light of common experience as it bears on the critical question 
of discrimination." Furnco, supra, at 577. Where the de-
fendant has done everything that would be required of him if 
the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie case, 
whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant. The 
district court has before it all the evidence it needs to decide 
whether ''the defendant intentionally discriminated against 
the plaintiff." Burdine, supra, at 253. 
On the state of the record at the close of the evidence, the 
District Court in this case should have proceeded to this spe-
cific question directly, just as district courts decide disputed 
questions of fact in other civil litigation. 5 As we stated in 
Burdine: 
"The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. [H]e 
may succeed in this either directly by persuading the 
court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated 
the employer or indirectly by showing that the employ-
er's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." 
450 U. S., at 256. 
In short, the district court must decide which party's ex-
planation of the employer's motivation it believes. 
All courts have recognized that the question facing triers of 
fact in discrimination cases is both sensitive and difficult. 
5()f course, the plaintiff must have an adequate "oportunity to demon-
strate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employ-
ment decision," but rather a pretext. Burdine, surrra, at 256. There is 
no suggestion in this case that Aikens did not have such an opportunity. 
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The prohibitions against discrimination contained in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 reflect an important national policy. 
There will seldom be "eyewitness" testimony as to the em-
ployer's mental processes. But none of this means that trial 
courts or reviewing courts should treat discrimination 
differently from other ultimate questions of fact. Nor should 
they make their inquiry even more difficult by applying legal 
rules which were devised to govern ''the allocation of burdens 
and order of presentation of proof," id., at 252, in deciding 
this ultimate question. The law often obliges finders of fact 
to inquire into a person's state of mind. As Lord Justice 
Bowen said in treating this problem in an action for misrep-
resentation nearly a century ago: 
"The state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the 
state of his digestion. It is true that it is very difficult 
to prove what the state of a man's mind at a particular 
time is, but if it can be ascertained it is as much as fact as 
anything else." Eddington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. Div. 
459, 483 (1885). 
The District Court erroneously thought that respondent 
was required to submit direct evidence of discriminatory in-
tent, see n. 3, supra, and erroneously focused on the question 
of prima facie case rather than directly on the question of dis-
crimination. Thus we cannot be certain that its findings of 
fact in favor of the Postal Service were not influenced by its 
mistaken view of the law. We accordingly vacate the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals, and remand the case to the 
District Court so that it may decide on the basis of the evi-
dence before it whether the Postal Service discriminated 
against Aikens. 
It is so ordered. 
; 
- ------~-~~------------------~---------~--,-, "', 
March 9, 1983 
81-1044 U.S. Postal Service v. Aikens 
Dear 'Bill: 
l called your Chamhers this afternoon, just after 
you had departed, to say that I will be happy to join your 
"ne,,1" Aikens opinion. 
It may not make the casebooks, and yet I think it 
adequately disposes of this case. I note that you have in-
cluded bits and pieces from several of our opinionq, anrl 
this may help bring about a consensus. 
I appreciatP your undertaking a Solomonic revi-













From: Justice Rehnquist 
Circulated: MAR I 3 1983 
Recirculated: _______ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-1044 
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE BOARD OF GOV-
ERNORS, PETITIONER v. LOUIS H. AIKENS 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[March -, 1983] 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Respondent Louis Aikens filed suit under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et 
seq., claiming that petitioner, the United States Postal Serv-
ice, discriminated against him on account of his race. 
Aikens, who is black, claimed that the Postal Service had dis-
criminatorily refused to promote him to higher positions in 
the Washington, D. C. Post Office where he had been em-
ployed since 1937. After a bench trial, the District Court en-
tered judgment in favor of the Postal Service, but the Court 
of Appeals reversed. 642 F. 2d 514 (CADC 1980). We va-
cated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded for re-
consideration in light of Texas Department of Community 
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981). 453 U. S. 902 
(1981). 
On remand, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its earlier 
holding that the District Court had erred in requiring Aikens 
to off er direct proof of discriminatory intent. It also held 
that the District Court erred in requiring Aikens to show, as 
part of his prima facie case, that he was "as qualified or more 
qualified" than the people who were promoted. 665 F. 2d 
1057, 1058, 1059 (CADC 1981) (Per Curiam). We granted 
certiorari. 1 -- U. S. -- (1982). 
1W e have consistently distinguished disparate treatment cases from 
cases involving facially neutral employment standards that have disparate 
,, 
81-1044-0PINION 
2 U.S. POSTAL SERVICE BD. OF GOVS. v. AIKENS 
The Postal Service argues that an employee who has 
shown only that he was black, that he applied for a promotion 
for which he possessed the minimum qualifications, and that 
the employer selected a non-minority applicant has not estab-
lished a "prima f acie" case of employment discrimination 
under Title VII. Aikens argues that he submitted sufficient 
evidence that the Postal Service discriminated against him to 
warrant a finding of a prima facie case. 2 Because this case 
was fully tried on the merits, it is surprising to find the par-
ties and the Court of Appeals still addressing the question 
whether Aikens made out a prima facie case. We think that 
by framing the issue in these terms, they have unnecessarily 
evaded the ultimate question of discrimination vel non. 3 
By establishing a prima facie case, the plaintiff in a Title 
impact on minority applicants. See, e.g., Texas Department of Commu-
nity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 252 n. 5 (1981); McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802 n. 14 (1973). 
2Aikens showed that white persons were consistently promoted and de-
tailed over him and all other black persons between 1966 and 1974. 
Aikens has been rated as "an outstanding supervisor whose management 
abilities are far above average." App. 8. There was no derogatory or 
negative information in his Personnel Folder. He had more supervisory 
seniority and training and development courses than all but one of the 
white persons who were promoted above him. He has a Masters Degree 
and has completed three years of residence towards a Ph.D. Aikens had 
substantially more education than the white employees who were advanced 
ahead of him; of the 12, only two had any education beyond high school and 
none had a college degree. He introduced testimony that the person re-
sponsible for the promotion decisions at issue had made numerous deroga-
tory comments about blacks in general and Aikens in particular. If the 
District Court were to find, on the basis of this evidence, that the Postal 
Service did discriminate against Aikens, we do not believe that this would 
be reversible error. 
3As in any lawsuit, the plaintiff may prove his case by direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence. The trier of fact should consider all the evidence, 
giving it whatever weight and credence it deserves. Thus, we agree with 
the Court of Apeals that the District Court should not have required 
Aikens to submit direct evidence of discriminatory intent. See Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 358 n. 44 
; 
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VII action creates a rebuttable "presumption that the em-
ployer unlawfully discriminated against" him. Texas De-
partment of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 
254 (1981). See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 
U. S. 792 (1973). To rebut this presumption, "the defendant 
must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible 
evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. Burdine, 
supra, at 255. In other words, the defendant must "pro-
duc[e] evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone 
else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son." Id., at 254. 
But when the defendant fails to persuade the district court 
to dismiss the action for lack of a prima facie case, 4 and re-
sponds to the plaintiff's proof by offering evidence of the rea-
son for the plaintiff's rejection, the fact finder must then de-
cide whether the rejection was discriminatory within the 
meaning of Title VII. At this stage, the McDonnell-Bur-
dine presumption "drops from the case," id., at 255, n. 10, 
and "the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specific-
ity." Id., at 255. After Aikens presented his evidence to 
the District Court in this case, the Postal Service's witnesses 
testified that he was not promoted because he had turned 
down several lateral transfers that would have broadened his 
Postal Service experience. See Tr. 311-313, 318-320, 325; 
Pet. App. 53a. The District Court was then in a position to 
decide the ultimate factual issue in the case. 
The "factual inquiry" in a Title VII case is "whether the de-
fendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff." 
Burdine, supra, at 253. In other words, is "the employer 
(1977) ("[T]he McDonnell Douglas formula does not require direct proof of 
discrimination.") 
'It appears that at one point in the trial the District Court decided that 
Aikens had made out a prima facie case. When Aikens concluded his case 
in chief, the Postal Service moved to dismiss on the ground that there was 
no prima facie case. Tr. 256. The District Court denied this motion. 
Tr. 259. See Pet. App. 47a. 
; 
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... treating 'some people less favorably than others because 
of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."' 
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577 
(1978), quoting Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U. S. 324, 355, n. 15 (1977). The prima facie 
case method established in McDonnell Douglas was "never 
intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather, it is 
merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in 
light of common experience as it bears on the critical question 
of discrimination." Furnco, supra, at 577. Where the de-
fendant has done everything that would be required of him if 
the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie case, 
whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant. The 
district court has before it all the evidence it needs to decide 
whether "the defendant intentionally discriminated against 
the plaintiff." Burdine, supra, at 253. 
On the state of the record at the close of the evidence, the 
District Court in this case should have proceeded to this spe-
cific question directly, just as district courts decide disputed 
questions of fact in other civil litigation. 5 As we stated in 
Burdine: 
"The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. [H]e 
may succeed in this either directly by persuading the 
court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated 
the employer or indirectly by showing that the employ-
er's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." 
450 U. S., at 256. 
In short, the district court must decide which party's ex-
planation of the employer's motivation it believes. 
All courts have recognized that the question facing triers of 
fact in discrimination cases is both sensitive and difficult. 
•of course, the plaintiff must have an adequate "oportunity to demon-
strate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employ-
ment decision," but rather a pretext. Burdine, supra, at 256. There is 
no suggestion in this case that Aikens did not have such an opportunity. 
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The prohibitions against discrimination contained in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 reflect an important national policy. 
There will seldom be "eyewitness" testimony as to the em-
ployer's mental processes. But none of this means that trial 
courts or reviewing courts should treat discrimination 
differently from other ultimate questions of fact. Nor should 
they make their inquiry even more difficult by applying legal 
rules which were devised to govern "the allocation of burdens 
and order of presentation of proof," id., at 252, in deciding 
this ultimate question. The law often obliges finders of fact 
to inquire into a person's state of mind. As Lord Justice 
Bowen said in treating this problem in an action for misrep-
resentation nearly a century ago: 
"The state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the 
state of his digestion. It is true that it is very difficult 
to prove what the state of a man's mind at a particular 
time is, but if it can be ascertained it is as much as fact as 
anything else." Eddington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. Div. 
459, 483 (1885). 
The District Court erroneously thought that respondent 
was required to submit direct evidence of discriminatory in-
tent, see n. 3, supra, and erroneously focused on the question 
of prima f acie case rather than directly on the question of dis-
crimination. Thus we cannot be certain that its findings of 
fact in favor of the Postal Service were not influenced by its 
mistaken view of the law. We accordingly vacate the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals, and remand the case to the 
District Court so that it may decide on the basis of the evi-
dence before it whether the Postal Service discriminated 
against Aikens. 
It is so ordered. 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
March 14, 1983 
Re: U.S. Postal Service v. Aikens 
Dear Chief, Byron, and John: 
When we discussed what cases were "ready" at a recent 
Friday Conference, I mentioned that I was going to try to 
rewrite the circulating draft in this case to get a Court. 
As matters stood then, the Court seemed to be irrevocably 
divided three ways: the three .of you had joined my 
circulating draft, Lewis had written separately and was 
joined by Sandra, and Thurgood had written separately and 
was joined by Bill and Harry. Since the question is one 
of statutory construction, it seems unfortunate to let 
it come down that way, and hence the enclosed and substan-
tially revised draft. 
The revised draft pretermits any attempt to answer the 
question of whether the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine "prima 
facie case" was applicable to the situation here, where 
respondent was passed over for promotion to a single vacancy. 
It instead attempts only the more modest task of discussing 
the usefulness of such "prima facie case" analysis after the 
case has been fully tried and is on appeal. I think what we 
say is still worth saying, and I think it better to say this 
(if it is possible to get a Court for it) than to splinter 
on the more far-reaching issue. 
I have shown the revised draft to Lewis, and he says 
he can join it. I did this because if there were no possibility 
of picking up additional votes, I did not want to go through 
the trouble of recirculating. If I can get a "Court" from 
among the three of you, Lewis, and Sandra, I would prefer 
to go with the "revised" draft. If I cannot get a Court 
for either version, I think it probably best to stick with 
the previous circulation which the three of you have joined. 
The Chief Justice 
Justice White 
Justice Stevens 
c C"':---..,. Justice Powell 
Justice O'Connor 
Sincerely~ 
March 14, 198 '3 
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Please Join me in the revised draft. I think it 
would be most helpful to get a Court opinion if at 
all possible. 
Justice Rehnquist 
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
March 16, 1983 
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Please join me in your latest circulation. 
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Justice Rehnquist 
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your second edition. 
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2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-1044 
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE BOARD OF GOV-
ERNORS, PETITIONER v. LOUIS H. AIKENS 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[March -, 1983] 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Respondent Louis Aikens filed suit under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e 
et seq., claiming that petitioner, the United States Postal 
Service, discriminated against him on account of his race. 
Aikens, who is black, claimed that the Postal Service had dis-
criminatorily refused to promote him to higher positions in 
the Washington, D. C. Post Office where he had been em-
ployed since 1937. After a bench trial, the District Court en-
tered judgment in favor of the Postal Service, but the Court 
of Appeals reversed. 642 F. 2d 514 (CADC 1980). We va-
cated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded for re-
consideration in light of Texas Department of Community 
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981). 453 U. S. 902 
(1981). 
On remand, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its earlier 
holding that the District Court had erred in requiring Aikens 
to offer direct proof of discriminatory intent. It also held 
that the District Court erred in requiring Aikens to show, as 
part of his primafacie case, that he was "as qualified or more 
qualified" than the people who were promoted. 665 F. 2d 
1057, 1058, 1059 (CADC 1981) (Per Curiam). We granted 
certiorari. 1 -- U. S. -- (1982). 
1 We have consistently distinguished disparate treatment cases from 
cases involving facially neutral employment standards that have disparate 
; 
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The Postal Service argues that an employee who has 
shown only that he was black, that he applied for a promotion 
for which he possessed the minimum qualifications, and that 
the employer selected a non-minority applicant has not estab-
lished a "prima facie" case of employment discrimination 
under Title VII. Aikens argues that he submitted sufficient 
evidence that the Postal Service discriminated against him to 
warrant a finding of a prima facie case. 2 Because this case 
was fully tried on the merits, it is surprising to find the par-
ties and the Court of Appeals still addressing the question 
whether Aikens made out a prima facie case. We think that 
by framing the issue in these terms, they have unnecessarily 
evaded the ultimate question of discrimination vel non. 3 
By establishing a prima facie case, the plaintiff in a Title 
impact on minority applicants. See, e.g., Texas Department of Commu-
nity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 252 n. 5 (1981); McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802 n. 14 (1973). 
2 Aikens showed that white persons were consistently promoted and 
detailed over him and all other black persons between 1966 and 1974. 
Aikens has been rated as "an outstanding supervisor whose management 
abilities are far above average." App. 8. There was no derogatory or 
negative information in his Personnel Folder. He had more supervisory 
seniority and training and development courses than all but one of the 
white persons who were promoted above him. He has a Masters Degree 
and has completed three years of residence towards a Ph.D. Aikens had 
substantially more education than the white employees who were advanced 
ahead of him; of the 12, only two had any education beyond high school and 
none had a college degree. He introduced testimony that the person re-
sponsible for the promotion decisions at issue had made numerous deroga-
tory comments about blacks in general and Aikens in particular. If the 
District Court were to find, on the basis of this evidence, that the Postal 
Service did discriminate against Aikens, we do not believe that this would 
be reversible error. 
3 As in any lawsuit, the plaintiff may prove his case by direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence. The trier of fact should consider all the evidence, 
giving it whatever weight and credence it deserves. Thus, we agree with 
the Court of Apeals that the District Court should not have required 
Aikens to submit direct evidence of discriminatory intent. See Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 358 n. 44 
; 
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VII action creates a rebuttable "presumption that the em-
ployer unlawfully discriminated against" him. Texas De-
partment of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 
254 (1981). See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 
U. S. 792 (1973). To rebut this presumption, "the defendant 
must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible 
evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. Burdine, 
supra, at 255. In other words, the defendant must "pro-
duc[e] evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone 
else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son." Id., at 254. 
But when the defendant fails to persuade the district court 
to dismiss the action for lack of a prima facie case,4 and re-
sponds to the plaintiff's proof by offering evidence of the rea-
son for the plaintiff's rejection, the fact finder must then de-
cide whether the rejection was discriminatory within the 
meaning of Title VII. At this stage, the McDonnell-Bur-
dine presumption "drops from the case," id., at 255, n. 10, 
and "the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specific-
ity." Id., at 255. After Aikens presented his evidence to 
the District Court in this case, the Postal Service's witnesses 
testified that he was not promoted because he had turned 
down several lateral transfers that would have broadened his 
Postal Service experience. See Tr. 311-313, 318-320, 325; 
Pet. App. 53a. The District Court was then in a position to 
decide the ultimate factual issue in the case. 
The "factual inquiry" in a Title VII case is "whether the de-
fendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff." 
Burdine, supra, at 253. In other words, is "the employer 
(1977) ("[T]he McDonnell Douglas formula does not require direct proof of 
discrimination"). 
• It appears that at one point in the trial the District Court decided that 
Aikens had made out a prima f acie case. When Aikens concluded his case 
in chief, the Postal Service moved to dismiss on the ground that there was 
no prima facie case. Tr. 256. The District Court denied this motion. 
Tr. 259. See Pet. App. 47a. 
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. . . treating 'some people less favorably than others because 
of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."' 
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577 
(1978), quoting Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U. S. 324, 355, n. 15 (1977). The prima facie 
case method established in McDonnell Douglas was "never 
intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather, it is 
merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in 
light of common experience as it bears on the critical question 
of discrimination." Furnco, supra, at 577. Where the de-
fendant has done everything that would be required of him if 
the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie case, 
whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant. The 
district court has before it all the evidence it needs to decide 
whether "the defendant intentionally discriminated against 
the plaintiff." Burdine, supra, at 253. 
On the state of the record at the close of the evidence, the 
District Court in this case should have proceeded to this spe-
cific question directly, just as district courts decide disputed 
questions of fact in other civil litigation. 5 As we stated in 
Burdine: 
"The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. [H]e 
may succeed in this either directly by persuading the 
court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated 
the employer or indirectly by showing that the employ-
er's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." 
450 U. S., at 256. 
In short, the district court must decide which party's ex-
planation of the employer's motivation it believes. 
All courts have recognized that the question facing triers of 
fact in discrimination cases is both sensitive and difficult. 
5 Of course, the plaintiff must have an adequate "oportunity to demon-
strate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employ-
ment decision," but rather a pretext. Burdine, supra, at 256. There is 
no suggestion in this case that Aikens did not have such an opportunity. 
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The prohibitions against discrimination contained in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 reflect an important national policy. 
There will seldom be "eyewitness" testimony as to the em-
ployer's mental processes. But none of this means that trial 
courts or reviewing courts should treat discrimination 
differently from other ultimate questions of fact. Nor should 
they make their inquiry even more difficult by applying legal 
rules which were devised to govern "the allocation of burdens 
and order of presentation of proof," Burdine, supra, at 252, 
in deciding this ultimate question. The law often obliges 
finders of fact to inquire into a person's state of mind. As 
Lord Justice Bowen said in treating this problem in an action 
for misrepresentation nearly a century ago: 
"The state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the 
state of his digestion. It is true that it is very difficult 
to prove what the state of a man's mind at a particular 
time is, but if it can be ascertained it is as much as fact as 
anything else." Eddington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. Div. 
459, 483 (1885). 
The District Court erroneously thought that respondent 
was required to submit direct evidence of discriminatory in-
tent, see n. 3, supra, and erroneously focused on the question 
of prima facie case rather than directly on the question of dis-
crimination. Thus we cannot be certain that its findings of 
fact in favor of the Postal Service were not influenced by its 
mistaken view of the law. We accordingly vacate the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals, and remand the case to the 
District Court so that it may decide on the basis of the evi-
dence before it whether the Postal Service discriminated 
against Aikens. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE MARSHALL concurs in the judgment. l 
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JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN March 29, 1983 
Re: No. 81-1044 - u. s. Postal Service v. Aikens 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your circulation of today. 
Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
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